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ABSTRACT 
RETURN TO UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RE-ENERGIZING U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS 
POLICY 
William T. Eliason 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp 
Today's international environment characterized in nuclear threat terms as having 
increasing concerns about the potential for terrorist or non-state use of nuclear devices 
and a decline in the likelihood of the original nuclear weapon states engaging each other 
in a nuclear war remains in search of a path away from the fear of nuclear attack some 
twenty years after the end of the Cold War. This research dissertation will seek to answer 
the question of how best to reestablish a nuclear arms control regime. This dissertation 
argues that the international environment has fundamentally changed since the end of the 
Cold War requiring a shift in emphasis on multilateral efforts to solve issues like nuclear 
proliferation with the United States as the leader of such work. Specifically, this research 
will test the hypothesis that the United States must reassert a position of leadership 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperation to develop appropriate nuclear arms 
policies that effectively reestablish worldwide controls, continue reduction of nuclear 
arms toward the Non Proliferation Treaty goal of nuclear disarmament. By reviewing the 
U.S. relationship to three specific nuclear arms control agreements, this research explores 
how U.S. leadership in these efforts impacts the risk of further nuclear proliferation and 
the potential for nuclear attacks by both states and non-state actors. Once the relationship 
of the United States to the nuclear arms control regime is characterized, a suggested 
policy framework will be provided as a means to analyze the strength of the dissertation 
hypothesis. 
This dissertation concludes that U.S. leadership is essential to the reinforcement 
of the NPT, conclusion of additional bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements 
and fostering a persistent and supporting multilateral relationship with all states to 
achieve the goals of the NPT, halting nuclear proliferation, eventually achieving total 
disarmament. While the United States has begun to refocus international efforts to 
address nuclear issues, an expanded set of policy recommendations is discussed as well 
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The United States as the first nuclear weapons state has a special obligation and 
responsibility to lead the community of nations to eventually fulfill the goals of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). From the near nuclear exchange of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis to the present renewal of strategic arms control negotiations, the United 
States has been at the center of all nuclear arms issues. When this history is reviewed, a 
clear record of the impacts, both positive and negative, of U.S. leadership on the outcome 
of these issues from decisions to participate in strategic arms races to negotiations to 
reduce the nuclear inventories of the Cold War. Today's international environment 
characterized in nuclear threat terms as having increasing concerns about the potential for 
terrorist or non-state use of nuclear devices and a decline in the likelihood of the original 
nuclear weapon states engaging each other in a nuclear war remains in search of a path 
away from the fear of nuclear attack some twenty years after the end of the Cold War. 
This dissertation finds that the United States must reassert a position of leadership 
through multilateral cooperation to develop appropriate nuclear arms policies that 
effectively reestablish worldwide controls, continue reduction of nuclear arms toward the 
NPT goal of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear arms policy of the United States is central 
to determining how successfully the original nuclear weapons state will fulfill its stated 
goal of a nuclear weapon free world. Arms control has been the most direct path the 
This dissertation follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition, The 
University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
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United States has attempted to control nuclear arms races and sought to achieve the goals 
oftheNPT. 
The record of success in this effort has been uneven but as this research will show 
that the cumulative experiences of these efforts can be useful in developing an 
appropriate nuclear arms policy for the future that achieves the goals of the NPT. This 
leadership position on nuclear disarmament will require an appropriate balancing of 
multilateral efforts in those existing institutions such as the NPT Conference and the UN 
while finding appropriate power based options for nuclear states and those who seek to 
become nuclear states. Without direct and consistent engagement of the United States in 
bilateral and multilateral efforts to control nuclear materials and weapons, the goals of the 
NPT will remain distant and the international community less safe from nuclear attack 
than during the Cold War. 
Arms control has long been an essential component of international diplomacy. 
The 20th Century, in particular, since the opening of the atomic era, has witnessed 
numerous arms control efforts in the form of treaty negotiations. While nuclear arsenals 
of the Cold War have been substantially reduced since 1990, their levels among the 
declared nuclear states remain at levels far in excess of any defensible amount with those 
of the United States and the Russian Federation constituting the vast majority of both 
strategic delivery systems and warheads. Currently, the United States and the Russian 
Federation possess an estimated 10,000 and 17,000 plus nuclear warheads respectively. 
The United States has 3,696 warheads operationally deployed while the Russian 
Federation has over 7,200 deployed warheads.1 When compared to the remaining 
1
 Arms Control Association (Washington D.C.), "Fact Sheet: United States Profile," Arms Control 
Association website, 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/unitedstatesprofile, (accessed March 22, 
3 
declared and undeclared nuclear states that possess an estimated combined total of less 
than 1,000 warheads of all types, one can easily see the need for cooperation and 
leadership to complete the unfinished efforts begun in the Cold War to achieve nuclear 
arms reduction. While the ultimate goal for some is a complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons, this research will focus on the policies needed to achieve progress in the near 
term which could potentially set the stage for great strides toward that goal. 
The remaining nuclear arms control regime today is a result of several bilateral 
agreements which range from ratified treaties to outlines of yet to be completed 
negotiations between the United States and the now former U.S.S.R. now known as the 
Russian Federation. From the first agreed treaty in 1963, the "Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water" or the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the now revived discussion of completing the 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, more than a half century of effort has shown the 
complexity, difficulty and at times success that can be achieved. Typically, these 
agreements have been negotiated among the five original nuclear weapon states (United 
States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, the Peoples Republic of 
China. The majority of these agreements have been between the United States and 
Russia, the owners of the majority of nuclear weapons in the world. In recent years, even 
as the proliferation of nuclear capabilities has increased, progress on this path has been 
slow and in the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in reverse. 
The nuclear regime, or the rules of the nuclear game, took over forty years to 
build and a series of external events to this "game" resulted in a virtual abandonment 
2009). Summary information from various web pages of The Arms Control Association website. These 
figures include estimates of Russian tactical nuclear weapons which the Russian Federation has yet to fully 
inventory. 
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until the past year of any formal process to reach a permanent arrangement on controls of 
the two largest nuclear arsenals. At the same time, a lack of attention to formal 
negotiations and maintenance collectively of the nuclear regime has had the negative 
collateral impact of directly or indirectly encouraging several states to develop or expand 
nuclear capabilities. Since the departure of the Soviet Union as a partner in the effort to 
reduce the level of nuclear weapons, the relationship between the United States and 
Russia has not been sufficiently robust to insure a formal continuation of the decades 
long effort to reduce their weapons. The emergence of the United States as the "sole 
superpower" in the post-Cold War era combined with United States exercising 
conventional military power has had a number of side effects including pushing a number 
of less capable states to select pursuit of nuclear capabilities as a counterbalancing 
strategy. 
The current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the election of President 
Obama allow for a unique moment since the end of the Cold War to reassess and 
reenergize U.S. nuclear arms policy especially in relationship to the Russian Federation. 
This dissertation will show that the ability to control nuclear proliferation lies in first 
understanding the global impact of the last twenty years of U.S. nuclear arms policy. 
Current international relations theory can provide useful means to explain this impact and 
allow a basis for formulation of more effective policy leading to the reestablishment of an 
effective nuclear arms control regime. The desired result of this policy agenda is an 
effective nuclear arms control regime that provides security and a reduction of the risk of 
a nuclear incident within the international community. This research is aimed at 
determining of the impact of consistent leadership by the United States in nuclear arms 
control and the achievement of the goals of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
specifically nuclear non-proliferation and eventual disarmament. 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The nuclear arms control regime of the Cold War period was essentially left to 
atrophy after the fall of the Soviet Union due in great part to a lack of U.S. policy 
leadership. This research dissertation will seek to answer the question of how best to 
reestablish a nuclear arms control regime that leads to achievement of the NPT goals. 
Specifically, this research will test the hypothesis that the United States must reassert a 
position of leadership through multilateral cooperation to develop appropriate nuclear 
arms policies that effectively reestablish worldwide controls, continue reduction of 
nuclear arms toward the NPT goal of nuclear disarmament. By reviewing the U.S. 
relationship to three specific nuclear arms control agreements, this research can explore 
the question of whether or not a lack of U.S. leadership in these efforts impacts the risk of 
further nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear attacks by both states and non-
state actors. As the relationship of the United States to the nuclear arms control regime is 
characterized, a suggested policy framework will be provided as a means to analyze the 
strength of the dissertation hypothesis. This framework will be based on the experiences 
from the Cold War through the current environment. As recent events have indicated, the 
United States is working to address the unworkable policy choices of the last twenty 
years while emphasizing the mutual benefits to all nations of first reestablishing a nuclear 
arms control regime followed by an orderly accounting and appropriate reduction of 
nuclear arms and their associated components. Whether this return to the unfinished 
business of the nuclear issue will be sustained remains an open question. This research 
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attempts to describe the benefits, challenges and risks associated with the remaining 
legacy of the Cold War nuclear arms race. 
As scholars and policy leaders saw the end of superpower confrontation abruptly 
arrive, the global desire was to focus on the "peace dividend" prior to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. The international studies community struggled to define the new 
environment that replaced the long revered bipolar explanation of the international 
system. Reinforced by the U.S. dominance of Iraq through demonstrated conventional 
power in freeing Kuwait in 1991 and the rapid implosion of the former Soviet power, 
those who had supported the intellectual community engaged in nuclear arms control 
turned their focus and economic support to other areas of international affairs. While a 
focus within the international relations academic community focused on the neorealist 
issue of polarity, whether the loss of a bipolar situation meant the creation of a unipolar 
situation and if so for how long a period of time, the longstanding centrality of nuclear 
arms to the core power of states seemed to fade from view. With perceived the loss of a 
"balance of terror", states, policymakers and theorists shifted their focus on a wide range 
of other pressing issues. As a result the international relations literature from 1990 to the 
present became a much broader and diverse set of concepts and ideas, virtually all of 
which set nuclear issues to the periphery, an unfinished business that seemed to have 
been swept into the closet for later disposal. 
While the primary focus on the bipolar security relationship that nuclear weapons 
supported has now shifted, there is a discernable set of literature on how an effective 
nuclear arms control regime could be achieved. Today's environment requires such a 
regime that accounts for the concerns of all states and at the same time effectively 
7 
addresses criminal activity that allows non-state actors to acquire nuclear capabilities 
once the sole purview of a limited number of governments. When the current 
international environment is measured against international relations theory, any review 
of the post Cold War period of international relations research shows advancement 
beyond the traditional power based approaches of the realist tradition (Morgenthau, 
Waltz, and Mearsheimer). While the growth of normative literature has yet to overcome 
the more dominant power based theories of the field, significant ground has been opened 
to expose a strong set of alternatives focused on institutions, norms, rules and absolute 
gains. In the area of arms control and disarmament, the limits of traditional realist based 
theories may have reached their explanatory limits within the current environment. The 
purpose of this research is to begin to identify those theoretical concepts that are most 
useful to explain how to reestablish a nuclear arms control regime and suggest a practical 
U.S. nuclear arms control policy agenda for achievement of the NPT goals of non-
proliferation and disarmament. 
REGIME THEORY, INSTITUTIONS AND ARMS CONTROL 
International relations as a field of study has long sought to describe how political 
phenomenon operate in the world while offering insights on how states can seek long 
term solutions to conflict. Arms control has been a constant source of case studies for 
those in the international relations field especially those who are interested in resolving 
conflict. From the dawn of armed combat, belligerents have sought advantage over their 
foes that would substantially increase their ability to achieve victory on the battlefield 
which would lead to the desired political state once the smoke of battle clears. For the 
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purposes of this paper, the writings of modern international relations theorists including 
Waltz, Jervis, Keohane, Mearsheimer, Ruggie, Gilpin, Krasner, Nye and others provide a 
theoretical foundation to review specific instances of arms control efforts in the atomic 
era. Other scholars offer additional insights on the potential methods that can be 
employed to turn conflict into cooperation with an eye on reducing the likelihood of 
future nuclear war. Given the nature of nuclear weapons and the decreasing strength of 
the memory of the direct witnesses to the use of these weapons at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, a growing requirement to renew international efforts toward achieving 
effective non-proliferation and reduction of the available weapons is evident. The signal 
that the new U.S. Administration of President Barak Obama has renewed efforts to 
discuss strategic nuclear arms control with Russia is a welcome if cautious renewal of the 
work needed to complete the work begun during the Cold War. The ability to assist 
policy makers and negotiators from all nuclear states both acknowledged and undeclared 
with understandable and useful theory of how to achieve a lasting set of binding and 
effective international nuclear arms agreements is an obvious goal of international 
relations theorists and practitioners. 
In his seminal work, After Hegemony, Robert Keohane sought to delineate a 
functional theory of international regimes. Drawing extensively from economics, he was 
interested in providing a path out of the realist forest of constant state on state conflict. In 
particular, he looked to explain the conditions under which independent countries could 
cooperate in the world political economy especially those instances where the 
cooperating states were not under the direct influence of a hegemon. Starting from an 
2
 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
1st Princeton classic ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 8-9. 
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understanding of "Realist insights about the role of power and the effects of hegemony," 
drawing "on the Institutionalist Tradition," Keohane argued "that cooperation can under 
some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions, 
broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge."3 He further argued that 
policymakers view cooperation "less as an end in itself than a means to a variety of other 
objectives."4 Arms control can be viewed as an act of cooperation, a means to a number 
of objectives. What is most useful from Keohane's work for the purposes of this paper 
are his definitions of cooperation and international regimes as well as his functional 
theory now over a quarter century since he proposed it. 
Keohane defines cooperation first by contrasting it to harmony, an economic 
condition where cooperation is unnecessary as all participants as they pursue their 
individual self-interests must in turn contribute to the collective interests of all 
participants in the market. At the political "marketplace," cooperation between 
governments "takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are 
regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of 
a process of policy coordination. "5 Keohane cites the development of the definition of 
international regimes beginning with Ruggie (1975) and refined by the international 
relations academic community a few years later. Specifically, regimes are 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. 
3
 Ibid., 9. 
4
 Ibid., 10. 
5
 Ibid., 51. 
6
 Ibid., 57. See John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," 
International Organization 29, no. 03 (2009): 557-84. 
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Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice.7 
These definitions provide a basic platform to discuss international cooperation and 
regime theory as well as review the role of international institutions in achieving and 
sustaining nuclear arms control regimes. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is a qualitative analysis of U.S. nuclear arms policy formation, 
implementation and resultant impacts on the international nuclear arms control regime. 
The policies and related nuclear force structures that existed before the end of the Cold 
War have changed in the two decades since the first President Bush took power. Yet as 
the older bipolar relationship passed from view, significant changes in U.S. nuclear arms 
policies were not fully aligned with the international environment that emerged after the 
Cold War. The analysis contained in this dissertation seeks to review three specific 
nuclear arms control treaties, the impact of U.S. participation on their development, 
implementation and sustainment while examining the relationship between these treaties 
and regime theories. Specifically, three nuclear arms control agreements will be reviewed 
to determine the impact of the United States in the implementation and sustainment of the 
international nuclear arms control regime. 
This dissertation examines the hypothesis that the United States is essential to the 
sustainment of an international nuclear arms control regime. Without the development of 
a set of U.S. national policies to support the reestablishment and sustainment an 
7
 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 57. 
Author citing Stephen D. Krasner, editor. International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
2. 
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international nuclear non-proliferation regime, U.S. attempts at leadership in the nuclear 
issue area will not likely be effective and are likely to result in a continuation of the 
weakened nuclear non-proliferation regime. Without significant renewed efforts to do so, 
the United States and its allies will likely be faced with increasingly complex and 
persistent challenges to the nuclear "rules of the road." From a social science perspective, 
this study examines the interaction international nuclear treaties as a dependent variable 
and U.S. leadership in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation as an independent 
variable. Specifically, this study is based on the idea that the degree to which the United 
States forms and implements effective policies that lead to participation in nuclear arms 
control will result in a direct, positive enhancement of international security from the 
threat of renewed proliferation and potential use of nuclear weapons. Said another way, 
states will more likely adhere to a nuclear arms control regime, rejecting the pursuit of 
nuclear arms as the United States increases its participation in nuclear arms control and 
disarmament. 
Using three specific case studies, this dissertation will discuss both the formation 
of specific nuclear arms control treaties and the policy positions taken by the United 
States relative to these agreements. Assuming nuclear arms control is primarily the 
responsibility of nation states and that doing so is in the security interest of all nation 
states, then a nuclear arms control regime would be made up of "principles, norms and 
decision-making procedures reflecting the interests of the most powerful states in the 
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 10-11. In this passage, the author defines and explains the use of dependent and 
independent variables borrowed from mathematics in social science terms. 
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system."9 Any policy that detracts from the maintenance of such a regime can be seen as 
counter to the interests of the most powerful state. Given that the United States, during 
the immediate post Cold War period, can be defined as a powerful, if not the most 
powerful, state in the international system, then this relationship between theory and 
policy making can be tested. The importance of this research is to provide a theoretically 
based approach to the development of policy options that lead to the reestablishment of 
an effective and sustainable international nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of six chapters which include an introductory chapter, 
an argument chapter, three case study chapters and a concluding chapter. This 
introductory chapter discusses the outline of the dissertation, presents the thesis statement 
and provides appropriate but brief historical background discussion on the important 
features of Cold War nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime. The argument 
chapter includes a discussion of the theoretical foundations that explain how regimes, 
institutions and state leadership can enable achievement of the goal of nuclear 
disarmament. The argument also suggests a hybrid explanation for states to cooperate 
toward achievement of the goals of the Non Proliferation Treaty. 
The case study chapters will focus on the development of nuclear arms control 
9
 Theory Talks.com, "Theory Talks Presents Theory Talks #21: Stephen Krasner on Sovereignty, 
Failed States and International Regimes," Theory Talks.com website, 2009. 
http://theorytalks.fileave.com/Theory%20Talk21_Krasner.pdf, (accessed April 14, 2009). Specifically 
Krasner describes the development of two separate definitions of his earlier work on regimes, one 
neorealist and one constructivist. From the interview, Krasner states "there's a realist definition, which is: 
'regimes are principles, norms and decision-making procedures reflecting the interests of the most powerful 
states in the system'." 
13 
and disarmament focusing on those treaties that form the three case studies: the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the series of 
strategic arms control treaties from the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) 
through the new START Treaty signed in April 2010. Each of the three case study 
chapters provides useful material and theoretical discussion in support of the concluding 
chapter. The final chapter will provide an analysis of the value of the case studies in 
support of the dissertation thesis and a conclusion that will discuss the necessary steps to 
outline a U.S. policy agenda that may be used to rebuild the nuclear arms control regime 
while accounting for the new realities of the current international security environment. 
Each chapter is briefly introduced here. 
WHY REGIMES, INSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEADERSHIP MATTER: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
This chapter examines the theoretical foundations that explain how regimes, 
institutions and state leadership can enable achievement of the goal of nuclear 
disarmament and states the central argument of the dissertation: if the goals of the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), prevent nuclear proliferation, enable civilian 
peaceful uses of nuclear power and eventually reach complete disarmament are to be 
realized, a robust, multilateral effort led by the United States is essential. As a pillar of 
the NPT, nuclear disarmament is a nearly universally accepted aim of the international 
community but has remained elusive for more than 40 years. By considering relevant 
international relations theory, an appropriate set of explanations for both the impediments 
and the way forward to this goal can be examined. Specifically, two central themes of 
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international relations theory are important to any explanation of an international goal 
that has yet to be reached. First, realist based explanations of the international system 
focused on the power relationships between states have held a prominent and firm 
position within international relations theory since the end of the Second World War. 
Most explanations for the rise of nuclear weapons are tied to individual state concerns 
about their survival and their perceived right to protect themselves and their national 
sovereignty. These concepts have a strong hold on those states that have sought nuclear 
weapons as the best guarantee of their security in what each sees as an anarchic world. 
The other central theme within international relations that is derived from liberalist 
thought, specifically cooperation of states primarily through multilateral approaches 
supported by international institutions is essential to achieve is important to 
understanding how to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
What this research suggests is the requirement for a middle ground explanation or 
"hybrid theory" to allow states from either power or cooperation viewpoints to begin to 
see the value of agreement on an actionable agenda that leads to nuclear disarmament. 
Similar in approach to removing language as a barrier between two cultures, the hybrid 
theory proposed in this chapter attempts conceptualize a common framework based in 
international relations theory to assist in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime leading to disarmament. Nuclear weapon states and those who see their security in 
primarily military power terms retain an image of the world that is best explained in 
realist terms but is increasingly less appropriate given the growth of globalization and 
increasingly dense relationships between states on economic, political and social issues. 
Purely military power applications by states including deterrence which nuclear weapons 
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support are increasingly problematic given the growing interdependence of states. For the 
remaining states that have either rejected nuclear weapons or never sought them, 
cooperation through the "bargain" that the NPT provides has been seen as more 
important toward achieving their view of national security. The hybrid theory suggested 
in this chapter is an attempt to create a common language or framing of the nuclear issue 
for both groups of states. As the one state that possesses a great deal of power in any of 
the dimensions of state power be it political, military, economic, social or informational, 
the United States is best positioned to lead both groups to a common understanding that 
would eventually lower both the risk of nuclear weapons and the reliance on them for 
security. 
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: A CASE STUDY IN REGIME 
MAINTENANCE 
This case study will review the history of the NPT from its development through 
the current period where the treaty will be undergoing its five year review which offers 
an opportunity to reinforce its regime and advance toward its disarmament goal. The 
history of the NPT offers the reader an understanding of the difficulty of reaching a 
multilateral agreement as well as its durability. Contained within the case is a discussion 
of the NPTs strengths, weaknesses and potential improvements that would further the 
agenda of nuclear disarmament. The NPT provides a rich platform to discuss the 
importance of multilateral agreements and international institutions to the maintenance of 
a nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime which is the first main element of 
this dissertation's argument. As will be shown, the NPT's weaknesses can and should be 
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addressed through a renewed interest in the non-proliferation and disarmament process 
reenergized by one state in a leadership role. The United States seems once again to be 
rising to this challenge through a renewed nuclear agenda. Sustained efforts by the United 
States to reinforce the NPT and support multilateral efforts to reach its goals will be 
essential to long term success. The May 2010 NPT Review Conference offers the United 
States an excellent opportunity to continue to forward the goals of the treaty. 
THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY: A CASE STUDY ON THE 
NORMATIVE POWER OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 
This chapter will detail the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty's history, review 
the major issues it addresses, provide a review of the contemporary discussions at three 
critical moments in the life of the treaty and discuss the related international relations 
theory specifically the value of leadership perception and institutionalism as they relate to 
the long term implications of U.S. withdrawal. 
The ABM treaty represents first demonstration of U.S. willingness to abrogate an 
international agreement which had in fact led to other mutually reinforcing agreements on 
nuclear disarmament. The ABM Treaty was developed in conjunction with the strategic 
arms limitations negotiations that began as an outcome of the detente between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. during the Nixon Administration and remained in force until the 
United States unilaterally withdrew in the winter of 2001-2002. The historical record 
would seem to indicate that the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has reinforced 
other nations' concerns of the validity of previous U.S. treaty obligations especially in the 
area of nuclear issues, lessened cohesion within the international community to develop, 
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agree and enforce similar agreements and likely increased the difficulty in reestablishing 
an increasingly more binding non-proliferation regime. 
Both the historical record and international relations theory support the value of 
continuing and reinforcing arms control agreements like the ABM Treaty and that 
national leadership along with their supporting elites are critical to their initial 
negotiation, ratification and sustainment. The value of established nuclear arms control 
agreements when supported and updated by the states involved can provide an important 
foundation for other similar agreements. This foundation as theory and practice would 
suggest requires active participation by more than just the states to be fully effective. 
Epistemic communities can be successful participants in achieving lasting change where 
governments are unable or unwilling to do so. In an area involving so many agencies and 
a nearly incomprehensible destructive power, coherence of action at the individual level 
is an essential element to compliance with state obligations. One essential component of 
any agreement is the willingness of the parties to be transparent in their actions. 
Epistemic communities can act as the forcing function for transparency and state 
compliance with its obligations. 
Despite the passing of the ABM Treaty, bilateral negotiations and agreements can 
form a significant and useful portion of larger multilateral arms control efforts. The 
renewed U.S. nuclear policy agenda still places value on completion of a limited missile 
defense and seeks cooperation in this effort with Russia. Continuing to support a renewal 
of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia is an important part of 
the overall nuclear disarmament effort. 
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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: A CASE STUDY IN LIMITING ARMS 
RACES 
Among the longest and most prominent arms control efforts since the end of the 
Second World War are the series of negotiations between the United States and Russia on 
limiting strategic nuclear arms. Beginning with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I) in the Nixon Administration and continuing through to the renewed discussions 
following the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on December 
5, 2009, the United States and Russia have been in a lengthy effort to control and reduce 
their massive holdings in strategic nuclear systems. This strategic arms reduction process 
has made substantial progress toward achieving the ultimate goal of the NPT, total 
disarmament. While progress has been slow, a number of significant successes have 
occurred despite significant swings of the political landscape on the part of both nations 
as well as the environment around them. This process, which has had a renewed 
momentum in the last year, displays several key features of a successful arms control 
process that are supported by international relations theory. This chapter will detail the 
strategic nuclear arms reduction process of the past four decades, review the major issues 
associated with strategic arms reduction, provide a review of the contemporary 
discussions of stages of this process and discuss the related international relations theory, 
specifically the potential for regional nuclear arms races, as it relates to the importance of 
future negotiations and strategic arms reduction agreements. 
An arms race between the United States and U.S.S.R. was a prominent feature of 
this period. While the international environment will not likely see a repeat of such 
enormous nuclear arsenals, concerns of new states emerging as nuclear weapon states 
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lead to a question of the level of understanding among the elites of these states and those 
who feel threatened by them. While power based theories of international relations 
developed during the Cold War may have seemed appropriate at the time, the increased 
potential of a terrorist initiated nuclear attack since September 11, 2001 has provided 
power to Sagan's call for strengthening of non-proliferation. Renewed negotiation efforts 
between the United States and Russia in line with President Obama's April 2009 Prague 
Speech have resulted in a new START agreement which offers support for continuing to 
reduce strategic arms and open a wider discussion of all nuclear issues. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The final chapter provides a summary analysis and conclusion of the dissertation 
research highlighting the case studies and identifying three central findings. First, 
multilateral treaties that establish an issue based regime, like the NPT, tend to be difficult 
to achieve initially, if properly developed around an appropriate set of rules and norms, 
and reviewed frequently and equitably, will last significantly longer than bilateral treaties 
among powerful states. Second, for any international agreement on nuclear weapons to 
succeed, it must be supported by the United States. Finally, power-based international 
relations theories seem to be losing their explanatory power in the increasingly globalized 
environment of the post Cold War world while normative theories have yet to completely 
replace them. A significant factor in the issue area of nuclear disarmament is the merging 
of arms control efforts into the overall non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. The 
research supports the dissertation argument that a hybrid explanation of how states can 
best cooperate to achieve the goals of the NPT where states focused on power can 
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cooperate in bilateral and multilateral efforts and normative based states can accept 
power explanations for resolving nuclear issues. 
In an effort to bridge the gap between the two schools of international relations 
that bear on this issue area, this research suggests the formation of a hybrid theory which 
provides a the potential to allow nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states 
including emergent or undeclared nuclear states to develop a more frequent multilateral 
effort to achieve the goals of the NPT. First, the issue of eventual extinction of nuclear 
weapons has clearly been decided as early as 1970. Even the non-signatories of the NPT 
have from time to time indicated their willingness to eliminate nuclear weapons under the 
assumption that the regional issues that placed them in the security dilemmas driving 
their requirements for the weapons are resolved. The majority of the world's states do not 
possess any nuclear capabilities either for security or electric power generation. Most of 
the world's states do not face an extant security threat and as a result have no need for 
nuclear weapons. 
A framework that explains the need to eliminate nuclear weapons would have to 
be able to explain the requirement in a power-based way for nuclear weapons states and 
regionally threatened states while adding in normative based procedures that provide 
appropriate transparency and irreversibility to reassure the rest of the international 
system. As an example of initial steps taken by the United States and Russia, efforts like 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program offer appropriate economics 
based incentives to comply with treaty requirements while building a sufficient level of 
trust between the participants. Removal of the Libyan WMD programs under 
international supervision is another example. States have to see the alignment of short-
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term interests with long term international goals in order to decide to comply with 
established multilateral norms. Regardless of the internal rationale for making the 
decision to disarm, the international community must be prepared to support that decision 
in the long term. Financial and political incentives are likely key to such efforts. Specific 
policy recommendations from the case studies will be summarized into a single 
framework presented in the conclusion. 
Full U.S. support to the NPT community and its goal of total disarmament would 
have to be a prerequisite to the required further bonding of all states to the norms of this 
regime. From the NPT's initiation through each of its key stages including the 1995 
decision to permanently extend its mandate, each positive step has occurred with the full 
support of the United States. The current difficulties in further solidifying the treaty's 
norms have also been in part due to incomplete U.S. support for these initiatives. The 
upcoming 2010 NPT Review will likely succeed or fail on U.S. support for any 
recommended changes. Similarly, the United States should continue the tradition of 
bilateral negotiations with Russia until these states' arsenals reach an equivalent level 
with the other nuclear weapons states when an increasingly multilateral negotiation under 
the NPT norms should be developed. The conclusion section of the final chapter provides 
a review of the suggested changes to policy the United States needs to consider in order 
to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and further merge arms control efforts 
with nuclear disarmament. 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation that United States must reassert a position 
of leadership through multilateral cooperation to develop appropriate nuclear arms 
policies that effectively reestablish worldwide controls, continue reduction of nuclear 
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arms toward the NPT goal of nuclear disarmament requires a supporting argument which 
the next chapter provides. The key elements of the argument are based in international 
relations theory that discusses regimes, institutions and state leadership. This argument 
essentially forms the lens through which one can evaluate the three cases that follow and 
assess the appropriateness of the policy discussion that concludes the dissertation. While 
the suggestion that the United States must lead in the effort to achieve nuclear 
disarmament may seem somewhat obvious, the substance of how this leadership will be 
accomplished is the focus of this research. Ultimately, this dissertation contains a point of 
review of the past record of U.S. leadership in nuclear issues and a point of departure to 
return to the unfinished business of the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER II 
WHY REGIMES, INSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEADERSHIP MATTER: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
This chapter examines the theoretical foundations that explain how regimes, 
institutions and state leadership can enable achievement of the goal of nuclear 
disarmament and states the central argument of the dissertation: if the goals of the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), prevent nuclear proliferation, enable civilian 
peaceful uses of nuclear power and eventually reach complete disarmament are to be 
realized, a robust, multilateral effort led by the United States is essential as are bilateral 
arrangements that account for those states who continue to see power based solutions as 
more acceptable. As a pillar of the NPT, nuclear disarmament is a nearly universally 
accepted aim of the international community but has remained elusive for more than 40 
years. By considering relevant international relations theory, an appropriate set of 
explanations for both the impediments and the way forward to this goal can be examined. 
Specifically, two central themes of international relations theory are important to any 
explanation of an international goal that has yet to be reached. First, realist based 
explanations of the international system focused on the power relationships between 
states have held a prominent and firm position within international relations theory since 
the end of the Second World War. Most explanations for the rise of nuclear weapons are 
tied to individual state concerns about their survival and their perceived right to protect 
themselves and their national sovereignty. These concepts have a strong hold on those 
states that have sought nuclear weapons as the best guarantee of their security in what 
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each sees as an anarchic world. The international system has also been explained by more 
normative based explanations derived from liberalist thought. The minority view within 
international relations theory views the international system as capable of supporting 
cooperation of states primarily through multilateral approaches supported by international 
institutions. While it would be elegant to classify states in one or other of these categories 
(power or normative based), states that rely primarily on power based explanations for 
their views of their security environment also frequently participate in multilateral efforts 
to resolve issues. Finding a middle ground explanation or as this dissertation suggests, 
finding a hybrid theory of how to achieve a greater level of engagement of all states in 
the multilateral effort to control nuclear capabilities, is essential to understanding how to 
achieve the long term goal of nuclear disarmament. 
What this research suggests is the requirement for a middle ground explanation or 
"hybrid theory" to allow states from either primarily power or cooperation viewpoints to 
begin to see the value of agreement on an actionable agenda that leads to nuclear 
disarmament. Similar in approach to removing language as a barrier between two 
cultures, the hybrid theory proposed in this chapter attempts to conceptualize a common 
framework based in international relations theory to assist in strengthening the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime leading to disarmament. Nuclear weapon states and those who 
see their security in primarily military power terms retain an image of the world that is 
best explained in realist terms but is increasingly less appropriate given the growth of 
globalization and increasingly dense relationships between states on economic, political 
and social issues. Purely military power applications by states including deterrence which 
nuclear weapons support are increasingly problematic given the growing interdependence 
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of states. For the remaining states that have either rejected nuclear weapons or never 
sought them, cooperation through the "bargain" that the NPT provides has been seen as 
more important toward achieving their view of national security. The hybrid theory 
suggested in this chapter is an attempt to create a common language or framing of the 
nuclear issue for both groups of states. As the one state that possesses a great deal of 
power in any of the dimensions of state power be it political, military, economic, social or 
informational, the United States is best positioned to lead both groups to a common 
understanding that would eventually lower both the risk of nuclear weapons and the 
reliance on them for security. 
WHY ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NECESSARY? 
In understanding how nuclear disarmament could be achieved and what the U.S. 
role toward its achievement should be, a central question must be answered: what 
purpose do nuclear weapons serve today? During the Cold War, they were seen as 
essential to guarantee the security of those nations who possessed them and their allies. A 
balance was sought between the two ideological sides of the conflict and nuclear 
weapons played their role. Proliferation of nuclear weapons had two dimensions, 
horizontal or adding more states to the nuclear "club" and vertical or adding more 
weapons to existing arsenals. Horizontal proliferation was feared and was considered by 
a few dozen states but in reality remained limited to less than ten. Vertical proliferation 
reached over 60,000 weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-
1980's and now stands at less than a third of that number. So if this confrontation has 
ended, should other states seek to avoid the expense and the risk of accident, use or theft? 
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Both states and individuals are renewing their call for nuclear disarmament as was done 
in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which itself led to the completion of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States was a central actor in the 
achievement of the initial NPT and remains central to the achievement of its goals. 
This research accepts the premise that nuclear disarmament is not only an 
acceptable goal of the international community but an achievable one. All of the policy 
and procedures required to achieve nuclear disarmament are known and have been 
suggested. The NPT, used as a basic platform to build a cooperative and sustained 
regime, provides much of the necessary components for nuclear disarmament. The 
history of the bilateral arms control relationship between the United States and Russia 
(including the former Soviet Union) provides additional useful mechanisms for the 
regime as well as highlighting the limitations of any such two state effort. What has 
eluded the international community is a sustained and global non-proliferation and 
disarmament regime that incorporates the best features of arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament and has the substantial and persistent support of the nuclear states. The 
United States is uniquely positioned as the original nuclear state to choose to lead a non-
proliferation and disarmament coalition. The power of national leadership and in 
particular the American President to deliver and sustain an appropriate disarmament 
agenda is seen as the necessary catalyst for such a global enterprise. 
Forty years ago, all but a handful of states stated their common desire "to further 
the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order 
to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all 
their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons 
27 
and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control."1 With the dramatic changes 
of twenty years ago which resulted in an incomplete resolution to the seemingly unending 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, one must wonder why the 
nuclear security issue area continues to generate global concerns that are equally vexing 
as those of the Cold War. If the collective aim of the community of nations is to rid the 
world of the risk of nuclear attack, then a number of important questions must be 
answered. What set of circumstances are required to advance the goal of total 
disarmament of nuclear weapons as envisioned in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT)? What set of theoretical approaches would be most useful in furthering such an 
agenda? What role and potential positive impact does U.S. leadership have in 
international efforts to reach nuclear disarmament? Since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
a true global effort to achieve this goal has been uneven at best. 
CENTRAL ARGUMENT: U.S. LEAD COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO ELIMINATE 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The central argument of this work is that the United States is uniquely positioned 
to lead the international community to the universally accepted conclusion that the risk 
posed by any nuclear weapon exceeds its utility given the current and likely future global 
security environment. In its simplest form, this research supports the need for a 
reenergized multilateral effort led by the United States that establishes and sustains a 
non-proliferation and disarmament regime built on existing international agreements and 
incorporates the best practices of past arms control efforts. This research examines three 
1
 Appendix A, 319. 
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interrelated and supporting concepts that are essential components of a successful nuclear 
disarmament effort and form the theoretical explanation of just how such an effort would 
be completed: 1) regime theory and the power of multilateral institutions; 2) the strengths 
and weaknesses of bilateral arms control agreements and 3) the role of national leaders in 
sustaining state participation in international agreements. The power of regimes to gain 
state adherence to a common norm through the support of international institutions like 
the United Nations has been established in non-security areas and has utility in the 
security environment as well. Bilateral agreements particularly between the United States 
and Russia (and the former Soviet Union) have important components as well as 
weaknesses that can be useful to multilateral efforts like the NPT regime. National 
leaders have proven essential as both catalysts and sustainers of arms control agreements. 
Future bilateral and multilateral nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 
efforts will depend upon the success of these leaders in leading their states to participate. 
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, despite its weaknesses, provides an 
important foundation for any nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The 
long history of strategic arms control between the United States and Russia provides both 
reinforcement of the need for multilateralism in international agreements as well as 
examples of effective elements for any sustained disarmament effort. This arms control 
history also highlights the importance of sustained and consistent United States 
leadership in achieving international disarmament. This last element, embodied by the 
President's policies and actions, can also serve as a catalyst to reenergizing nuclear 
disarmament. President Obama has explicitly stated his conviction that nuclear weapons 
should be eliminated. His administration is actively engaged in reviewing nuclear arms 
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policy, negotiating a follow-on agreement to the strategic arms reduction efforts of the 
past and is likely to strongly support efforts to strengthen the NPT at the 2010 Review 
Conference. In setting out an ambitious nuclear disarmament agenda, Obama has also 
suggested a number of international initiatives that would serve to energize international 
support toward nuclear disarmament. These include support for ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
(FMCT), wider acceptance of IAEA inspections, strengthened non-proliferation efforts, a 
cooperative nuclear fuel bank for civilian energy use, and support for stronger sanctions 
use against NPT violators as well as convening an international nuclear security summit 
to develop support for this agenda.2 
Exactly what purpose do nuclear weapons have if the majority of states agree that 
they should be eliminated? If they should be eliminated, the goal is universally accepted 
or nearly so, then only two questions remain: how to achieve it and how soon should it be 
achieved. Setting aside the lingering Cold War based rationales for nuclear weapons, 
many states are now asking important questions about the risks of maintaining nuclear 
arms related to concerns such as the tragic loss of life in any exchange to the social, 
political, economic and environmental impacts long term especially on non-belligerent 
states of any nuclear event. But many in positions of power within nuclear states, those 
2
 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech 
Republic, April 15, 2009," The White House website, 2009. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered/, accessed March 21, 2010. President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda for achieving nuclear 
arms reductions and eventual disarmament just three months into his presidency. While domestic agenda 
issues like universal health care reform took priority for his legislative efforts, the passing of the December 
2009 expiration date of the START I Treaty has been viewed by the Obama Administration as a reason to 
increase diplomatic efforts to reach agreement for a follow on and more restrictive agreement on strategic 
arms with Russia. Additionally, the Obama Administration has taken a longer period than expected to 
complete the related Nuclear Policy Review. This delay is believed to center on a difference of views 
between the Department of Defense and the White House over the future of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
policy. See David E. Sanger and Thorn Shanker, "White House Is Rethinking Nuclear Policy," The New 
York Times, February 28, 2010. 
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acknowledged, those suspected and those seeking that special status, have continued to 
devalue any other concerns about the weapons as they retain their perceived insurance 
against future threats. This group of states continues to hold to power based explanations 
of the international environment while the majority of states are seeking alternatives that 
agreements like the NPT offer. 
Bilateral agreements such as those negotiated between the United States and 
Russia, while resulting in a lower level in both states' inventories than during the Cold 
War, have proven insufficient and too easily abandoned to successfully achieve nuclear 
disarmament. Traditional nuclear arms control has provided essential processes that could 
be incorporated into the NPT and the renewed nuclear non-proliferation and elimination 
regime. Each nation would have to accept a loss of a certain amount of sovereignty in 
security decisions in order to gain the advantage of a world free of nuclear destruction. 
An important byproduct of this environment would be increasing levels of awareness of 
the roots and potential solutions to key security issues that an increased level of 
interaction of all states on the nuclear issue. For the United States, continued calls for 
states like North Korea and Iran to cease nuclear programs without a similar serious 
effort to meet the requirements of international agreements like the NPT are less likely to 
achieve their ends. 
This research is based on the thesis that nuclear disarmament is an appropriate 
goal for the international community and given the evolving security environment of this 
century should be aggressively sought in as short a period as possible. Nuclear 
disarmament requires a multilateral effort led by an engaged and powerful state, 
structured by international organizations ultimately the United Nations which in turn 
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engages all states to support efforts to resolve regional conflicts while inhibit its 
achievement. This disarmament goal rests squarely on the ability of the community of 
nations to cooperate through international organizations such as the United Nations. A 
robust regime that encompasses international efforts to control, verify, and eliminate 
nuclear weapons and related materials would be required to achieve the goal. Processes to 
implement the regime would have to be transparent and irreversible with sufficient 
international controls to check efforts to seek new nuclear arms whether by a state or 
group. This seemingly impossible situation would be sustained and guaranteed by the 
former nuclear states with the United States as the natural choice for regime leadership. 
This international cooperative effort is theoretically supported by the accepted concepts 
of regimes, the value of international organizations over individual states and the value of 
moral leadership of a state like the United States. 
The current international security environment has shifted from the bipolar Cold 
War arrangement to a limited period of dominance by the "sole remaining superpower" 
to a much more nuanced situation were traditional sources of military power have limited 
utility in deterring non-state actors or influencing emerging nuclear states. Stockpiles of 
the two former nuclear competitors have been dramatically reduced but remain at levels 
that are difficult to justify given the current and foreseeable global environment. Bilateral 
arms control efforts between the United States and Russia have not achieved their results 
as comprehensively or as rapidly as were expected in the immediate moments after the 
end of the Cold War. Other states have sought the "protection" that nuclear arms seem to 
provide. Non-state groups have professed their desire to possess them as well in order to 
further their aims. Whether one sees state-on-state nuclear exchanges, a terrorist attack or 
32 
an accidental use as the most likely next nuclear event, it would seem there is ample 
evidence to support the NPT's goal of nuclear disarmament especially in a world that has 
many more nuclear fault lines than existed two decades ago. Achieving this goal requires 
more that an established multilateral regime backed by international institutions which 
incorporate the best practices of bilateral arms control. Leadership of the first nuclear 
state is essential. 
DISARMAMENT CATALYST: THE REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP 
Modern international relations theory reflects the Cold War relationship of the 
two greatest military powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons 
were central to the power of these two states and as a result became the heart of the 
security concerns each had with the other. As the Soviet Union ceased to exist, nuclear 
issues were rapidly pushed to the periphery of states' foreign policy making and 
academic research agendas. Concerns over weapons of mass destruction lingered but 
shifted to a discussion of rogue states and terrorists with concerns over major nuclear war 
fading from view. Arms races or vertical proliferation among the more mature nuclear 
states were thought to have been relegated to the same dustbin of history as the Cold 
War. Yet only the United States and Russia were making any significant cuts in their 
existing nuclear forces. Today, the nuclear club has at least eight declared members with 
a range of other states considering their options, a situation that would argue the world is 
subject to an increasing risk of a nuclear event over time. 
How can the international community work to prevent further horizontal 
proliferation and eventually achieve the disarmament goal of the NPT? Reinforcing the 
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current non-proliferation regime and establishing international acceptance of the norms 
the NPT upholds would seem to be the obvious path. Leadership by the mature nuclear 
states, the United States particularly, would remove the argument that what one state does 
for security should be allowed for all states. A renewed valuing of multilateralism by the 
United States through increased support of international institutions would enable 
increased cooperation among states not only on the nuclear question but on a range of 
underserved issues such as regional conflicts, economic imbalances, environmental 
concerns, and individual rights. These institutions offer the ability to develop and 
implement agreements that bind states together in common purpose and readily identify 
defectors or cheaters for punishment when effectively supported by member states. As 
the web of agreements on a range of issues grows, individual issue regimes tend to be 
strengthened resulting in increased cooperation and reduced conflict among states. 
Over time states involved in international organizations see cooperation as more 
valuable than conflict or from an international relations theory perspective, normative 
state relationships replace those that relied on power based explanations. To effectively 
achieve nuclear disarmament, the near term agenda would have to include power based 
explanations to the nuclear "haves" and those who want to join them that encourage 
participation in the nuclear regime outlined here. For the more mature nuclear states, the 
"haves," specific practical confidence building efforts among them such as de-alerting 
forces, joint monitoring organizations, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and full support of a robust inspection system led by 
the IAEA would offer practical steps to lessen their nuclear security concerns. The United 
States has suggested such an agenda and through its actions to complete these items 
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would demonstrate a strong commitment to reducing a dependence on nuclear weapons 
for security. This example would in turn likely have a significant influence on other 
nuclear weapons states and those who see nuclear weapons as essential for their security. 
The actions of the United States would also be essential in resolving persistent regional 
security issues that tend to push weaker states to seek nuclear options to defend 
themselves. 
For the newer nuclear states and those who seek nuclear weapons, regional 
security issues would have to be addressed. The most persistent regional conflicts with 
nuclear dimensions include the ongoing issues within the Israeli neighborhood, the 
Arabian Gulf region, the Korean peninsula and the Kashmir question. Each of these 
unresolved conflicts has causes several states to turn to nuclear arms to influence their 
adversaries. In addition to dealing with the concerns of nuclear states and those who want 
to be one, today's international environment requires a regime that addresses the security 
concerns of all states and at the same time effectively addresses criminal activity that 
could potentially allow non-state actors to acquire nuclear capabilities that were once the 
sole purview of a limited number of governments. While the United States would seem to 
be the one state best positioned to set the example for other states to follow while placing 
the necessary support to the non-proliferation regime, the extent to which the original 
nuclear state is willing to do so remains to be seen. As this dissertation argues, the 
building and sustainment of a regime within the auspices of an international institution is 
the first element of the necessary framework to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
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GOING BEYOND ANARCHY: REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS 
As the United States attempts to take action on the agenda President Obama 
established in his April 2009 Prague speech, understanding and support for the non-
proliferation regime through participation in international institutions will be critical to 
success. While the concepts of regimes and institutions are not new, many states continue 
to seek the realist path of self-help when confronted with security challenges. Regimes 
and their supporting international institutions offer the promise of a release from the risks 
of a state's tendency to singularly focus on military power as a solution to security 
concerns. Without a concentrated and sustained international effort to seek a different 
security arrangement than that of the 20* Century, states may be more likely to be subject 
to the growing negative effects of globalization such as nuclear terrorism. Cooperation on 
security specifically on the nuclear question through the support of a non-proliferation 
and disarmament regime offers a higher potential for reduced risk of a catastrophic 
nuclear event. 
After three decades of competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, a growing number of theorists sought to define new ways to consider international 
relations in situations which the concept of power was not central to the explanation of 
their behavior. One of the key concepts that became prominent in the early 1980's was 
regimes. In "Security Regimes," Robert Jervis defined regimes as 
those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in 
their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept 
implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a 
form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-
interest the fact that neither superpower attacks the other is a form of 
cooperation, but not a regime. The links between the states' restraint and 
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their immediate self-interest are too direct and unproblematic to invoke the 
concept. 
Steven Krasner defined them similarly as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations."4 The definition Krasner uses narrows the concept to 
a single issue between two or more states. Regime theory has been useful in several issue 
areas such as environmental, legal and business but has had limited success when applied 
to security concerns.5 Specific to this research, nuclear issues, specifically non-
proliferation, have been associated with the concept of a regime. As the NPT has evolved 
over the years, the treaty and subsequent associated agreements has functioned as a 
regime with a range of results. Each time an event that is viewed as contrary to the 
principles of the NPT, such as a North Korea exploding a nuclear device, the non-
proliferation regime is seen as failing or no longer viable. Within the international 
relations field, regimes remain a subject of study and criticism especially due a limited 
set of successful examples. 
Regime theory can be divided into three main views: power based, interest based 
or knowledge based depending on the degree that institutionalism matters to the 
description.6 The power based explanation centers on the concept of hegemonic stability 
advanced by Kindleberger and later codified by Gilpin. Gilpin theorized that an 
3
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international liberal economy was dependent on a single dominant state to survive. This 
hegemonic state has to be committed to the principles of a liberal international order.7 
The hegemon is also "has a responsibility to guarantee provision of the collective goods 
of an open trading system and stable currency."8 Given the history of the 20th century, 
Gilpin saw an alignment of dominant economic power with military power. Today, the 
discussion of the U.S. relationship to the world is in line with this concept. 
The concept of interest based regimes is primarily from the work of Robert 
Keohane which will be discussed later in this review. In essence, Keohane's argument is 
based on the realist assumption that states are rational actors seeking self-help and utility-
maximizing under international anarchy. Regimes facilitate international cooperation, 
which, in Keohane's view, would otherwise be difficult or impossible to achieve, not 
necessarily by changing actors' interests (preferences) or values but by altering their 
incentives or calculations for action.9 International cooperation materializes in mutually 
beneficial agreements, not specifically in regimes. Regimes help bring about such 
agreements. Keohane argues that regimes facilitate cooperation by providing states with 
information or by reducing their information costs.10 States decide to cooperate because 
of their individual fear of being cheated is lowered by the fact that regimes facilitate the 
flowing of information about other states' compliance. 
7
 Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton 
University Press Princeton, 1987), 72-79. Author credits Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the 
International Political Economy," International Security Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 242-254, for first 
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Keohane uses game theory to explain the power based theory of cooperation 
where individual states' violation or defection from agreed procedures, rules or norms 
will affect their ability to achieve goals in other issue areas. As the games are iterated, 
cooperation will be achieved. Keohane also believes regimes help shape the reputations 
of members by providing standards of behavior, which raise the costs associated with 
noncompliance. But Keohane also acknowledges that there are transaction costs in 
creating and maintaining a regime, thus states are more willing to create regimes that are 
based on a large set of mutually beneficial agreements, but still regime's collapse is 
possible when transaction costs are high.'' Knowledge can also be a basis for regimes. 
Knowledge based or cognitive regimes focus on "knowledge dynamics, communication, 
and identities."12 Supporters of this theory, referred to as cognitivists, suggest these 
regimes are formed around the ideas and knowledge possessed by state decision makers. 
Cognitivists believe that the interests of states are shaped by the beliefs held by their 
respective leadership. As regimes are formed to shape state behavior, cognitivists see this 
shaping beginning with the assumption that leader's beliefs can be changed which in turn 
would lead to a change in policy that would be in line with regime norms. Changes in 
beliefs are likely to occur as state leadership assesses changes in the international system 
and see the need to align state interests with their new beliefs. 
Cognitivism is divided into "strong" and "weak" formulations. Strong cognitivists 
see the existence of an international society governed by international institutions. The 
strong cognitivists "basic insight" about knowledge based regimes is that knowledge 
states possess is actually what the state is. These states exist "only by virtue of a shared 
11
 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 100-03. 
12
 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 2. 
39 
knowledge which spans international relations as a social space."13 Weak cognitivists 
believe regimes can be formed and sustained based on learning of new ideas which "can 
influence the demand for rule-based cooperation between states."14 These regimes are 
supported by experts like scientists who work with governments, non-governmental 
groups and individuals to form epistemic communities or knowledge-based transnational 
networks who can assist in agenda setting for regimes.15 
DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING REGIMES 
From a theoretical standpoint, if relations between states can be explained in 
terms of distribution of military and economic power (balance of power) then no regime 
exists. Jervis believes "if the connections between outcomes and national power are 
indirect and mediated, there is more room for choice, creativity, and institutions to 
restrain and regulate behavior, and produce a regime."16 If states that submit to relations 
that are defined by activity that allows the fostering of long-term peace and are less likely 
to maximize the achievement of power in pursuit of fulfilling self-interest then a regime 
can operate. Problems exist from the fear of cheating or individual states behaving in 
pursuit of self-interest vice the common international good that the regime seeks to define 
and regulate. In the NPT regime, the common international good is total nuclear 
disarmament. 
The biggest roadblock to achieving an effective regime is fear. Jervis is careful to 
point out that this dynamic can be seen in areas other than security but the stakes in the 
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security area are much higher. Regimes seek to solve the security dilemma or the 
likelihood of states believing they need to increase their offensive and defensive 
capabilities due to a similar buildup of other competing states. The dilemma arises from 
two problems, first, the inability of this competition to defuse itself in anything less than 
war and second, the belief of the individual competing states that not building up will 
leave them vulnerable to attack and defeat. Regimes can achieve an acceptable level of 
security through the establishment of a set of rules or norms of cooperative behavior that 
all states accept. Jervis finds "security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of 
the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has, all 
compound the prisoners' dilemma and make it sharper than the problems that arise in 
most other areas. Furthermore, decision makers react by relying on unilateral and 
competitive modes of behavior rather than seeking cooperative solutions."17 What has to 
occur for states to cooperate is the fostering of a collective willingness to go beyond the 
traditional security fears driving them to defect and protect their self interests. 
While one can see specific instances where states can seek and achieve 
agreements but not necessarily under conditions one could identify as a regime, states can 
and do form regimes. Robert Keohane, drawing on the work of Ronald Coase, pointed 
out that states would not need a regime to form if agreements could be reached where the 
parties could be held accountable for any adverse actions, perfect information on the 
Ibid., 359. For a discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma in the context of regimes, see Arthur A 
Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization 
(1982). Stein's discussion is also contained in David A. Baldwin, ed. Neorealism andNeoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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issues was available and there would be no transaction costs associated with the 
agreement.18 
According to Robert Jervis, to form and operate, regimes require four conditions. 
First, the most powerful states have to agree to start one which assumes they are happy 
with the status quo. Second, all states must share the belief that all share the same values 
for mutual security and cooperation. Third, no state can have expansionist desires in the 
belief that this would improve its security. Finally, states must see war and seeking 
security in pursuit of individual state interest "must be seen as costly."19 Jervis describes 
the Concert of Europe as the best historical example of an operating regime. During this 
period, states chose to cooperate as a matter of state policy, emulating these four 
conditions for at least eight years (1815-1823) and to a lesser extent through the end of 
the Crimean War in 1856.20 These same four conditions remain essential to the viability 
of regimes even in today's security environment. What remains a point of discussion 
among international relations theorists is how regimes control state behavior. 
One of the key divisions between realist and liberal views on regimes lies in just 
how regimes control national behavior. From the realist tradition, states will always act in 
line with their self interest only yielding when the power of other states cannot be 
countered. Jervis points to The Concert of Europe as an example of a successful regime 
as it provided the states involved with the belief that continuing the regime was better 
than going one's own way. This "self-fulfilling dynamic" allowed the states to believe 
that war was not eminent and continuing the Concert was instrumental in maintaining this 
18
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belief. Key to regime sustainment was the fact that states believed that the Concert 
would prevent any change to the status quo in relation to territory. Jervis discusses the 
idea of reciprocity as a strengthener of the Concert, or states were able to negotiate, make 
concessions without being seen as weak by other states, and in several instances states 
could give several concessions without expecting an equal amount from the others. 
One could argue that states in the Concert were acting in their self-interest but not in an 
effort to maximize their individual power, alignment with group norms trumped power 
seeking. 
This environment was maintained by the accepted belief that any behavior outside 
the established norm would not be accepted and would result in a collapse of the regime 
and a loss of any further benefit especially in the long term. While the Concert lacked 
any formal institutional structure, it did have sufficient power from direct involvement of 
the states' sovereign leaders when discussions had to occur. In order to keep the leaders 
from developing positions that would be contrary to the common good, the diplomats met 
frequently and over time expressed views that were not always in line with national 
views. These conferees had developed a common understanding that worked to the 
benefit of all states vice the state individuals represented.22 Frequent meetings of 
conferees provided an early form of institutionalization of the common view of the 
participants that was distinct from their individual governments. When any participant 
did meet with their leaders at home, this common view was a direct influence on the 
briefs provided to state leaders and can be shown to have influenced national decisions. 
21
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While the Concert showed an early example of an operating regime, Jervis 
believes that a lack of formalization, the process of "controlling the risk of war, and the 
perception at home of a lack of national loyalty likely destroyed it. States eventually saw 
the need to follow self-interest as the collective memory of the reason to form the 
Congress faded. The short-run need to be secure over rode the pursuit of the long-term 
goal of peace. Jervis concludes that a security regime is less likely to be in demand when 
the balance of power between competing states has "apparent stability."23 
Key to his formulation of how regimes function was Jervis' discussion of the 
relationship of offensive and defensive weapons. Which "individualistic measures" a 
state takes in order to maintain its security "depends on whether offensive measures 
differ from offensive and defensive policies."24 If a state can secure a "relatively cheap, 
safe and effective" defense, such as through a national anti-ballistic system, it would be 
less inclined to require a regime.25 This offensive versus defensive debate is a strong 
thread throughout the literature both in realist and liberal camps. 
At the height of the Reagan period of the Cold War some three years after 
"Security Regimes" was published, Jervis provided a deeper discussion on the 
mechanisms involved in establishing and maintaining a security regime. He first outlines 
the power based assumptions of state interaction where security is gained through the 
traditional balance of power theory. States react to external pressures to seek to maintain 
an acceptable level security in relation to other states. Normally this balancing effort 
results in states working together to prevent any one state from becoming dominant. 
Through this discussion, Jervis was building a bridge from power based explanations to a 
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more normative view of the interaction of states in pursuit of security. In order to see how 
regimes can be successful, one needs to see the relationship between them and their 
supporting structures known as international institutions. 
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: EXPLAINING REGIMES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
In the neoliberal view of international relations theory, international institutions 
are the support structure for regimes to form and operate. Robert Keohane has been the 
leading theorist within what has become the school of institutionalism. Beginning with 
his collaboration with Joseph Nye in 1968 to develop a means to explain transnational 
actions and expand the discussion space in international relations, Keohane has 
progressively developed a set of concepts that go beyond the solely power based view of 
neorealists. The seminal work Power and Interdependence has been reissued twice with 
each new edition adding and adapting their conception of how states can work together 
for common interests.26 Power and Interdependence outlines a set of four models of how 
regimes change state behavior based on the assumption that power alone is insufficient as 
a concept to fully explain state behavior.27 These models are based on the concept of 
interdependence which assumes states are mutually dependent on each other for a range 
of transactions and outcomes. 
Interdependence is not always mutually beneficial or balanced. Keohane and Nye 
saw the international system as divided in its operation along issues and by regions. Not 
all states were not as frequently drawn into as many other states' economies, issues or 




conflicts in 1977 when Power and Interdependence was first published as they are today. 
Even the most powerful states in the past did not directly impact every other state in the 
system. The authors argue that a more complex interdependence of states was emerging 
in more than military or security terms but also along increasingly economic and social 
lines. Keohane and Nye saw international regimes as the "intermediate factors between 
the power structure of an international system and the political and economic bargaining 
that takes place with it."28 
Interdependence is described by Keohane and Nye through four models of regime 
change which is driven by changes in the norms and rules adopted by international 
institutions. From a social science perspective, changes in the rules states agree to follow 
in international institutions like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, or the 
World Trade Organization would form an independent variable that impacts regime 
changes in issue areas. Regime change which would influence state behavior would form 
a dependent variable. Interdependence was not a simple issue of multiple bilateral state 
interactions. Complex interdependence, which more accurately described the world 
system, has three characteristics including "multiple channels of contact among society, 
lack of clear hierarchies of issues, and irrelevance of military force."29 The four models 
Keohane and Nye discuss include economic and technology processes, issue structure, 
overall power and international organizations models. Each of these models describes 
different dimension of the overall complex interdependence concept. Each also helps to 
show the limitations of a single and parsimonious theory that explains how the 




mainly in the security dimension, any action or policy taken would have impacts within 
all dimensions. 
In the area of economics and technology processes (economic sensitivity model), 
Keohane and Nye point out that economic changes and advancements in technology have 
been suggested as having the power to upset existing international regimes. While they 
do not deny the wide ranging impacts of these changes, the authors believe states can and 
do reallocate resources to at least marginally mitigate these impacts. Money like power, 
they suggest, is fungible and more economically successful states are under no direct 
pressure to share their resources. Each economic issue or technological advance has 
varying levels of importance to different states and as a result those states with the 
greatest amount of economic power successfully tie it to political agendas.30 
Keohane and Nye's second model assists in explaining regime change and 
focuses on overall power structure, specifically in relation to a hegemon's ability to 
control the system. This model draws heavily on the idea that a militarily powerful state 
would also be the dominant economic power and was particularly useful during the early 
post Cold War period when the United States was seen as the sole remaining superpower. 
Change in this type of regime could only occur at a time of defeat in war or economic 
collapse. The history of the post Cold War period seems to be less supportive of the 
descriptive power of such a model. The power of the United States for example after 
World War II has declined economically in relation to other states such as Japan and 
Germany. The once dominant U.S. military power is seen by many today to be atrophied 
by the prolonged engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Soviets and Chinese systems 
were essentially separated for the world economy and had varying levels of military 
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power before the demise of one and the opening economically of the other. As 
globalization takes hold, this model would seem to be losing its predictive capability. 
Issues structuring, the third of Keohane and Nye's regime models, aligns directly 
with the functioning of regimes as defined by Jervis. This model assumes the actor in a 
specific issue area with the most strength will drive the agenda by setting the norms and 
rules all actors would follow and while forcing compliance. In effect, an issue dominant 
actor is achieving a balance of power situation in an area that is important to its interests. 
Oil distribution and control in the 1970's by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was cited as an example of this type of regime. In the area of the law 
of the seas, smaller states dominated the agenda asserting their rights to access resources 
that had been assumed to belong to those states who first laid claim to them.32 Adding 
further complexity in the current international environment, actors who are not states can 
and often do become visible in the debate on specific issues and have at times dramatic 
impact on the establishment of both rules and outcomes. 
Keohane and Nye provide a fourth model based on international organizations 
which attempts to deal with the inadequacies in the three structural models described 
above. The international organizations model assumes issue infungibility, or that there 
are no alternative solutions to an issue, is a problem to be solved. An international 
organization is able to leverage the combined capability of the individual states to 
counterbalance more powerful or capable states. By conveying rights to all member 
states, the more capable states have a lower importance. The machinery of international 
institutions allows change within regimes resulting in changes in the international 
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environment. The limitation of international organizations and this model lies in the fact 
that complex interdependence must be occurring. Should any state not wish to support the 
principles of an international organization, Keohane and Nye indicate one or more of the 
I T 
other models would be more useful. 
The authors were able to use primarily economic and diplomatic examples to 
demonstrate the workings of their models but had not completely built concrete linkages 
between regimes and institutions. Keohane would provide a great deal of this necessary 
work in his book, After Hegemony?* While modeling the current environment is difficult 
to do precisely, two decades of experience and trends for the near future provide ample 
support for the requirement to attempt to do so as accurately as possible. Regimes and 
international institutions operate in an international environment that has long been 
described by international relations theorists as dominated by individual states acting in 
their self interest which in the case of security is means acting to survive. These 
explanations still retain a significant among of power and must be understood to see how 
to best seek an effective regime in today's international environment. 
THE REALIST TRADITION: UNDERSTANDING THE POWER OF ANARCHY 
Discussions on how states relate to each other have a rich literature that in the last 
century has flowed from the dominant concepts of states acting in a world of lawlessness 
to the more nuanced views of a normative narrative since the 1970's. To fully appreciate 
the normative literature, one must have an understanding of the power based concepts 
that today's international relations theories either contain or challenge. Since the rise of 
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the concept of a Westphalian state, scholars have worked to describe a general theory of 
how states interact. The core concepts that emerged in the last century flow from the 
writings of Hans Morgenthau. Later refined by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, 
power based theories of state interaction focused on a world of anarchy. 
Anarchy remains the most important concept within international relations theory. 
Defined as a state of lawlessness or chaos that governs the international environment, 
anarchy socializes actors or states to behaviors that are shaped by the situation they face. 
These states will find a need to protect themselves from threats of other states' behaviors. 
Security dominates this world view and is evidenced in reality by the fact that nearly all 
states have armies. An anarchic world is then characterized by a lack of government 
structure above the individual states. Without a governing body, no policing of "illegal" 
behavior occurs. States are free to pursue their own agendas which are in line with their 
interests. Key among these interests is survival. This Hobbsian world lacks any sense of 
community or a need to cooperate on common interests. 
The anarchic world in this view is in operation today when compared with the 
available evidence especially beginning in the 20th century and continuing to today. 
Despite the efforts of the United Nations, today's international environment is absent of a 
widely effective government over all of the states. States are free to act as they see fit to 
further their interests. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been viewed as evidence of a 
state only minimally seeking UN permission to act on its behalf. Russia recently engaged 
in combat operations in Georgia violating another states border without any significant 
sanction or penalty from the UN. The only effective issue area where the UN has had 
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success is in the development and enforcement Law of the Seas and is beginning to have 
an impact in other non-security areas. 
Within this anarchic world, the lack of a widely effective government over all 
states also leads to three important absent characteristics that state governments possess. 
First, in a state of anarchy, the world does not have an effective policing function. In the 
last century, the United States has frequently led other states in furtherance of this 
policing role. Whether in World War II as a late joining member of an alliance of states 
to Korea as a member of a United Nations force to Afghanistan in a coalition which 
includes the NATO Alliance, the United States has selectively engaged in enforcing the 
interests of the world community. One could just as frequently show the number of 
conflicts that were violations of the UN Charter that the United States chose not to enter 
to enforce the "will" of the international body. 
The second missing characteristic of government missing in today's world is a 
universally accepted set of laws that are enforceable and effective. The UN Charter is an 
attempt to set a foundation for such a set and is quite comprehensive in terms of generally 
accepted principles of human rights and proper behavior of states. Yet states repeatedly 
chose to follow their individual interests whenever these are seen as more important. 
Often this is a result of the unresolved conflicts that existed before the establishment of 
the UN. Despite the high ideals they embody, not all cultures accept even some of the 
basic accepted concepts of others. History is far longer than the efforts of modern states 
to develop a universally acceptable set of laws to be abided and enforced. 
An example of this missing characteristic of government in the security arena 
would be found in the preamble to the UN Charter where the unresolved historical 
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conflict between sovereignty of individual states and the quest for universal peace acts as 
an incentive to strive for world government. 
We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding 
generations from scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends 
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and 
security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution 
of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to 
combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.35 
How do the states of the world, all mindful of their individual survival, simultaneously 
release their hold on individual sovereignty sufficiently to align with the interests of all 
states? Evidence would indicate this is being attempted slowly but steadily on an issue by 
issue basis. Outliers such as war criminals are being held to account, Serbia's Milosevic 
being the latest example, under international legal authority. 
The last missing characteristic of government that would control the anarchic 
world is a sense of global community. State governments are often formed and 
perpetuated based on culture. Among the nearly 200 recognized state entities that exist 
today, a wide range of cultures, economic conditions, resources available, and political 
systems results in few common or shared threads to hold them together. In comparison, 
the United States has a political culture based on democratic principles and an economic 
culture that is based on free enterprise. Other states range from autocratic rule similar to 
United Nations, "Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations," United Nations website, 2010. 
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that of the pre-Westphalian world to enlightened democratic states. Vestiges of the 
communist era remain despite the growing impact of globalization and the resulting 
political, demographic, economic and social shifts it has brought to the world. A single 
view of government has yet to emerge that fully eliminates the baser instincts of 
individuals and groups to seek power. 
Living in an anarchic world has consequences. The largest among these has been 
the recurrence of state on state warfare. The UN was created in a second attempt in less 
than a generation to create a world body dedicated to reminding its members that war was 
a circumstance to be avoided. The previous attempt, the League of Nations, failed in part 
due to a lack of support of all nations to seek peace and reject an individualistic agenda. 
At the end of the Second World War, the victors and the losers sought to avoid another 
war. This United Nations concept was born out of the same motivations and painful 
memory of war that spawned the Concert of Europe. One could easily argue that while 
the threat of major power war has passed the potential for a recurrence is exists in the 
anarchic world. Another important feature of the anarchic world is the drive for states to 
act in their self interest. This "self-help" world is a constant theme within the realist 
school and one that is difficult to completely deny. But is it possible to encourage and 
develop the appropriate frameworks to lower the likelihood of conflict? If so, how would 
that be accomplished? Institutionalism and regimes development offer one set of 
potential solutions. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, anarchy and power based 
international relations theories came to be hotly debated by those who saw its limitations. 
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NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: POWER VERSUS NORMS 
In the study of international relations, a debate between two prominent groups of 
scholars, best labeled as neorealists and neoliberals, began primarily with the publication 
of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics in 1979. Central to the debate was 
how the international system operated with neorealists led by Waltz maintaining the 
anarchic character of state interaction. Neoliberals had a wide range of alternative views 
of how the system functioned with most based on normative concepts. Somewhat 
simplified, the debate placed power or norms as the central force in the relationship of 
states to each other. One of the key points of contention was the role of regimes and 
institutions. In 1993, David Baldwin offered, Neorealism andNeoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, a collection of essays and articles that renewed and extended this 
debate.36 
Baldwin framed the discussion in his introductory essay which outlines six key 
points of the debate.37 Both sides acknowledged that the international system is anarchic 
but disagree about what anarchy means and why it matters.38 On the issue of cooperation, 
neorealists view it as difficult if not impossible to achieve or maintain. Neoliberals accept 
this view but offer the European Union will be the modern test for the success of 
cooperation.39 Neorealists view relative gains, where as long as a state stays ahead of the 
nearest competitor its security needs are fulfilled, as key to the international system while 
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neoliberals see absolute gains, where all states must see their needs are met, as central to 
fostering cooperation.40 On the issue of priority of state goals, neorealists stress the need 
for national security for state survival. Neoliberals understand the need for security but 
believe economic issues are primary to achieving it.41 Neorealists see the measurement 
capabilities of states as another key to the relationship between states. Neoliberals 
emphasize the intentions of states as seen in their efforts to gain capability. A final 
major focal point for the debate centers on the role and value of international institutions 
and regimes. Keohane argues that since WWII, regimes and institutions have gained a 
significant role in international affairs that is not fully accounted for in neorealist theory. 
Neorealists accept the existence of both regimes and institutions but discount their impact 
on the anarchic system.43 
From the neoliberal's side, Arthur Stein offered regimes as a solution to 
anarchy.44 Describing regimes in terms similar to those of Helen Milner, Stein felt that 
they exist when the interaction of states is not unconstrained or ruled by independent 
decision making.45 International regimes exist when joint state decision making results in 
desired patterns of state behavior.46 These regimes tend to arise in two situations or 
dilemmas: common interests or common aversions. The dilemma of common interests is 
commonly referred to the prisoner's dilemma where two actors independently chose 
options that result in an equilibrium outcome in neither state's interest. The issue is 
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addressed by regimes that focus on collaboration where specific desired behaviors and 
penalties for cheating are agreed.47 The dilemma of common aversion is a situation where 
actors seek to avoid a common result. A regime focused on cooperation allows for self-
enforcement and succeeds through converging of expectations.48 Stein also provided 
further discussion on regimes and interests, the structural bases for regime formation, and 
regime change. All are elements of theory which neorealists and Waltz in particular tend 
to discount.49 
Displaying a range of alternative explanations to the neorealist view of the 
international system, other neoliberal voices provided key elements of the normative 
view that retain their value and help frame the role of regimes and international 
institutions. While not rejecting the concept of an anarchical world, Robert Axelrod and 
Robert Keohane outlined how cooperation can be achieved within one.50 They focused 
on the effects of structure on cooperation and the context of how states interact. 
Cooperation among actors is affected by three situational dimensions: the mutuality of 
their interests, the concept of the "shadow of the future "and the number of actors 
involved.51 As states interact, each has specific interests that drive their actions. When 
these interests are similar, cooperation can be fostered if a suitable payoff structure for all 
actors can be devised. An improper payoff structure will likely result in an increase in 
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the level of conflict which in turn causes actors will defect from the agreement. The 
authors believe achieving cooperation is more easily done in some settings than others. 
They note security issues tend to be more contentious than economic ones.52 
The degree of value the states place in payoffs for future cooperation relative to 
today's payoffs will determine the level of continued cooperation, as the value increases 
in the future (lengthening the shadow), cooperation will increase.53 This shadow is 
lengthened by several factors including long time horizons of agreements, reliability of 
information exchanged and fast feedback of changes in other actor's actions.54 The 
number of actors involved affects the level of reciprocity among them. To be effective, 
reciprocity depends on the actors' ability to identify defectors, the ability of actors to 
retaliate against defectors, and the sufficiency of long term incentives to do so.55 The 
authors believe that problems with reciprocity can be dealt with by including powerful 
actors to deal with states with a lower level of commitment.56 Regimes can be used to 
reinforce and institutionalize reciprocity.57 
Confronting a central neorealist concept, Helen Milner challenged the view 
that the world is anarchic directly and offered that interdependence is a more appropriate 
theory of international politics. Addressing one of the keys to widening the neoliberal 
view, interdependence, Helen Milner offers a critique of neorealist approach of 
emphasizing international politics over domestic systems. She stresses the concepts 
interdependency as being the better description of the world. She draws on Thomas 
Schelling to describe "strategic interdependence" as "the ability of one participant to gain 
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his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other 
participant will make." Milner believes in this situation, an actor must cooperate to 
achieve his desired interests.58 She extends interdependence to a structural type that 
would show the anarchic international system as functioning like a perfect market in the 
economic sense.59 Adding another challenge to a central concept to neorealist theory, 
Duncan Snidal argued that relative gains do not represent an inhibiting impact on 
international cooperation.60 His main claim is that in conditions other than bipolarity, 
relative gains are not as important to the actors.61 Neoliberal views of the international 
system retain useful explanatory power as they support the role of norms and regimes 
which are in turn supported and sustained by international institutions. 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: AFTER THE HEGEMON 
FALLS 
Derived primarily from realist tradition, international institutions are defined as 
those structures within the international system that will provide states with the same 
stability that was provided previously by a hegemon. After the failure and decline of a 
hegemon, the common goods it provided will become the responsibility of international 
institutions. An international institution is a persistent and connected set of rules both 
formal and informal that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
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expectations. These institutions are larger in concept than a regime as they can and will 
shape state's behavior in a range of issue areas vice a single one as regimes do. States 
join institutions in a realist view due to their cost versus benefit analysis and will attempt 
to change these institutions when their analysis dictates they do so. 
Three distinct schools of thought within these concepts evolved in the 1980's: 
conventional structural school, modified structural school, and the Grotian school. The 
conventional structural school of international institutions, in a pure realist view, 
recognizes institutions exist but see their power as far less than that of states. States' 
power will determine outcomes of interactions in the international system. The 
modified structural school sees institutions as potentially having impacts on the system 
when the Pareto-optimal (game theory) outcomes between states do not have the 
expected impact.64 States will use regimes under these institutions to achieve desired 
outcomes in a particular issue area. In the modified structural school view, institutions 
will achieve better outcomes. The Grotian School believes that institutions are threaded 
through the life of world politics and that they play fundamental roles in the system 
including with the powerful states.65 This school sees institutions as being normative by 
nature, that they have a moral basis as they ask states to determine what good will come 
from their actions. Grotians see a better world is achieved through the use of institutions. 
Institutions have three functions: lower transaction costs, increase transparency 
and increase trust between states. Institutions offer states a "place" to interact at low costs 
as they typically provide a forum for mediation. The cost of talking is always lower for a 
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state than war where citizens die and national treasury are spent. Institutions provide a set 
of norms around which actor expectations converge which in turn form the basis for good 
understanding. Transparency is increased informally as states interact through exchanges 
of ideas and views. Institutions have rules that require transparency such as the IAEA's 
access to NPT signatory states. Greater transparency within institutions leads to greater 
trust. Cheating is readily visible and is quickly punished as state actions are always under 
review. Institutions make expectations for states more clear than in bilateral state 
relationships. Repeated transactions between member states primarily through meetings 
allow for verification, review and updating the rules within the institution which in turn 
will result in compliance and behavior management. 
One of the central concepts used to describe the impact of institutions on states, is 
the "shadow of the future" of state interactions.66 The longer states expect to be 
interacting then the shadow of the future will be said to lengthen. In terms of security, if 
states interact through institutions over a long time then states will sense their cost benefit 
analysis will continue to push them to interact. This projection of the future where the 
"shadow" is lengthened is a positive one which will in turn shape a state's behavior in the 
present. A long shadow will push states to comply and cooperate in the short run and be 
less likely cheat or defect from the institution. If states perceive a short shadow of the 
future, then cheating will likely not be punished. Over time states will lengthen and 
deepen cooperation as long as others do and work to prevent "bad" state behavior. This 
concept forms the core of the normative description of institutions and regimes where 
rules will in the long run shape states behavior. In order to effectively develop a common 
understanding of the NPT goals, both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
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states require these goals to be framed in such a way that matches their view of the 
international system and their future in it. 
In an effort to bridge the gap between the two schools of international relations 
that bear on this issue, this research suggests the formation of a hybrid theory which 
provides the potential to allow nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states 
including emergent or undeclared nuclear states to develop a more frequent multilateral 
effort to achieve the goals of the NPT. First, the issue of eventual extinction of nuclear 
weapons has clearly been decided as early as 1970. Even the non-signatories of the NPT 
have from time to time indicated their willingness to eliminate nuclear weapons under the 
assumption that the regional issues that placed them in the security dilemmas driving 
their requirements for the weapons are resolved. The majority of the world's states do not 
possess any nuclear capabilities either for security or electric power generation. Most of 
the world's states do not face an extant security threat and as a result have no need for 
nuclear weapons. So how does one resolve the issue of the needs of the few outweighing 
the needs of the rest? This research suggests the development of a "hybrid" explanation 
that is useful for both power focused states (realist view) and states seeking international 
cooperation to resolve their security issues (normative view). This hybrid explanation is 
developed to provide a common ground, a new language of sorts for two different 
security cultures to seek and understand how to reach a mutual understanding leading to 
nuclear disarmament through cooperation. As this theory is developed, it is important to 
note that all states have a certain amount of both power and normative based conceptions 
of the international environment depending on the issue under consideration. This hybrid 
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theory discussion that follows is an attempt to acknowledge this reality and seek to 
determine the extent that a useful theory that describes it can be developed. 
BRIDGING A THEORY DIVIDE: A HYBRID EXPLANATION FOR NUCLEAR 
DISARMAMENT COOPERATION 
Given the very different views of the international environment of nuclear 
weapons states from those of non-nuclear weapon states, a hybrid explanation of how to 
cooperate on the goal of nuclear disarmament for both would be useful. Such a hybrid 
explanation would provide a framework that explains the requirement in a power-based 
way for nuclear weapons states and regionally threatened states while adding in 
normative based procedures that provide appropriate transparency and irreversibility to 
reassure the rest of the international system. Importantly, all states use both power and 
normative based explanations for their policies and actions depending on the issue being 
considered. As a result, all states have a less than infinite set of options in the 
international environment. The deeper all states cooperate, each has a further limited set 
of options especially in the area of using force to resolve security issues. From this 
reality, the ability to find an explanation theoretically for state interaction that would lead 
to nuclear disarmament that combines both power and normative concepts is possible. 
The most useful concept from international relations theory for this hybrid explanation 
lies in a discussion of gains from actions states take. Neorealist explanations have seen 
states as focused on relative gains in the security arena while neoliberalist explanations 
have suggested absolute gains matter more. 
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The essential components of this argument will be discussed in the context of 
three case studies which in turn discuss the three central components of this argument, 
the requirement and utility of an arms control and non-proliferation regime backed by 
international institutions and a multilateral treaty, the weakness of arms control through 
bilateral agreements alone, and the importance of leadership by one state to act as catalyst 
and sustainer of the disarmament effort. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, 
achievement of nuclear disarmament is a common goal of the international community 
embodied in the NPT but progress toward this goal has been uneven at best. The first key 
to furthering the agenda of nuclear disarmament, as highlighted in the NPT case study, is 
reinforcement of a single issue nuclear disarmament regime. This regime would be 
focused on widening the agenda of bilateral nuclear arms control through a wider 
engagement of nuclear states beyond the United States and Russia first to the N5 then 
regional conflict focused states such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Israel and 
their neighbors and finally a universal discussion sponsored by the UN. Keys to its 
success would be multilateral efforts to enable transparency, irreversibility and a focus on 
absolute gains for all states. Gains, as will be discussed later in this chapter, are the 
common reference point for neorealist or structural realist states and normative or 
neoliberal institutionalist states. 
In order to achieve the common goal of disarmament, all states need to understand 
the limitations of bilateral agreements which the case study on the ABM Treaty shows. A 
vary narrowly focused arms control agreement may satisfy each party's desire to "do 
something" about the systems that are perceived to lower the costs of using force against 
the other. The power of a single state's leadership to influence such an agreement as it is 
63 
developed cannot be overstated. These agreements may also provide useful processes for 
removing these systems and opening a lasting channel of discussion between the parties 
such as the ABM's Standing Consultation Committee. However, as the unilateral 
withdrawal of the United States from the ABM in 2002 highlights the major weakness in 
bilateral agreements is the lack of other parties to provide a deeper binding of the 
agreement. A single influential state, which in the current environment this research 
indicates is the United States, can also be equally useful as a catalyst and sustainer of 
both bilateral efforts to reduce the two largest nuclear stockpiles and serve as a 
confidence and momentum builder for further multilateral disarmament. 
States can be divided into essentially two camps, one which follows power based 
concepts and the other seeking normative or a rules based society. These views are not 
necessarily in conflict as has been discussed power based states can and often do 
cooperate if not for normative reasons. Each group, power and normative based states, 
sees the requirement to calculate the gain achieved from future interaction in the 
international environment. In the nuclear issue area, nuclear weapon states tend to 
perceive the security environment in power based or structural realism terms. As has been 
discussed earlier, states that perceive the international environment as a Waltz-like 
system accept that this system is anarchic and security focused where military power is 
the primary guarantor of a state's security. These states tend to seek to maximize their 
power relative to other states especially those that are perceived as threats. In this system, 
force is most often seen as the eventual option required for the survival of the state, a 
constant concern. Relative gains a state receives in this system are often sought as a 
means to eventually be used against other "weaker" states. Since the narrative these states 
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have is focused on such concepts as power, threats, relative gains and use offeree, 
persuading their leaders to seek an actual end state such as nuclear disarmament will be 
difficult at best. A hybrid explanation that is able to offer a potential alternative to 
holding to relative gains calculus is needed. 
This issue within international relations theory has long been a point of debate 
between structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism in general terms. Robert Powell 
provided an effort to align discussions of conflict and cooperation into a single analytic 
framework which sought to shift "the focus of analysis away from preferences to 
constraints" facing states. Powell observed that in line with structural realism, states 
focus on relative gains "when the possible use of force is at issue." This seeking of 
relative gains is at the core of realist views on the potential for cooperation in an anarchic 
system. Unequal absolute gains in the neorealist international system as an option of 
cooperation are unsustainable due to the issue of defection of states to allow them to 
achieve a relative gain. Cooperation will be achievable when force is not a part of the 
future outcomes as any state's relative loss will not result in harm to the state by another 
in the future. When this is the case that relative gains are no longer important to states, 
cooperation is possible. Powell developed a simple structural model that produced three 
results which are supported by this argument and accompanying research and serve as a 
point of departure for forming a hybrid explanation for nuclear disarmament. 
Powell's model merging relative and absolute gains produced three important 
results. First, the differences to the two approaches to state interaction should focus on 
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constraints not state preferences for future action.69 Powell observes through his model 
that Waltz's view of the international system does not adequately account for changes in 
constraints on states particularly whether or not a state should use force to achieve 
relative gains. He cites repeated plays of games such as those involving the Prisoner's 
Dilemma that give a state additional relative gains without a significant advantage over 
another state as evidence. Second, Waltz's system is unable to account for variations in 
the feasibility of cooperation.70 Powell also believes that his model "clarifies the relation 
between anarchy and cooperation by helping to explain why anarchy does not imply a 
lack of cooperation in some systems but does impede cooperation in others as 
neoliberalism has shown."71 Finally, cooperation is dependent on the degree of whether 
or not the use of force is considered an option. Powell believes that cooperation is not 
necessarily dependent on a universal government to enforce the rules as neoliberal 
institutionalism proposes. However, a lack of such a government makes enforcement of 
rules to sustain cooperation more difficult. This lack of central authority and constraints 
on states also offer the opportunity for some states to take advantage of relative gains to 
the disadvantage of others. 
Taking Powell's discussion a step further into a specific issue area in the 
international system, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, a direct extension of his 
work is possible. If states rely on nuclear weapons as a part of their security, then as long 
as each sees these weapons as providing a relative advantage over another in a future use 
of force and in absence of a central authority, the weapons will remain. Those states that 
see international institutions and agreements as valuable prefer to seek the absolute gain 
69
 Ibid., 1305. 
70
 Ibid., 1312. 
66 
for all states by subtracting these weapons from the potential use of force calculus. Any 
strengthening of enforcement of universal agreements, in this case the NPT, through the 
UN's IAEA and backed by the UN Security Council would serve as a means to raise the 
cost of the use of force above the level where states see a future advantage of any relative 
gain. 
The current issue of alleged Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapons program serves 
as a current test case of the strength of this concept. Assuming Iran is seeking nuclear 
weapons, success in stopping this effort would serve as an effective example of this 
model and offer power based states a reminder of the potential of multilateral efforts. The 
recurring attempts by North Korea to engage the United States in a bilateral discussion 
and the United States continued policy of supporting only a multilateral effort offers 
additional support for the likelihood of a hybrid explanation of the path to nuclear 
disarmament. Other specific initiatives have allowed the United States and Russia to 
provide evidence that the security framework these states operate within may not require 
nuclear weapons indefinitely. 
PRACTICAL STEPS AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS 
As an example of initial steps taken by the United States and Russia, efforts like 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, offer appropriate economics 
based incentives to comply with treaty requirements while building a sufficient level of 
trust between the participants. Removal of the Libyan WMD programs under 
international supervision is another example. States have to see the alignment of short-
term interests with long term international goals in order to decide to comply with 
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established multilateral norms. Regardless of the internal staff rationale for making the 
decision to disarm, the international community must be prepared to support that decision 
in the long term. Financial and political incentives are likely key to such efforts. 
Ultimately, the issue of nuclear disarmament will neither be quickly resolved nor 
remain permanently completed without a concerted and sustained multilateral effort. 
Nuclear disarmament is a stated objective of the United States and all but four states in 
the international system. This dissertation suggests that international institutions backed 
by both power based and normative focused states in a multilateral effort is required to 
shift the focus of the international security environment away from the use of force which 
nuclear weapons provide the "ultimate security guarantee." The case studies that follow 
show the potential of a multilateral agreement like the NPT and the weaknesses and slow 
progress of the 40 year U.S./Russian nuclear arms control effort. The agenda provided by 
President Obama in Prague in April 2009 and the resulting new strategic nuclear arms 
agreement between the United States and Russia offers fresh evidence of the power of 
state leadership to create momentum toward nuclear disarmament. The potential to widen 
the nuclear conversation beyond the bilateral relationship is also a part of the U.S. nuclear 
arms policy agenda as evidenced by the April 2010 U.S. sponsored 47 nation Nuclear 
Security Summit and strong support for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. While these 
initiatives are welcome, getting global consensus will remain difficult. 
Nuclear weapons states like the P5 will find it difficult to disarm without 
sufficient mutually reinforcing behaviors on the part of the other states. For example, the 
United States would have to refrain from attempting to describe China or Russia as a 
potential military competitor in such documents like its Nuclear Policy Review. De-
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alerting nuclear forces and allowing IAEA or at least bilateral confidence building, 
inspection and verification efforts to become routine practices among all nuclear states 
would be essential to advancing toward the NPT goal. Support for these activities is well 
within the power-based side of international relations theory and are proven methods that 
were used in completion of the INF Treaty as well as the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty provides a better fit for any 
multilateral nuclear disarmament program than the bilateral INF Treaty. 
The non-nuclear weapons states would provide a ready pool of support for the 
development of additional inspectors and negotiators who could offer and insist on 
changes to strengthen the NPT. Efforts in the past have been stalled by nuclear weapons 
states that were for a number of reasons unable or unwilling to commit to changes that 
did not seem to reassure them that the potential for cheating was eliminated. Given the far 
more integrated international environment, efforts to educate state elites on the history, 
theory and implications of nuclear weapons to all states are likely far more influential and 
simplified than during the Cold War. In a recent NPT Review workshop held in the 
Philippines, the Republic's Foreign Secretary expressed concern for the need to work for 
an improved NPT in order "to benefit Filipinos, especially those living and working 
overseas." 
His nation was proud to lead the effort "because it is in our national interest to 
strive for a world free from the threat of these devastating and inhumane weapons. There 
is not a single corner in this small world of ours where you will not find a Filipino who 
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could be adversely affected with the use of nuclear weapons."72 This view is likely felt by 
a majority of non-nuclear weapons states and contains both the norm of disarmament 
enshrined in the NPT as well as alignment of state interest in protecting its people from 
nuclear threats without using military force as a response. Leadership in the NPT Review 
by a non-nuclear weapons state is a significant opportunity for the normative focused 
states to engage the nuclear weapons states in a common effort to disarm. Support in this 
effort from the United States and other nuclear weapons states will be critical. 
Increased access to other states academic research, historical studies, as well as 
cultural experiences that would help states with little knowledge of the impact of nuclear 
weapons both from a security or power based perspective as well as a societal or social 
impact such as that of the Japanese, Russians and Americans. Reform of the United 
Nations Security Council to allow increased influence of states with a normative view of 
security issues might be another important step toward the goals of the UN Charter and 
NPT. 
Full U.S. support to the NPT community and its goal of total disarmament would 
have to be a prerequisite to the required further bonding of all states to the norms of this 
regime. From the NPT's initiation through each of its key stages including the 1995 
decision to permanently extend its mandate, each positive step has occurred with the full 
support of the United States. The current difficulties in further solidifying the treaty's 
norms have also been in part due to incomplete U.S. support for these initiatives. The 
upcoming 2010 NPT Review will likely succeed or fail on U.S. support for any 
recommended changes. 
72Jerry E. Esplanada, "Rp Riding High, Heads Nix Nuke Conference," Philippine Daily Inquirer 
On-line edition, January 31, 2010. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100130-
250247/RP-riding-high-heads-nix-nuke-conference (accessed February 5, 2010). 
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A security regime that is strengthened by universal state acceptance and 
evidenced by state behavior in compliance with its rules and norms is seen to be 
providing a needed public good to participating states. States view of their future in terms 
of security is important to how they will likely behave in reaction to this view. Robert 
Axelrod's description of cooperation among states or "lengthening the shadow of the 
future" is useful for both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states in terms 
of how they will view future NPT efforts.73 One state has the experience, resources and 
moral position to lead the effort to lengthen the shadow of the future for all states in 
terms of the nuclear issue: the United States. 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES: LEADERSHIP TOWARD DISARMAMENT 
The United States must seek to reinforce the NPT through a range of activities 
that both reduce the threat of a nuclear event in the near term and eventually eliminate it 
altogether thus lengthening the shadow of the future for all states. The public goods that 
this leadership would produce include freedom from nuclear threats, attacks or accidents 
as well as opening up the opportunities for economic benefits that come from nuclear 
power based electricity production. The United States has the requisite position and 
power to help all states adjust their cost versus benefit calculation of trading in weapons 
for economic property and the security that comes with increased wealth. Similarly, the 
United States should continue the tradition of bilateral negotiations with Russia until 
these states' arsenals reach an equivalent level with the other nuclear weapons states 
when an increasingly multilateral negotiation under the NPT norms should be developed. 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
71 
The essential components of this argument will be discussed in the context of 
three case studies that follow in the next three chapters which in turn discuss the three 
central components of this argument, the requirement and utility of an arms control and 
non-proliferation regime backed by international institutions and a multilateral treaty, the 
weakness of arms control through bilateral agreements alone, and the importance of 
leadership by one state to act as catalyst and sustainer of the disarmament effort. In the 
next chapter, the first case study of this work provides a discussion of the history, 
strengths and weaknesses of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as well as a suggested 
set of options to adapt it for the future. Following the NPT case study, the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty provides an example of the limitations of a bilateral nuclear agreement, 
describes the relationship of such agreements to limiting arms races and offers key 
components for an effective nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The third 
and final case study discusses the impact of national leadership on negotiations and 
resulting agreements through a review of the United States and Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation strategic arms reductions agreements from the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT I) to the current negotiations of a follow on agreement to START I. To 
achieve nuclear disarmament, the ultimate stated goal of U.S. nuclear arms policy, 
leadership of the United States in a multilateral arms control and non-proliferation regime 
that learns the lessons of the past is required. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: A CASE STUDY IN REGIME 
MAINTENANCE 
As long as some nations continue to insist that nuclear weapons are essential 
to their security, other nations will want them. There is no way around this 
simple truth. 
Former Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, 
International Atomic Energy Agency1 
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek 
the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. 
President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, 
April 5, 20092 
While El Baradei's simple truth about nuclear weapons as a guarantee of state 
security is difficult to discount, he does offer the opening that if states, most importantly 
the original nuclear weapon states, were to stop insisting that these weapons were 
required then other states could reconsider their options. The United States has had a 
stated policy to work to reach total nuclear disarmament since the initial signing of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3 The actions of the United States since the 
beginning of this multilateral effort have not always followed the path toward the goals of 
the treaty. With the end of the Cold War now two decades past, the opportunity for the 
United States to regain a position of leadership among nations to achieve the goals of the 
1
 Mohamed El Baradei, '"Globalizing Security: A Challenge for Your Generation,' 
Commencement Address to the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, MD, May 25,2006," International Atomic Energy Agency website, 2009. 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n008.html (accessed October 9,2009). 
2
 Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 
15,2009." 
3A full copy of the Treaty can be found in the Appendix A or from the United Nations Office of 
Disarmament Affairs website, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed October 6,2009). 
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NPT through multilateral and bilateral efforts has arrived. The President has stated his 
commitment toward the goals of the NPT and has been actively aligning both U.S. policy 
and nuclear negotiations with this purpose. Each of the emerging policies and activities 
by the United States can ultimately be measured against the degree of international 
progress toward the NPT goals. The difficulty of the past four decades of the NPT 
provide an appropriate case study in the power of multilateral efforts and the 
effectiveness of a leader state such as the United States to achieve the stated goals of the 
treaty. As the argument presented in the dissertation asserts, the essential element of 
successful multilateral efforts to control and eliminate nuclear weapons is leadership of 
the first nuclear weapon state toward the goals of the NPT. 
This case study will review the history of the NPT from its development through 
the current period where the treaty will be undergoing its five year review which offers 
an opportunity to reinforce its regime and advance toward its disarmament goal. The 
history of the NPT offers the reader an understanding of the difficulty of reaching a 
multilateral agreement as well as its durability. Contained within the case is a discussion 
of the NPTs strengths, weaknesses and potential improvements that would further the 
agenda of nuclear disarmament. The NPT provides a rich platform to discuss the 
importance of multilateral agreements and international institutions to the maintenance of 
a nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime which is the first main element of 
this dissertation's argument. As will be shown, the NPT's weaknesses can and should be 
addressed through a renewed interest in the non-proliferation and disarmament process 
reenergized by one state, specifically the United States in a leadership role. 
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OVERVIEW 
The keystone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970. The three goals of the agreement, no state to 
state transfers of nuclear weapons (Article I), sharing nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes (Article IV), and nuclear disarmament (Article VI) have been almost universally 
accepted in principle by all but a handful of states. In general, these goals have been 
respected and continue to be respected by the vast majority of states. As with any 
multilateral agreement, the NPT has both strengths and weaknesses which have direct 
impact on the successful achievement of its goals. 
This case study of the NPT in the contemporary context contains a discussion of 
the weaknesses in the treaty. A discussion of the current Iranian nuclear issue highlights 
many of the important problems within the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the 
difficulty with reaching total nuclear disarmament. One of the important elements in 
understanding the complexity of the Iranian issue is viewed through the concept of how 
states develop a strategic culture and are influenced by their strategic elites. These elites 
still must work through the calculus of deterrence as the key concept to the rationale for 
developing and deploying nuclear arms. As the added complexity of achieving 
multilateral norms may at times be seen as opposing national interests, other means must 
be sought for convincing states through their elites that the loss of perceived power in 
adherence with such a norm is beneficial in the long run. Epistemic communities have 
achieved such gains in other issue areas such as the environment and international law of 
the seas and may provide an important new dimension toward nuclear disarmament. One 
of the key features of an effective regime lies in how states are persuaded to accept a loss 
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of freedom to take actions within the international environment for the gains offered by 
conformance to the regime's norms. The leadership of a single state in the non-
proliferation regime is seen as essential with the United States being the best candidate 
for the position. The research conducted for this case study indicates that the NPT 
remains the best international agreement in support of a regime that promotes non-
proliferation and eventual disarmament, requires a means to effectively deal with the 
differing state views of the role of nuclear weapons and will rely on the emergence of a 
single state leader, most likely the United States, that can set and persuade compliance 
with regime norms, rules and procedures. The 2010 NPT Review Conference provides an 
obvious opportunity for the United States to seek such leadership. 
THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR POWER: PREVENTING PROLIFERATION 
For several decades, a great deal of effort to control the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction has yielded an international non-proliferation regime. The purpose of 
these efforts is to check the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with the 
ultimate goal of elimination of all WMD capabilities. Consisting of interlocking 
agreements, verification tools and controls on production of WMD, the non-proliferation 
regime has seen both success and failure. After pursuing various WMD programs for 
national interests, Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina have been persuaded by these 
agreements and the associated international pressure to eliminate their respective 
programs. Chemical and biological weapons programs have a number of complexities 
from production to operational employment that make them less desirable than 
conventional or even nuclear weapons. Yet with nuclear weapons, there remains a 
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constant residual power that these weapons offer to both established nuclear weapon 
states as well as those who see the advantages they offer against other states with superior 
conventional forces. Some states have taken the lesson of the last two decades of the 
dominance of U.S. conventional power that the best defense against this power is through 
nuclear arms programs. 
These other nations who see nuclear arms as an appropriate defense to external 
extant or perceived threats have rejected these agreements either in part or total lessening 
the opportunities to make further progress. Some nations have for various reasons either 
openly or clandestinely developed, tested, deployed and used their WMD as in the case of 
Iraq and Iran. The case of Iraq is without doubt the best known example of a nation 
doing all it could to gain a full complement of WMD, prepare, deploy and employ them 
in combat while maintaining a public position of the opposite.4 Their example is not 
likely unique. Most experts agree that only with the full and continuing support of the 
five nuclear weapon states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) 
named in the NPT (known as the P5) will other nations curb and eventually eliminate 
their WMD programs. While only limited success has been achieved, with continuing 
verification efforts and a willingness of the nation being inspected to fully comply with 
the spirit and intent of the various agreements, actual WMD disarmament can occur. 
Even the P5 would eventually have to submit for the goal of WMD disarmament to be 
reached. As long as any of these nations see a potential or actual threat that can be 
deterred by the possession of nuclear arms or other WMD, reductions will be difficult to 
achieve. Some experts have even begun to see the continuing utility of nuclear weapons 
4
 Joseph Cirincione, Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (New York: Routledge, 2000), 175-84. 
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as a deterrent not only to similar weapons but also the use of chemical and biological 
weapons citing Iraq's restraint from using chemical or biological warheads on their 
SCUD missiles in the Gulf War of 1991.5 
Would the United States have used nuclear weapons to retaliate on Iraq in 1991? 
Fortunately, the question was not answered at the time. As has been demonstrated in 
2003, the United States chose to use conventional force to action its concern for Iraq's 
alleged WMD capabilities. The problem still lies in the age-old issue of national interest 
being held up as superior to achievement of disarmament. With the addition of both 
declared and undeclared nuclear states since the NPT was signed, the calculus for 
continuing disarmament under the original "rules" has become increasingly complicated. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty stands as one of if not the most significant and 
accepted international agreement in the arms control arena. Nearly all of the world's 
states are signatories with a lesser number having ratified and fully supporting all of its 
constraints. Weaknesses in inspection and verification as well as controlling dual use 
technologies that were a part of the original treaty have been strengthened over time but 
still require state compliance in order to be effective. The three most recent crises over 
compliance have focused attention on three states that were not willing to adhere to the 
NPT norms: North Korea, Iraq and Iran. While Iraq has been resolved by the U.S. led 
intervention and North Korea seems to have emerged as a nuclear state, Iran remains the 
focus of concern over the effectiveness of the NPT. A review of the development of the 
treaty, its goals and weaknesses with a focus on the current issues will provide key 
insights on the value of the treaty and the viability of the non-proliferation regime. 
5
 See Oliver Thranert, "Nuclear Weapons: A Deterrent to Biological Warfare?" in David G. 
Haglund, ed. Pondering NATO's Nuclear Options: Gambits for a Post-Westphalian World (Kingston: 
Queen's Quarterly: John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, 1999), 81-104. 
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Despite the weaknesses inherent in the original treaty, the three pillars of the agreement, 
non-transfer of nuclear weapons technology, seeking total nuclear disarmament and 
sharing nuclear technology for civilian uses remain essential to the security of the 
international environment. In order to better understand the value of a multilateral 
agreement to achieve international goals of the magnitude of nuclear non-proliferation, 
support of civilian uses of nuclear power and eventually nuclear disarmament, a review 
of the history of the NPT provides important insights on how the treaty was constructed 
and its important features. 
BUILDING A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NPT 
The movement to create a universal control of nuclear weapons leading to their 
eventual elimination has roots as deep as any in international relations. As long as 
humans have fought each other, there have been efforts to control the tools by which they 
use force. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the only nation to have used 
nuclear weapons in war, the United States, proposed a complete ban and the rules by 
which this ban should be implemented.6 The Truman Administration forwarded the 
Baruch Plan in 1946 to the newly formed UN Atomic Energy Commission which had 
two key elements that remain central to the discussion of nuclear issues today: 
recommendations on how to totally eliminate nuclear weapons and on how to control the 
exploitation of nuclear materials for production of energy both through internationally 
6
 Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary 
International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 2 (1987): 264-65. In discussing the 
theoretical basis for a non-proliferation regime, Roger K. Smith argues that the US took this approach not 
as the common interpretation of history as a natural posture of a hegemonic state seeking to protect the 
sources of its power. Instead, Smith suggests the historical record of US efforts to form regimes in other 
areas such as economic recovery through the Marshall Plan as a part of an open international trade regime 
were successful. US efforts with the assistance of the UK to control access to nuclear weapons and 
materials were not, essentially showing that cooperation is not the result of hegemonic control. 
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regulated controls. This plan specifically called for "international managerial control or 
ownership over all potential weapon-related nuclear facilities, as well as powers to 
license and inspect all other nuclear activities."8 As would become the pattern for the 
future, the Soviet Union response was to submit a plan that was based on national control 
and ownership.9 Within three years, the Soviets would have their own nuclear weapons 
followed by the United Kingdom in 1952. As this occurred, the United States abandoned 
its efforts to deny other states from acquiring nuclear capability to a position of 
cooperation with the formulation of the Atoms for Peace program in 1953.10 This 
program formed the basis for the non-proliferation regime later codified with the NPT 
signing. Serious negotiations on limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons began in 
1954 with the initial focus on allowing individual national control and ownership of all 
aspects of a state's nuclear programs "but overlaying this with international arrangements 
to provide assurances that these activities were not being used for military explosive 
purposes."11 These discussions led to the formation of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in October 1956. 
During this period, the U.S. Congress passed legislation called the Atomic Energy 
Acts of 1954 and 1958 with the aim of limiting the flow of nuclear capabilities to those 
7
 John Simpson, Kristan Stoddart, and Marion Swinerd, "Mountbatten Center for International 
Studies CNS NPT Briefing Book (2008 Edition)," Mountbatten Centre for International Studies website, 
2008, Part I, 12. http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/briefingbook 2008/pdfs/npt briefingbook08 partl.pdf 
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nations the United States was willing to assist. The 1954 act was to arrange how U.S. 
government agencies and civilian firms could transfer nuclear material and processes to 
other nations for the peaceful development of nuclear energy for primarily power 
production. The 1958 act delineated the limited transfer of nuclear weapons designs to 
U.S. Allies to facilitate the carriage and use of U.S. nuclear weapons in wartime as well 
as how to operate in a nuclear combat environment.12 Unfortunately, the result of the 
1958 Act was the unintended signal to all states that they could negotiate bilateral 
arrangements relatively freely on nuclear weapons issues outside of any multilateral 
arrangement just as the United States intended to do.13 This U.S. move would serve to 
undermine the effectiveness of the IAEA. Equally unhelpful to the regime being 
established was the formation of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM), regional entity that was separate from any UN or single state solution.14 
These events show the initial outline of the early period of nuclear non-proliferation 
policy making that raises the question of how an effective and lasting regime could be set 
in place and maintained if individual states selected positions that would be 
counterbalancing as in the case of the bipolar United States and then Soviet Union's 
relationship. 
During this early period, nuclear non-proliferation developments were 
characterized by the growth of the IAEA and its safeguards and sanctions development, 
U.S. efforts to provide its allies with nuclear weapons, the spread of technical knowledge 
to various states in order to develop peaceful uses of nuclear power, and most importantly 
12
 Simpson, Stoddart, and Swinerd, "Mountbatten Center for International Studies CNS NPT 




 Ibid. See also the EURATOM website for more details on the current activities of this 
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to the non-proliferation regime, the birth and growth of a process for nuclear 
disarmament negotiations.15 Additionally, this era saw the outline of specific issues that 
would frame the non-proliferation agenda for the foreseeable future emerge: slowing and 
eventually halting the testing and further development of nuclear weapons, slowing the 
nuclear arms race, dismantling and destruction of existing weapons, verification of status 
of nuclear programs, banning nuclear weapons from entire geographic regions and steps 
to prevent the spread of devices and technology to more states.16 
One of the early efforts to control the nuclear arms race was somewhat successful 
in slowing the competition by limiting testing. The Comprehensive Ban on Nuclear 
Testing (CBT) while not achieving an actual treaty led the three nuclear weapon states of 
the time to establish a moratorium on testing from 1958-1961.17 The key issue blocking 
agreement was the inspection protocols to verify compliance which were seen as too 
intrusive to be acceptable. The Soviet Union resumed testing in 1961 followed by the 
United States two years later. As the prospects for agreement on a complete ban faded, 
the states sought to achieve some limits on testing through the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT). The PTBT was seen as a path to slow development of military weapons by 
agreeing to prohibit all but underground testing.18 In succeeding years, the states were 
unable to limit nuclear weapons through a curtailment of the production of nuclear fissile 
material. As the desire to build nuclear power plants increased, the inability to see a clear 
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controlled both of these processes caused "insurmountable difficulties"19 in achieving any 
form of agreement. In 1964, the leaders of the three nuclear weapons states separately 
announced national intentions to put measures in place to limit future fissile material 
production for military purposes. 
By this time, attempts to limit nuclear proliferation through the creation of 
regional nuclear free zones were at an impasse, ideas to form an international agreement 
to deal with the potential for proliferation of nuclear technology leading to weapons 
development and deployment had developed sufficiently to encourage a group of states to 
develop the NPT under the auspices of the United Nations. Resolution 2028 was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 1965 outlined the terms under which the NPT was to be 
negotiated.21 Five main tenets of the NPT for the negotiations to conclude were: 
• No loopholes that would allow states to proliferate nuclear weapons in any form; 
• Should balance the mutual responsibilities and obligations of both nuclear and 
non-nuclear states; 
• Should be a step on the road to achieve global complete disarmament including 
nuclear disarmament; 
• To assure the NPTs effectiveness, it should include "acceptable and workable 
provisions"; 
19
 Simpson, Stoddart, and Swinerd, "Mountbatten Center for International Studies CNS NPT 
Briefing Book (2008 Edition)." 
20
 Ibid. 
21Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OP ANAL). "United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2028, Non proliferation of nuclear weapons," 
OPANAL website, 2009. http://www.opanal.org/Docs/UN/Res-2028.pdf (accessed October 9, 2009). 
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• Should contain no provisions that would negatively impact "the right of any group 
of states to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties."22 
By 1966, the forum to negotiate the NPT had migrated to the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which was not a formal UN entity but met in Geneva 
on the UN compound, was co-chaired by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and included 
several non-aligned nations as well as allies of the co-chairs. Neither Germany nor Japan 
were members but the United States assisted by Italy provided coordination in an 
eventually successful effort to craft a treaty that both would sign.23 Articles I and II of the 
NPT were developed by the United States and U.S.S.R. and dealt with retaining current 
U.S. agreements on bilateral transfers of nuclear capabilities with NATO allies as well as 
the ability to transfer and store nuclear weapons during wartime but prohibited transfer of 
complete nuclear weapon systems in peacetime.24 One key missing provision in the NPT 
was any prohibition of "the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons states' nuclear 
systems in a non-nuclear weapons state."25 Article III, negotiated in 1967, provided 
verification provisions through the existing IAEA with the EURO ATOM agency 
agreeing to submit to these same safeguards at the insistence of the Soviets.26 
In an effort to fulfill the intent of the signatories to expand the access to nuclear 
energy production for economic development, Article IV enshrined "the inalienable right 
of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes without discrimination" which was intended to help developing 
22
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nations in particular. Reflecting the early days of nuclear evolution, Article V allows for 
non-nuclear states to have access to research data from nuclear testing. Article VII 
allows for regional nuclear weapons free zones to be negotiated. Articles VIII, IX, X and 
XI provide the processes and procedures for amendments and their review; signing and 
ratification; withdrawal and long-term viability of the NPT; and equality of the five 
different language versions respectively.29 
The main goal of the NPT in the short run was to limit and eventually stop nuclear 
arms races particularly between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with the ultimate goal 
of elimination of all nuclear weapons, total disarmament. Specifically this would be 
carried out through negotiations among the states. Article VI states: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.30 
By 1968, an agreed wording of the treaty was reached, states began to sign. Key 
delineations of the treaty negotiated over time established both the goals of the treaty and 
the sources of continuing concern and issues as to the ability of the agreement to actually 
achieve the intended results. First, the NPT established the dividing line between nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapon states declaring a nuclear weapon state "is one which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 
January 1, 1967."31 The other key operational concept of the NPT was the dual 
obligations of nuclear weapons states to refrain from providing nuclear weapons or 
27
 Appendix A, 320. 
28
 Appendix A, 321. 
29
 Appendix A, 320-2. 
30
 Appendix A, 320. 
31
 Appendix A, Art IX, section 3, 321. 
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related technology and the non-nuclear weapons states from receiving, making or 
accepting assistance in the development of nuclear weapons.32 Two years later the NPT 
went into force with the hopes that negotiations to tie the treaty to the IAEA inspection 
protocols would follow in short order. 
The true power of any treaty that involves arms reduction is a combination of 
compliance of the signatory states and an agreed inspection protocol. While states may 
act in accordance with the letter of a treaty, confidence that they have done so and will 
continue to comply rests within the evidence of compliance provided to both signatories 
as well as states and interested parties outside of the treaty. Since the NPT was 
envisioned to account for and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons while promoting 
peaceful uses of nuclear power, the requirement for compliance verification would be 
crucial to success. Eventually, signature states were able to agree to the use of the IAEA 
process for inspection and verification through lengthy negotiations. These negotiations 
set the precedent for recurring negotiations during each of the five-year reviews of the 
treaty. The obvious most distant goal set by the treaty of total disarmament would 
continue to elude the party states to the present time due in large part of the interaction of 
the United States and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War and the continuing uncertainty of 
regional security especially in the geographic arc from the Arabian Peninsula to the 
Korean Peninsula. 
In an era of constant suspicion of states' intentions when millions of lives were at 
risk at nearly a moment's notice that existed in the Cold War, this portion of the treaty's 
processes became both key to reaching the treaties goals and subject to intense interest of 
32
 Appendix A, Art I and II respectively, 319. 
33
 George Bunn, "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems," Arms 
Control Today 33, no. 10 (2003): 4-10. 
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both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.34 These two negotiation 
periods, first the ten years from 1958-1968 leading to the opening of the treaty for 
signature and the inspection protocol discussions following this period are key to a full 
understanding of both the power and limitations of achieving even a partial success in 
reducing nuclear weapons both in the past and today. From the inception of the idea of a 
nuclear non-proliferation regime to today, the United States has been at the center of the 
developments and key to negotiations, establishment and maintenance of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. The only states not signatories of the NPT are India, Pakistan, Israel 
and Cuba. All but Cuba allow some IAEA inspections of their nuclear programs.35 
International concerns over questionable or suspected activities on the part of signatory 
states Iraq, Iran and North Korea are seen by detractors as evidence of the weakness of 
international agreements and the inability of their multilateral organizations to be 
effective. 
From the issues surrounding Iraq in the 1990's subsequent to the end of the 1991 
Gulf War, the international community reached agreement on revised IAEA inspection 
protocols that served to strengthen the Agencies ability to detect and warn of treaty 
violations. One of the keys to strengthening the IAEA included providing the Agency 
with improved intelligence which in the case of North Korea led to identification of their 
covert nuclear activities. Spurred a lack of enforcement action from the UN Security 
Council once apprised of the North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections as a 
part of the Agreed Framework between 1994 and 1998, the United States "took the lead 
Amy F. Woolf, "Arms Control and Non-proliferation Activities: A Listing of Events," in Leon 
T. Carter, Arms Control and Non-proliferation: Issues and Analyses (Huntington, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers, 2000), 33. 
87 
in negotiating an agreement that sought to stop construction at North Korea's disputed 
facilities and eventually open them to IAEA inspections."36 While there is some dispute 
over the status of North Korea in relation to its member status in the NPT, the continuing 
interaction of the United States in the process of seeking to enforce compliance of 
member states to the principles of the NPT provides an ongoing example of both the 
difficulties and the potential a multilateral treaty like the NPT. Two other examples of 
the need for enforcement of the NPT include Iraq's efforts to develop various weapons of 
mass destruction including nuclear weapons and the on-going Iranian efforts in the 
nuclear arena that fall in the crease between peaceful uses of nuclear power and potential 
weapons development. Each of these examples will be reviewed next to provide support 
for argument that a multilateral agreement that supports a non-proliferation regime is 
essential to international security environment. Ultimately, these examples support the 
value of sustained U.S. diplomatic leadership in multilateral efforts to deal with nuclear 
proliferation. Since the end of the Cold War, the NPT remains the essential foundation of 
the non-proliferation regime despite dramatic shifts in the international security 
environment including new compliance challenges from a number of states including 
Iraq, North Korea and Iran. The continuing evolution of Iran's nuclear ambitions 
provides an important demonstration of the limits of the current NPT regime and the need 
for a multilateral agenda to deal with those states that resist compliance with NPT norms. 
THE NPT IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD 
Despite the near universal acceptance of the NPT and the demise of the bipolar 
confrontation that marked the Cold War, some states continue to act in concert with their 
36
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interests even when they conflict with the articles of a treaty they have signed and 
ratified. While the NPT was designed to require a reaffirmation of its value after it had 
been in place for 25 years, it would seem that without a universal acceptance of its 
permanence, these states believe in the primacy of their state over international norms. 
One of the key provisions of the treaty was its expiration clause contained in Article X: 
Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or 
shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be 
taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.37 
This relatively unique provision allowed both those states who wanted a means of putting 
some time limits on the schedule for total disarmament and those who would wish to 
hedge their security interests against the constant unknown of the future security 
environment to see their options preserved. Combined with the requirement for five year 
reviews, the NPT at least allowed the member states to have a reminder and a forum for 
review and expression of concern which did not exist. It was clear to many states that 
allowing the two main antagonists of the Cold War to be relied upon to "self-police" was 
problematic as in the time between the first explosions and the beginning of the NPT 
these states made their own decisions on who would share both nuclear energy and more 
importantly nuclear weapons technology. But by the time the 25th anniversary of the 
treaty arrived, this antagonism had at least changed if not disappeared and nearly a dozen 
states had or were seeking nuclear weapons. This change in the international political 
scene did not immediately result in an orderly acceleration of arms negotiations or 
reductions. 
Appendix A, 322. 
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Beyond the issue of how to proceed in negotiations, the immediate nuclear needs 
in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union including determining the final status of 
ICBM systems outside of the Russian borders, securing nuclear material and related 
technology and finding proper employment for nuclear technicians in order to contain the 
further spread of nuclear capability were of immediate concern to the international 
community. At the same time the security situation was changing in Europe, other states 
of concern had the attention of the NPT community. The case of Iraq's alleged weapons 
of mass destruction program is the most controversial due to the 2003 invasion of the 
United States and subsequent continuing events triggered in great part to the lack of 
appropriate cooperation with IAEA inspections by the Iraqis. Another is the case of North 
Korea's decade and a half continuing nuclear brinkmanship beginning with the events 
that resulted in the 1994 Agreement with the United States and its subsequent failure. 
This Agreement was nullified by the United States in reaction to continuing actions by 
North Korea to proceed with a nuclear program in direct violation of their obligations 
under the NPT. During this period, the North Korea's stated their intent to withdraw from 
the NPT itself.38 A more recent challenger to the NPT regime is the on-going issue of the 
Iranian nuclear program. Without a direct diplomatic link to Iran until recently, the 
United States had limited options except to work with other nations to seek Iranian 
compliance with the NPT. The non-adherence to the NPT regime of these states displays 
both the weaknesses and potential strength of the NPT and provides a view into the 
relationship that U.S. involvement in multilateral negotiations and international affairs 
has on outcomes related to NPT enforcement. With Iraq's WMD programs now a matter 
38
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for historians to discuss and North Korea having withdrawn from the NPT and become a 
nuclear state, the future of the NPT's ability to control state proliferation behavior 
continues to be tested by Iran. 
CURRENT CHALLENGE TO THE NPT: CONTROLLING NON-COMPLIANCE 
As fears of a major conventional war in Europe faded, terrorism replaced the 
superpower nuclear confrontation as the main threat to peace. Many experts predict that 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is already under way to more states and potentially 
terrorist groups. Given the recent membership expansion of the nuclear club and the 
potential for more members in the fixture, revision and restatement of the club rules are a 
prerequisite to controlling further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But far from being a 
never ending cycle of more and more states or groups seeking nuclear capabilities, 
reestablishing the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on treaties, backed by 
international inspections and enforced by multilateral state efforts and international 
engagement activities below the state level should allow reduction of the threat of nuclear 
weapon use and the desire to acquire these capabilities. This reinvigorated non-
proliferation regime must be seen as legitimate, fully supported by the international state 
system and energized by non-state groups. In many respects, the challenges of 
combating terrorism are the same as those encountered in controlling the spread of 
nuclear weapons. A non-proliferation regime that is seen as legitimate, that can 
adequately address all states' security concerns and that can be effective in controlling its 
members' nuclear affairs is central to the collective security of the world. 
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IRAN: DANCING ON THE NUCLEAR SEAM BETWEEN PEACEFUL USE AND 
WEAPONS 
One of the facts of the post-Cold War period is that nuclear weapons and their 
delivery systems are still important but different states retain or seek to acquire them for 
different reasons. The original five nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, United 
Kingdom, France and China) remain stewards of varying sizes and capabilities that have 
dramatically fallen in numbers in the last 15 years. Their challenge rests in maintaining a 
reliable capability as a hedge and as a visible symbol of their importance to the 
international system. The next tier of nuclear weapon states has now risen to four with the 
recent North Korean nuclear tests. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea each possess 
their capabilities primarily for regional security balancing but directly impacting the 
international security equation. Of this group, North Korea has caused the most concern 
and may have provided other states with an example that validates Dr. El Baradei's view 
expressed at the beginning of this chapter. While the Six Party talks were not able to 
arrest North Korea's nuclear ambitions, Iran's emerging nuclear calculus has heightened 
international concerns. 
The Iranian effort to develop nuclear capabilities initially for peaceful purposes 
extends back well before current Islamic state and was for many years after the revolution 
dormant. Continued U.S. presence in the region, long term impact of economic sanctions 
and growing nationalism among the people and their leadership has provided an 
opportunity for another NPT signatory to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is 
likely to do so through using domestic civilian nuclear capabilities to enable weapon 
development. 
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Iran's current program to develop nuclear capabilities both for energy as the 
government publicly claims and for weapons as the international community assumes 
began during the 1980-1989 war with its neighbor Iraq.39 As Iranian efforts are difficult 
to identify directly due to the low amount of direct contact with international 
organizations or an open diplomatic outlook, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has provided the best available assessment of the Iranian efforts. The IAEA was 
allowed to inspect and monitor Iranian nuclear energy related programs beginning in 
1974 in accordance with a nuclear safeguards agreement.40 Iran and the IAEA had 
negotiated a nuclear safeguards agreement that the agency eventually concluded had been 
violated by Iran. In August 2002, when the IAEA was informed by Iranian exiles that 
Iran had "built a vast uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak 
without informing the United Nations."41 By December 2002, satellite photos of the 
facilities at Natanz are shown on international television and Iran agrees to accept 
additional inspections by the IAEA. Additional allegations that the Iran continued to 
develop nuclear weapons were aired. 
In September 2005, the IAEA reported on Iran's 18-year record of nuclear 
deception and declared Iran was in non-compliance with its NPT obligations setting up 
the possibility of UN Security Council action.42 IAEA did so in March 2006 resulting in 
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a UNSCR "statement calling upon the Tehran Government to suspend all uranium 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in an effort to guarantee that its nuclear 
programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes."43 Iran has steadfastly held to the line 
that their efforts are for nuclear energy producing purposes and that even if they were to 
undertake efforts to produce nuclear weapons, Iran has a sovereign right to do so.44 
Why is Iran attempting to become a member of the nuclear club? As this program 
is two decades old in its current form, the obvious answer would have been Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq. With his removal from power and the resulting instability of the new 
Iraq, Iran likely sees an even greater uncertainty in the security situation in the region and 
sees the nuclear card as a hedge for the future. Additionally, Iran likely views the 
presence of the U.S. led coalition in its neighbors (Iraq, Afghanistan, and several of the 
former Soviet republics) as additional evidence of the need for additional capability 
beyond its conventional military might. Iran has seen the application of U.S. and allied 
conventional military power twice in the past 15 years. The Iranian leadership no doubt 
noted that this evidence clearly points to the need for states to engage in combat that does 
not involve the United States or find new means to negate their conventional superiority. 
The other message from the two U.S.-Iraqi contests: a state's military should be 
organized, trained and equipped to fight in such a way as to achieve their state's 
objectives while keeping the United States and its allies out of the war. The India, for 
example, decided to take the lesson of relying on nuclear weapons and the Revolution in 
43
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Military Affairs from Iraq's experience in the Gulf War.45 Pakistan followed suit. 
Military parity even at the nuclear level has historically been seen as a necessity for state 
survival in this region. 
The problem, then, for any state that has a requirement for a robust defense and 
certainly for any state that contemplates future offensive action lies in deciding whether 
or not to acquire nuclear capabilities. With the relative importance and power of the 
United States and its allies as a potential opponent, the options may be quickly 
determined. Even if a state determines the United States is not likely to be a part of the 
combat (as Iraq must have thought in 1990), the presence of any state possessing nuclear 
weapons in a state's home region would be incentive for it to do so as well. This rational 
helps to somewhat explain why Iran has declared Israel a partner of the Great Satan 
(United States) and should be removed from the face of the earth. By openly expressing 
rancor towards Israel, Iran may be attempting to get Israel to display her nuclear 
intentions.46 
Given the level of isolation and decreasing standards of living in Iran which are in 
many ways similar to the path that North Korea has traveled, are external threats enough 
of an incentive? Many states who desire to be prominent in the international environment 
see the possession of nuclear weapons as a path to respectability, a member of an elite 
group that determine the path of world events or the perception that nuclear capability 
will give them a better ability to chart their own destiny. Displaying tenacity in denying 
its existence, Iranian leaders no doubt see a nuclear development program as providing 
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all of these advantages with a low likelihood of negative consequences beyond those they 
already suffer. 
If Iran wants a nuclear capability, how soon will they have it? Estimates vary 
widely. Most agree that Iran is still a few years from having a complete weapon system to 
deliver a nuclear weapon to its target. 7 Key to this development is the ability of Iran to 
acquire sufficient weapons grade material for the warhead device. The IAEA has so far 
identified two programs in Iran that could produce nuclear material for either nuclear 
power generation (peaceful purposes) or for weaponization. These processes include a 
gas-centrifuge based uranium enrichment program and a heavy-water moderated nuclear 
reactor now under construction. The enrichment requirements for power generation, 
called low-grade uranium, are far less than those of weapons-grade (high-grade 
uranium).48 Centrifuges used in enriching uranium spin the material at high speeds in 
order to concentrate it. A single simple nuclear warhead might contain 10-20 kg (22-44 
lbs) of highly enriched uranium (HEU). To get this much HEU requires between 2000-
4000 centrifuges in a single facility working for approximately six months.49 The 
facilities at Natanz that were so prominently displayed on the international news were 
buildings built and covered over with earth and concrete totaling over 750,000 square feet 
in size, more than adequate to house a cascade of the size described above and larger.50 In 
the other alternative for Iran, the spent fuel from a heavy-water reactor contains 
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plutonium which can be used in nuclear weapons. Iran's efforts are not cutting edge 
technologies but can be expected to reliably produce the necessary material for either 
application once the facilities are operational. The IAEA estimates that the reactor 
facilities will not be completed for at least 3-7 years while the centrifuge complex could 
house as many as 3,000 centrifuge units and be operational within a year.51 This 
capability matches that described by Kokoski earlier or one to two weapons worth of 
material per year. These concerns supported by the United States and European states 
prompted the UN Security Council to act. The world powers clearly fear the instability in 
the international order that the addition of a "rogue" state with nuclear capabilities might 
bring. 
The United States has declared Iran to be actively engaged in a clandestine effort 
to provide its military with nuclear weapons.52 The Iranian government continues to 
deny this claim but has constantly reserved their right to insure their security. The United 
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States has been an active partner in the multilateral talks to determine exactly what 
nuclear capability Iran is developing and to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear 
weapon. Why does Iran see a need to have nuclear weapons? Do regional security 
concerns folly explain the effort or are there other factors? Understanding the Iranian 
ruling elite will help explain their motivation to join the nuclear club and provide a means 
for U.S. elites to evaluate the options under consideration as negotiations continue. 
IRAN'S NUCLEAR CHOICES: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE AND NPT 
COMPLIANCE 
Understanding the Iranian leadership and its views on security requires unraveling 
a complex and unique combination of political, religious and social dynamics that have 
developed since 1979. One long time observer describes Iran as led by a "ruling clerical 
caste, which is deeply divided among 'hard-liners,' 'reformers,' and quiet 
'traditionalists,'" who work within an Islamic state structure that has an "extraordinary 
concentration of executive and supervisory powers in the hands of the appointed supreme 
clerical leader."53 The hard-liners are firmly in control and have been able to suppress 
any serious political opposition and resist any ideological shift within the country. The 
population has been marginalized in the political process and is not likely to become 
radicalized against the state.54 The leadership of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has 
hardened the control of the ruling elite and refocused the population on the religious 
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values of the revolution.55 Given the concentration of power in a relatively small elite 
combined with the low likelihood of any internal overthrow of the regime, theoretical 
explanations of strategic ruling elites first described during the Cold War about the Soviet 
Union's leadership are useful. 
Describing the decision making process within the Soviet Union in a RAND study 
sponsored by the U.S. Air Force in 1977, Jack Snyder provided a theoretical construct of 
a state leadership similar in function today's Iran. Snyder defined the concept of strategic 
culture "as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of 
habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."5 
Snyder believed that "strategic cultures, like cultures in general, change as objective 
conditions change."57 But even as conditions change, the state's strategic culture would 
retain "a large residual degree of continuity. Individuals are socialized into a mode of 
strategic discourse and acquire a fund of strategic concepts that evolve only marginally 
t o 
over time.... Culture is perpetuated not only by individuals but also by organizations." 
This strategic culture impacts policy decision making as the state's elites discuss 
the issues privately and publicly and adjust as required to fit their circumstances. Even at 
the height of the Communist era, publications within the Soviet Union exhibited some 
level of debate that was not just for propaganda purposes.59 These elites are also 
constrained by how they are arranged in the bureaucratic structure of their state and by 
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shared views and experiences especially in relation to the strategic dilemma their state 
faces. In the days of the superpower confrontation, these dilemmas were more distinct 
than today but the overall concept of strategic culture still holds. Given that "unique 
historical experiences, distinctive political and institutional relationships, and a 
preoccupation with strategic dilemmas" form the basis for a strategic culture, how a state 
reacts to external events or how a state plans to react to external events should be 
expected to take unique form to that state.60 
Iran's Islamic ruling clerical caste exhibits all of the characteristics Snyder 
defined and operates in similar fashion to the former Soviet Union's leadership at the 
height of the Cold War. Responses to invasion as in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1989), 
suppression of moderate student protests, frustration of a moderate president's approved 
legislation as well as the support of a hard-line non-cleric as President of the Republic in 
Ahmadinejad are all visible evidence of an active strategic culture in Iran. The external 
security issues as seen by the controlling elites in Iran place them in a strategic dilemma 
of needing to sustain the state they control while addressing the threats they see on their 
borders and beyond. As they have few reliable state allies in the region, Iran has turned 
to Pakistan, Russia, and China for political support in the UN in trade for their oil supply. 
The revenue gained from oil is sufficient to allow them to develop indigenous capabilities 
to enrich uranium for weapons while maintaining a hold on domestic life. Iran could 
argue that the region has been full of threats to their country for decades but with the 
removal of Saddam this argument seems to be less convincing. However, given the 
results of three conventional wars led by the United States against its neighbors in the last 
15 years and no immediate signs of a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region, the 
60
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ruling elites in Iran could be seen to be making a rational if internationally condemned 
strategic choice to pursue possession of nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear weapons provide a range of options to a state not available to those 
without them. Even the possibility of a state possessing nuclear weapons without any 
actual proof is sufficient to cause a potential adversary to reconsider its security options 
in relation to the emerging nuclear power. This is certainly an appealing situation to a 
state that considers itself "living in a bad neighborhood" as Iran does. Iran may also view 
nuclear capability as a cheap alternative to revitalizing their late 1970's conventional 
weapon systems. The strategic elite also can capitalize on the domestic front as other 
nations have done by playing on national pride that would accompany the achievement of 
nuclear status. Iran would likely greet such an event as validating their belief in the 
historical power of Persians in the region. Nuclear status might also embolden Iran to 
lobby for a seat on the UN Security Council. However, Iran would also have to consider 
the potential for further international sanctions or event military action to prevent further 
nuclear capability development. 
From an international relations theory perspective, the Iranian ruling elites likely 
see themselves as facing the traditional security dilemma. Recognizing that the 
international system, in the case of nuclear issues, the non-proliferation regime, either 
cannot or will not guarantee a state's national security sufficiently, the state will likely 
choose to defend themselves or in theoretical terms defect from the regime. The most 
obvious evidence of this Iranian defection is their continued pursuit of nuclear weapons 
capability. Reinforcing this security concern and assisting the drive to defect is the 
potential increase in international stature becoming a member of the nuclear weapons 
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states would potentially provide to Iran. Even on a regional level, an Iran with nuclear 
weapons would be far more feared and respected. The Iranian security culture might be 
emboldened enough to believe nuclear weapons would confer great power status on their 
nation even allowing them the right to demand a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. 
Despite the sometimes bleak future the Iranian situation poses, there are avenues 
that can be used to achieve the necessary discussions that lead to an agreement. One 
expert has suggested a process built from the Eur-3 discussions with Iran similar to the 
Six-party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. These talks would include the United 
States, Russia and China as well as the current parties. Such talks would include a 
package of "carrots" as well as "sticks" that would clearly define the benefits and 
consequences of Iran's future decisions.61 Previous efforts have not presented a unified 
effort nor included all of the nuclear capable, UN Security Council members in the effort. 
Without successfully gaining Russia and China's support, Iran can expect these states 
will oppose any use of sticks. The worst case path for the future of the NPT would 
involve Iran, a signatory of the NPT, choosing not cooperate with the IAEA and then 
withdrawing (or attempting to do so) from the treaty organization as North Korea 
believes they have done. This would be another clear indication that the original non-
proliferation regime has collapsed. 
Compliance with the NPT is accomplished primarily through formal inspections 
of signatories declared nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a 
UN controlled organization currently led by Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei. 
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The IAEA's mam function is to monitor the transfer of nuclear technology transfer. One 
of the provisions of the NPT is the right of nuclear weapons states or other states that 
possess nuclear technology to provide this capability to other states for peaceful 
purposes. Unfortunately, most nuclear technology that could be used for peaceful 
purposes can be and have been used to develop nuclear weapons. The most recent 
examples were seen in the North Korean nuclear test explosions. As long as nuclear 
technology use is not fully controlled and transparent to international inspection, nuclear 
weapons development cheating can occur. If inspections by the IAEA are not universally 
accepted, one could become very pessimistic about the prospects for further control of 
nuclear proliferation. 
NUCLEAR OPTION STATES: HOW MANY MORE NEW MEMBERS OF THE 
CLUB? 
While nuclear proliferation may seem to be on the verge of growing out of 
control, the record of states rejecting nuclear weapons since the close of the Cold War is 
significant. Considering their new security environment, three of the former Soviet 
republics, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, by 1996 had all of the Russian nuclear 
systems removed from their territory. South Africa announced in March 1993 that they 
had developed nuclear weapons but destroyed them prior to signing the NPT in 1991. 
Libya, long suspected of seeking weapons of mass destruction including nuclear 
capability, announced in 2003 that they would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
accepted unannounced IAEA inspections and gave their entire nuclear weapons 
development material to the United States. Libya also declared and destroyed its 
chemical weapons. Arguments still continue as to the reasons and motives behind 
Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's decision to "come in from the cold," but this particular 
case does provide a useful example of how states working on the nuclear option can turn 
back.62 Other states including but not limited to Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have all looked into acquiring nuclear weapons, 
some may be actively doing so. If we accept the potential of more nuclear proliferation 
as high, then which states are most likely to break out from the current non-proliferation 
regime? 
Regional security pressures will likely drive the next tier of states to consider or 
decide to pursue nuclear capability. In North Korea's neighborhood, South Korea and 
Japan have the ability and in the Koreans case have admitted to past nuclear weapon 
development activities both government sanctioned and illegal. Japan has long resisted 
consideration of a nuclear capability due to the lingering impact on their society of the 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima attacks and has long accepted the protection of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. Recent North Korean testing of missiles and the October 2006 nuclear weapon 
test have re focused concern on what Japan may decide to do.64 A similar concern has 
been raised about Taiwan who was dissuaded in the 1970's by the United States not to 
develop nuclear weapons.65 
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In Iran's region, their efforts may have been spurred by envy or threat but other 
states have seriously reconsidered their security situation. Iraq's non-nuclear situation is 
now well known but Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, have Israel or Iran or even 
the United States on their minds depending on the state. Syria has long been suspected of 
developing weapons of mass destruction as a counter to Israeli conventional and 
undeclared nuclear capabilities but has not had a significant effort to develop nuclear 
weapons. An emerging example of the proliferation problem at the state level, Egypt 
has had some difficulty deciding which way to go but recently may have chosen to follow 
the Iranian example.67 Saudi Arabia is likely doing a similar calculus.68 Turkey, where 
there is no evidence of a nuclear program but has a history of allowing NATO nuclear 
weapons to be placed there, has openly urged the United States to enter direct talks with 
Iran on the nuclear issue instead of allowing the three EU states negotiate.70 Could 
Turkey's next move be to ask for help with nuclear weapons as well? Adding Israel, 
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Pakistan and India to the mix with constant U.S. conventional military presence for the 
next several years can provide significant reason for some states to proliferate. One does 
not need to be too creative to imagine a number of scenarios where confrontations could 
easily lead to a nuclear exchange in the not too distant future in either SW Asia or SE 
Asia. 
Given these volatile regions identify some of the problems with the current non-
proliferation regime, we can begin to see the need to define the requirements for a 
renewed NPT based arms control regime that places states as the responsible actors and 
each would be equally transparent and secure in controlling all aspects of nuclear 
development and deployment whether for civilian or military purposes. This is a sizeable 
problem but not beyond the realm of the possible to solve. One aspect of this effort would 
be to ultimately reduce the numbers of weapons available to minimum levels and where 
possible eliminate some states' programs permanently. Consolidation of weapons 
programs under the nuclear weapons states and the IAEA would provide a necessary 
intermediate goal of 21st Century arms control. Ultimately, what remains to be done is 
develop a new effective nuclear arms control regime that includes eliminating 
proliferation totally, discourages new nuclear weapons programs for any reason, provides 
100% transparency of all nuclear activities, and takes full advantage of the emerging state 
and below state level interdependencies and leverage the useful and mutually reinforcing 
aspects of this global environment such as non-state or trans-state actors who can assist in 
achieving nuclear transparency and control. 
REBUILDING THE GENIE'S BOTTLE: OPTIONS FOR A NEW NON-
PROLIFERATION REGIME 
How can the non-proliferation regime be rebuilt to meet the challenge of 
stopping the emergence of a second nuclear age? The IAEA Director General has 
said that as many as 42 additional nations have the ability to develop and field 
nuclear weapons should they desire to do so. Is this goal of a new nuclear non-
proliferation regime feasible? El Baradei provided some reason for hope. 
On the one hand, efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons through 
the NPT treaty regime can be viewed as a remarkable success. With the 
exception of India, Israel and Pakistan, every country in the world has 
joined the NPT. The vast majority of NPT members have stood by their 
commitments. And the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced by 
more than 50 percent from its Cold War peak. On the other hand, in recent 
years, we seem to have come to an impasse, and many see the NPT regime 
as faltering. You might say that, while we started on the right track, we 
have lost our sense of direction. Today we have eight or nine countries 
that possess nuclear weapons - and more than 20 other members of 
alliances that continue to rely on these weapons for their security. Some 
countries are actually announcing programs for modernizing their 
stockpiles, and some have even spoken of the possibility of using such 
weapons - all the while insisting that they are off-limits to others.71 
A renewed non-proliferation regime is based on defining and enforcing the "Nuclear 
Rules of the Road" taking into account the evolved nature of the international state since 
the end of the superpower confrontation. Part of the calculus of this new regime must be 
an understanding how deterrence works in an N+l world should the regime efforts fail to 
achieve total transparency. 
If one accepts that North Korea has crossed the threshold to become a nuclear 
weapons state, then logically one would also accept that the traditional state-centered 
El Baradei. "Globalizing Security: A Challenge for Your Generation," Commencement Address 
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non-proliferation regime has not been adequate. This regime's purpose has been to 
prevent nuclear wars through transparency and state control of nuclear capabilities. 
Nuclear war has been averted but the other requirements have at best been of limited 
success. Theoretically, the NPT regime has worked to achieve success at the state level 
by lengthening the shadow of the future for member states through cooperation or at least 
helping states feel more secure from external threats and as a result of cooperation reduce 
the desire to defect and acquire nuclear weapons.72 This effort was aided by the 
traditional international system as it provided usually sufficient security assurance to 
those states that did not possess nuclear weapons. 
Even as the Cold War was in progress, not all states were protected by their own 
or allies' nuclear umbrellas. This incomplete extended deterrence allowed the excluded 
or uncovered states to seek their own nuclear capabilities. As has been argued earlier, 
even as the superpower confrontation ended, individual states still has security concerns 
that in some cases have been heightened in recent years causing the most fearful states to 
defect from the post-Cold War "security" of the emerging international system. At the 
same time, actors below the state-centered system began to emerge as significant 
influences on a range of issues that mattered to states such as environmental, human 
rights, economic, health and most importantly state security. In the area of security, the 
traditional security dilemma has in many cases expanded to much more than a territorial 
concern as was the case in the Cold War. Today, an individual or a small group of 
individuals can upset the national level functioning of a state through a single act of 
terrorism. Should this act include a nuclear device the state itself could cease to function 
and in an extreme case other states could become victims of collateral damage as a result 
72
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of a misaimed retaliation. A more comprehensive non-proliferation regime must attempt 
to limit the likelihood of any nuclear event occurring. 
If, as Philip Cerny suggests, the traditional security dilemma has changed due to 
transnationalism, increasing globalization and the rise of sub-state actors results in an 
international system which is increasingly chaotic and unable fully rely on the use of 
traditional state based solutions to stabilize itself.73 One can expect that as states defect 
from the cooperative non-proliferation system to seek security individually the options 
for great powers would be to become increasingly defensively armed, accept evolving 
new status quo or intervene individually or collectively. This situation is not far from 
that which President Kennedy feared. But even if the system has only faltered in a few 
cases, what can be done to reinforce it? 
THE NEW RULES OF THE NUCLEAR ROAD 
Can a system be constructed that assists states not to defect from the non-
proliferation regime? The simple answer must be yes but this new regime has to be 
broader than traditional state-based treaty compliance method of the past. Here the ideas 
of evolving structures of international governance, importance of triangulating 
democracy, trade and international organizations to achieve peace, and transnational 
advocacy network building are important. Each is a part of the new international system 
that has accelerated in the post-Cold War world. These concepts should be adapted to the 
traditional non-proliferation regime. 
Philip G. Cerny, "The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the 
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Deterrence, as the classical means of states using power to deter another from 
proliferating, seems to have less of an impact in the new international environment. State 
power is still useful but has limits as we are now seeing in Iraq. How much classical 
deterrence has diminished is difficult to tell as the current examples offer little assurance 
that state political and nuclear capabilities can have the desired effect. However, smaller 
states possessing weapons seem to be able to deter great powers from selecting military 
options making these weapons more attractive to them. This situation creates a new 
balance of power dilemma: smaller states creating a security dilemma for the larger 
states. Currently, Iran is an example of this relative to the United States. 
Concern that the traditional security dilemma may be changing to a new security 
dilemma where the state is less central, the international system less centralized, and 
other non-state groups may be providing both threats and security that were previously 
done in the state system is rising. Transnational processes are not bounded or completely 
controlled by states. The Khan network is example of negative side of globalization and 
transnational networks. This criminal activity shows that states will continue to seek 
nuclear capabilities if necessary from non-state actors when prevented by state non-
proliferation objectives. The new regime must develop a range of capabilities that 
address both the traditional state level concerns and take advantage of the emerging non-
state actors and processes. 
The basic outline of the new non-proliferation regime includes enhancements to 
existing treaties, enforcement the new UNSCR 154074 and other state level agreements, 
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and support for an inspection protocol primarily formed around the IAEA but flexible 
enough to allow for bilateral arrangements that fulfill the intent of the NPT regime. In 
addition to the traditional ingredients, the international system would support the 
development and engagement of non-state organizations in addition to existing 
international organizations such as advocacy groups and potentially informal groups that 
could assist in the surveillance and identification of related proliferation activities. From 
a practical point of view, this new regime would require enhancement of international 
systems for identifying and cataloguing existing nuclear materials to allow more effective 
monitoring. In conjunction with these activities on the nuclear issue, a system of 
confidence building measures and alternative security options for states considering 
going nuclear should be constructed. 
The existing NPT has long been criticized for the problems inherent in attempting 
to simultaneously control the spread of nuclear weapons technology while supporting the 
transfer of nuclear power generation capabilities to all of the nations that desire it. As has 
been well documented, the line between these two activities is hard to distinguish due to 
the wide range of activities the two efforts have in common. Experts have suggested the 
NPT can be updated to address this shortcoming. One has provided specific changes that 
are being discussed. Specifically, Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General of the 
IAEA concerned about the United States-India bilateral nuclear technology transfer 
agreement, believes other states like Russia and China will no longer feel constrained to 
strike similar deals with Pakistan, Iran or other states. Goldschmidt believes the UN must 
act quickly to shore up the NPT and has recently suggested the appropriate means to do 
so. 
I l l 
The single most effective and feasible way to establish the necessary 
measures is for the UNSC to adopt (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) 
generic and legally binding resolutions stating that: 
1. if a State withdraws from the NPT after being found by the IAEA to be in 
non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings, such withdrawal 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of 
the UN Charter; and all materials and equipment made available to such a 
State, or resulting from the assistance provided to it under a Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will be forthwith removed from that State 
under IAEA supervision and remain under Agency's Safeguards. 
2. If a State is reported by the IAEA to be in non-compliance: 
a. the non compliant State will have to suspend all sensitive nuclear 
fuel cycle activities for a specified period of time [but could by all means 
continue to produce electricity from nuclear power plants], and 
b. if requested by the IAEA, the UNSC would automatically adopt a 
specific resolution (under Chapter VII) providing the Agency additional 
verification authority until it has been able to conclude that there is no 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State and that its 
declarations to the Agency are correct and complete. 
The obvious difficulty is gaining UN and UNSCR support for change is the fact that 
the major nuclear weapons states are the main targets of these new constraints. 
Goldschmidt also suggests that adjustments to the rules governing the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group who are a multilateral state level group aimed at curbing 
technology transfers.76 
Independently, the Nuclear Supplier Group could adopt a rule whereby 
nuclear material and equipment would only be exported if the facilities 
where they are to be stored or used are covered by both a Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement and an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards Agreement. 
This requirement would block a recipient State from withdrawing from the 
NPT and claiming the right to do whatever it wants with the items 
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previously delivered or the materials derived there from. 
Unfortunately, the problem of influencing states to conform to international standards 
remains. It is hard to imagine the UN or a state who opposed the United States-India deal 
attempting to sanction the United States or taking more drastic action. The other states 
understand this hard rule of the international system. But are there other levels on which 
state behavior could be influenced? If so, how would that work? 
FUTURE OPTIONS: BACKING AWAY FROM THE TIPPING POINT 
Campbell and Einhorn have offered five recommendations for dealing the current 
international environment that has caused a number of states to potentially reach the 
"tipping point" for going nuclear which can serve as a means of assessing this paper's 
outline for a new non-proliferation regime.78 First, they suggest the international 
community take all necessary steps to prevent North Korea and Iran from going nuclear. 
Given that North Korea has barely crossed the weapon threshold, this advice is still valid. 
Next they suggest the United States must take the lead in addressing the regional security 
concerns discussed earlier in this paper. As the United States has lost some of its 
superpower strength, the need for a new U.S. strategic roadmap on the nuclear front is 
just as evident as the regional concerns the United States has in Iraq.79 
In that region, the continuing war in Iraq and Iran's security concerns driving the 
ruling elites to reach for nuclear weapons are directly related. Whether the future 
opponent is the United States, Israel or Iraq, when combined with their limited 
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conventional military might, Iran has significant reasons to consider nuclear weapons. 
Working with allies and other cooperative states as well as those who feel a rising 
security dilemma, the United States could be on the threshold of a new opportunity to 
pull several states back from the nuclear decision point. One could easily make the 
argument that both multilateral nuclear reduction efforts (Six-Party Talks on the North 
Korean Issue and the EUR-3 Talks with Iran) can be resolved to the international 
community's benefit and that the United States holds the keys to both future agreements. 
In their third recommendation, Campbell and Einhorn suggest the United States 
could lead the effort to fill the hole in the NPT on misuse of dual capable nuclear 
processes by organizing an international effort to centralize nuclear fuel production, 
distribution and recovery. By placing the fuel cycle process in international control, 
those states that need the fuel but are considering their own fuel cycle capabilities would 
have no reason to do so except for weapons material production. This concept fits well 
with this paper's call for increased controls of these materials and would increase the 
transparency of a state's nuclear intentions. Improvements in verification, intelligence 
and analytical capabilities that lead to better understanding and transparency of nuclear 
programs, their fourth recommendation, would clearly help prevent more Iraq scenarios 
where decisions are made based on incomplete data that have severe global 
consequences.81 Sharing of national intelligence and better cultural based assessments 
would improve decision elites' understanding of the "ground truth" of another state's 
intentions. Campbell and Einhorn point out that their study shows the common 
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understanding on Japan's intentions by the United States was not in line with reality. 
The United States should determine the means to share relevant intelligence information 
with other states in order to expose nuclear concerns far before they reach the crisis stage. 
Finally, Campbell and Einhorn suggest that the reduction of the salience of 
nuclear arms is fundamentally in the security interests of the United States. They argue 
also that states that decide to renounce nuclear weapons and eliminate their programs find 
the inertia to restart a new program difficult to overcome.83 This paper argues that state 
level and non-state level efforts to control nuclear programs would be focused on the goal 
of slowing and removing the incentives to start or restart nuclear weapons programs. 
While achievement of total nuclear disarmament will likely be an unattainable goal, 
reducing the incentives for strategic elites to seek these capabilities while offering 
increased security that economic interdependence affords is a necessary responsibility of 
the United States and the other nuclear weapon states. Another option to seek more 
effectiveness in the nuclear non-proliferation regime will likely be found in those 
communities with specific interests in achieving disarmament. Epistemic communities 
have achieved success in establishing and maintaining regimes in other areas. The future 
success of the NPT regime will require multilateral support with a strong state leader 
such as the United States but in an increasingly interdependent global system, these 
communities will be an important element of the ability of states to work together 
successfully. 
Ibid., 344. "The study on Japan, for example, revealed that there has been more internal 
consideration of the nuclear option than is commonly thought." 
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EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: IMPORTANCE TO 
REGIME SUCCESS 
As an example of the wide number of engaged states and international 
organizations, the power of the NPT, with the sustainment of its controls on nuclear 
materials and processes, is likely more than just the sum of its member governments' 
policies and enforcement actions. In order to sustain a complex regime like nuclear arms 
non-proliferation, concerned groups and individuals will be important to any chance for 
long term success. Peter Haas provides an example of a seemingly intractable problem 
that individual governments and existing international organizations were unable or 
unwilling to cooperate in achieving an effective, long lasting solution. As Europe 
industrialized after 1945, pollution of the Mediterranean became endemic. Over time, an 
epistemic community formed to address the issue. 
Haas believes that while regimes have been studied extensively for how they are 
created and maintained, they are the potential to be more than just rules and norms for 
states to follow.84 Haas believes regimes could be a vehicle for international learning 
resulting in convergent state policies. His research indicates that the current literature 
needs to focus on more than political order and economic growth that regimes foster. 
Researchers need to look at the transformative processes initiated or fostered by regimes. 
Haas states some regimes come from shared knowledge instead of domestic or 
O f 
international interest groups. 
As an example of the full potential of regimes, Haas describes the Mediterranean 
Action Plan (MAP), a regime for maritime pollution control. He believes the MAP 
84
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shows that a regime can alter the balance of power in as it did in Mediterranean 
governments by empowering a group of experts, who then helped develop convergent 
state policies that complied with the regime. This success was achieved in those countries 
with MAP experts who had direct access to political decision makers. These 
governments became the strongest supporting nations of the highly successful regime. 
The success of the MAP regime required careful balancing of various competing 
interests: industries, farmers who pollute and fishermen.86 
The issue MAP addressed was primarily a collective goods problem, pollution 
from one country washing up on another's shore. MAP sought restrictions to control 
pollution while being carefully balanced to prevent any country from gaining an 
economic competitive advantage. 7 Political mistrust and economic downturns worked 
against regime success but MAP achieved its goals through the persistence and 
embedding of experts within the member nations.88 Haas cites Oran Young and Robert 
Keohane who explain the positive power of a successful regime: "the most compelling 
argument for a regime's importance in promoting international order is the fact that 
compliance is achieved even when the regime's norms and principles run counter to the 
on 
short-term interests of the participants (or the hegemon)." 
Haas describes a regime as consisting of legal, assessment, management, and 
administrative components. The MAP regime meets Krasner's definition of a regime: 





around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. ° 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice." ' The MAP regime has annual intergovernmental 
meetings that review parties' attempts to draft and enforce national legislation for 
pollution control as recommended by the regime. One key regime success indicator is 
the fact that it has resulted in no increase in pollution.93 
Haas analyzes of the role of new actors such as the pollution experts and the 
process that resulted in national compliance. Ecologists and marine scientists (formed an 
epistemic community) set the international agenda for MAP, guided home nations to 
support the international pollution control efforts and put strong controls in place at 
home.94 The most supportive states were where community members were most 
influential. These individuals were able to get environment ministries to change from 
being coordinative to regulatory, the key to success. Haas notes that not all states 
changed.95 The MAP epistemic community set ecological principles as their core beliefs 
about cause and effect relationships. Their holistic approach to environment led to a 
broad definition of pollution that allowed a number of interpretations and leveling of state 
interests.96 The community worked political conflicts carefully and in gaining support 
from ministries allowed them to promote their vision of pollution control that was 
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broader in scope and more clearly focused than that of the individual ministries had 
been.97 Amazingly, most ministries were not challenged by industry.98 
In contrasting this analysis with more conventional analyses of regimes and 
policy change, Haas notes the MAP regime ran counter to normal explanations for the 
forming of convergent state policies such as foreign pressure (coercion), public opinion, 
and the rational anticipation of future benefits for a unitary government.99 This regime 
and compliance with it were not imposed and persistence of regime was not due to 
hegemonic support through bargaining, toleration of defections, or staunch enforcement 
of regime rules.100 Haas also states regime compliance did not stem from popular mass 
politics nor was it a result of anticipation of future benefits or from guarantees that other 
states would not free ride.101 Given all of the expected limitations of regimes offered in 
the literature, the Mediterranean Area Plan was indeed successful. While states will need 
assistance from epistemic communities to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT regime, 
multilateral efforts as with any "team sport" will require a lead state to set the agenda and 
encourage participation and to sustain progress toward the NPT goals. Until recently, the 
one best positioned state, the United States, was missing in action. 
U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: THE MISSING 
ELEMENT 
A new nuclear non-proliferation regime needs to be developed based on 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the current NPT and related regime structure. 
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This new regime will take advantage in strengthened written agreements that provide 
better inspection and enforcement provisions leading to increased transparency of state 
and non-state actor nuclear activities both civilian energy production and military uses. 
This new regime would also acknowledge and take full advantage of the role of non-state 
actors in expanding the nuclear reduction and security enhancement agenda. Increased 
interdependence of political, economic and social activities within and among states 
should be accepted as a key component of the new regime. Traditional international 
state-based fora and supporting agreements are the foundation of any regime but sub-state 
actors can potentially provide the enabling capabilities that increase transparency of 
nuclear programs, reduce related proliferation activity and ultimately increase the 
potential proliferating state's level of confidence in its security. The key to revitalization 
of this regime is the engagement of the central state in the nuclear arena, the United 
States. 
Writing in 2004, William Walker was concerned about a disruption to the former 
world order as a result of the terrorist attacks to the United States and other nations since 
the end of the Cold War.102 His primary objective was to seek U.S. engagement in the 
2005 NPT Review Conference. With the U.S. policies relative to Iraq, he believes the 
United States had potentially caused a rebirth of distrust among states that will encourage 
further proliferation of WMD and nuclear technology in particular. Walker offers liberal 
views on the history and role of nuclear weapons in the world order. He describes the 
current world situation as one where the United States should seek to gather in the "great 
powers" to re-establish a regime where they work together "to the task of restraining the 
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political, military and terrorist usage ofWMD" as an alternative to the current policies of 
the Bush Administration. Walker believes the world order is based on how states deal 
with the concept of enmity. He believes that politics is the only means to control enmity. 
World order, one marked by states adherence to established norms and administered 
through institutions, can be reestablished by "constitutionalism." He calls for the great 
powers (which can be defined as the nuclear nations) to work together with the leadership 
of the United States to return to the order before 9/11 and advance toward the elimination 
of chemical and biological weapons and reduction of nuclear arsenals to a minimal level. 
Walker believes the transition of the U.S.S.R. to current Russia was aided by 
adherence to international norms that define his concept of constitutionalism. Walker 
views constitutionalism as "embodied (in) the conviction that the nuclear order was the 
property of all states, not just the great powers, and that they collectively possess rights to 
define legitimate behaviour."103 This transition is evidence to him that a specific order is 
needed to assure the world that no one state's behavior would operate outside 
expectations of the other states. Walker also cites the UN passage of Security Council 
Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation as an opening for the Bush Administration to 
reengage in multilateral cooperation. This resolution has implicitly acknowledged the 
state as the only rightful possessor of WMD capabilities and that given the difficulty of 
one state may have in controlling these capabilities, it nonetheless expects each to do so. 
UNSCR 1540 also "amounts to a proclamation, issued by the Security Council, that all 
states should support the non-proliferation norm: 'the proliferation of nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons, as well as the means of delivery, constitutes a threat to 
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international peace and security.'"104 Walker sees this as a good step but expressed grave 
concern that the United States had not signaled strong support for it. 
Walker sees the overall issue of potential proliferation as revolving around the 
twin needs of legitimacy and efficacy. Quoting Kissinger's thesis, Walker states that any 
legitimate order depends on constant upkeep and reaffirmation by the participants. He 
sees this new order as operating on two levels; one among the great powers and the other 
with all of the states. He also offers that this new order will require the United States to 
return to respecting the four primary principles that legitimized the Cold War order: 
1) reciprocal obligation or the requirement to exercise restraint and uphold order, 
2) work toward elimination of all weapons or at least for nuclear constrain 
production and deployment, 
3) supremacy of diplomacy over war, 
4) pacta sunt servanta or the adherence to international law.105 
Walker's assessment of the current WMD environment offers important insights 
into the broad spectrum of reactions to the effects of a unipolar world. His work is an 
interesting piecing together of theory and history to form a suggested new world order 
that is an adaptation of the old bi-polar world but acknowledges the predominance of the 
United States. In Walker's view the United States must lead by forging a stronger 
consensus that is not possible to accomplish from an aggressive and unilateral foreign 
policy approach. The election of a new president and the arrival of a new foreign policy 
agenda which includes nuclear arms control as a top priority are already showing gains 
that Walker would approve. 
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The 2005 NPT Review conference was unsuccessful in its effort to advance the 
goal of the NPT. One reviewer saw the key issue behind a lack of further movement of 
the review as the U.S. position shift from non-proliferation support to a single state 
pursuit of counterproliferation. The United States had been focused on coalition building 
of "self-selected coalitions of the willing," and is seen as having "weakened some of the 
essential infrastructure and tools that the international community needs for combating 
WMD and terrorism."106 The 2005 NPT Review highlighted the requirement for good 
ideas and proposals to be backed by "innovative, pragmatic strategies and active 
presidents willing to use the rules and procedural tools to their maximum possibilities in 
order to achieve useful, regime-building outcomes."107 
The international environment had dramatically shifted in between the 2000 and 
2005 NPT Reviews with the most obvious event being the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. The immediate response of the United States to these actions 
as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 ostensibly to prevent Saddam Hussein from using 
WMD to threaten other states had a dramatic impact on international relations. One of the 
byproducts of these events was the rise of concern for terrorist groups gaining access to 
nuclear weapons or nuclear devices like a "dirty bomb" capable of spreading nuclear 
radioactive material in an urban area. 
Additionally, the NPT states need to seriously address the need for modernization 
of the NPT rules in order to allow necessary transparency and increased civil society 
participation.108 The upcoming 2010 NPT Conference will be the best moment for the 
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United States and other leading states to address these issues. Given the disappointing 
results of the 2005 NPT Review and the shift in outlook of the U.S. government on the 
nuclear issue front, the 2010 NPT Conference provides the United States with a new and 
time critical opportunity to diplomatically but firmly assume a leadership role in nuclear 
issues of proliferation and disarmament. President Obama has set out his agenda on 
nuclear disarmament beginning with the 2009 Prague speech109 and has continued to 
support efforts to replace the now lapsed 1991 START Treaty with a new agreement with 
Russia to further reduce and account for the two largest nuclear arsenals. His complete 
agenda is compatible if somewhat optimistic with the pillars of the NPT. 
In his Prague Speech, in addition to the call for the new START agreement with 
Russia, President Obama has called for a number of important nuclear initiatives to be 
completed including the ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which 
has yet to be approved by the U.S. Senate. Obama has also recommended the negotiation 
and ratification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) which would essentially stop 
any further production of the most essential component of any nuclear weapon. In 
conjunction with this effort and in support of the NPT civilian nuclear power pillar, 
President Obama has called for the establishment of a cooperative civilian nuclear fuel 
bank. Additionally, he supports increased funding for inspections as required by the NPT 
and other treaties which would add needed resources to the IAEA's efforts and provide 
essential transparency and confidence building to the non-proliferation regime. 
An essential component of the NPT regime is the prevention and if necessary 
punishment of nuclear proliferators. President Obama has called for increased 
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international support for application of consequences for rule breaking by states such as 
North Korea and Iran. One of the key issues within the proliferation area which the 
United States has repeatedly expressed concern is the prevention of the transfer of 
vulnerable nuclear materials to more states or even terrorist groups. The United States 
believes that efforts to control these risks lie within existing international institutions and 
can be assisted by newer programs like the Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism. Showing a willingness to assert U.S. leadership in 
the nuclear issue area, President Obama has sponsored an international nuclear summit to 
discuss the future of nuclear disarmament.110 Equally important to the establishment of 
U.S. leadership on the issue of disarmament generally is the need for consistent and 
persistent support to the upcoming 2010 NPT Conference as well as all future NPT 
events. 
The 2010 NPT Conference has specific issues that must be addressed in order for 
the non-proliferation regime to be strengthened and the goal of disarmament achieved. 
One of the most important issues to be resolved for a robust non-proliferation regime to 
appear is gaining long sought agreement from 22 non-nuclear weapon states to bring into 
force comprehensive safeguards as identified by the IAEA. Eight of these states have yet 
to even to submit written agreements for consideration by the IAEA Board of governors. 
Iran's continuing compliance issues are of deepening concern for the IAEA as well as the 
NPT states.111 One observer of the 2009 PreCom which provides the agenda for the 2010 
NPT Conference sees the most important result of the event is not another statement of 
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commitment to the principles of the NPT but the need for development "and completion 
of convincing action plans and apply the requisite resources for meeting proliferation 
challenges and moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons."112 This requirement is 
one that the most influential states of the international community need to seek to lead 
with the United States having the greatest obligation among them if in fact President 
Obama intends to place his state's action behind his words. 
FORGING A RENEWED MULTILATERAL SUPPORT FOR NPT: UNITED STATES 
TO LEAD 
Recent statements of the President and Vice President backed by actions such as 
the new START agreement and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicate that the United 
States is once re-energizing U.S. Nuclear Arms Policy and acting as a leader in the 
international community toward the NPT goals. If one accepts as the NPT preamble 
statements, "Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a 
nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a 
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war," 
then given the current security environment, a rational acting nuclear weapons states 
would have difficulty seeing the requirement for nuclear weapons on purely security 
concerns. Additionally, if one accepts the power of one state to influence the nuclear 
issue area as dramatically as the United States has, then one should expect other states 
including Russia also seek to influence as well. What is needed in this era of 
globalization where polarity has decreasing explanatory power is an agenda set by one of 
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the more powerful states that can lead others to cooperate and ultimately engage all states 
in a common goal, in this case nuclear arms reduction leading to disarmament. This 
research has suggested both a theoretical and a practical framework for achieving the 
non-proliferation goals of the NPT, a stated goal of all but a handful of states and now the 
restated goal of the United States. The United States in the last year has called for a 
renewed agenda of arms control and non-proliferation leading toward eventual 
disarmament beginning with President Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague and 
continuing through the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. This short period has 
witnessed a new START Treaty being signed by the U.S. and Russian presidents, the 
completion of the third U.S. Nuclear Posture Review which called for a renewed focus on 
non-proliferation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an unprecedented U.S. hosted Nuclear 
Security Summit where 47 nations committed to securing the world's nuclear material 
within the next four years and the NPT Review Conference. After more than a decade of 
little to no progress on nuclear arms control and a number of disturbing developments in 
proliferation of nuclear technology and even nuclear testing, this renewed focus on the 
nuclear issue is both supported by this research and cautiously welcomed by the 
international community. What remains to be seen is whether or not these steps will 
continue to build into a sustained march toward the NPT goals. If the United States is to 
retain its leadership position as this research recommends, a broader policy framework 
which includes the current U.S. stated policies and more is required. 
The United States will need to work to reinforce and sustain non-proliferation 
regime which is the foundation of the needed actions required to achieve nuclear 
disarmament and to assist the international environment to remain "nuclear arms free." 
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As a part of this effort, the United States will need to simultaneously support overall 
security of all states while improving bilateral relations with Russia and China in order to 
gain their cooperation on regional issues. This is both a part of the President's stated 
policy from the Prague Speech and is a prominent part of the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review. As this dissertation argues, the United States as the "strongest" power based 
(neorealist framed) state, is best equipped to assist in increasing complex interdependence 
among both power based and normative states. This unique position also provides the 
United States with opportunities to offer solutions to regional security issues in 
cooperation with other power based states like Russia and China. The central focus of the 
U.S. effort should be to lengthen the shadow of the future for power based states such as 
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea as well as their neighbors. As the level 
of nuclear arms held by the United States and Russia falls to a level nearly equal to the 
other major nuclear weapons states, the regional issues become the only significant state 
level security concerns that would prompt their elites to require nuclear weapons as a 
counter to those threats. At time unique but multilateral formations of states such as those 
currently dealing with the Iranian and North Korean issues will be required with support 
of the United States key to their success. 
Even if successful in developing consensus among power based states, the United 
States will have to also offer support to normative based states (neoliberal institutionalist 
framed) through appropriate for a which will remind power based states of their 
international obligations and the benefits available in other areas than military security 
from cooperation. If the United States is successful in dealing with only a limited amount 
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of states on both nuclear issues and regional conflicts, those normative based states that 
do not see any benefits could potentially determine that a change to power based views 
and associated military solutions is the best means of lengthening their shadows of the 
future. As the world's largest economic power, the United States, despite its current 
economic downturn, is most able to leverage its substantial economic and political power 
to limit the requirement for military power in these states. While the advantages of 
conventional military power will likely become more apparent as nuclear weapons are 
eliminated, the United States will need to become adept at leveraging the rising 
international credibility gained from all efforts to shift the international community from 
conflict to cooperation. The series of activities on nuclear issues currently underway 
should eventually result in the United States being recognized as the only state to have 
recently offered a public plan to reach nuclear disarmament and acted on those stated 
intentions. This state leadership should result in the United States gaining international 
moral authority and respect reversing a decade of decline in both. 
ENGAGING RUSSIA AND CHINA: KEY TO MULTILATERAL SUCCESS 
To succeed in shifting the international agenda from primarily focusing on 
security threats which nuclear weapons represent the ultimate response to them, the 
United States will need to continue to engage Russia and China. As has been argued in 
this dissertation, the return to prominence of arms control between Russia and the United 
States will likely have the beneficial impact of restoring a long neglected strategic 
relationship formerly between opponents. As the United States considers how to continue 
to engage Russia, the renewed relationship should be update to an appropriate form that 
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fits with the current environment. From a security perspective, the United States needs to 
assist its NATO Allies to develop a more useful relationship with Russia as has been 
suggested by the NATO Secretary General.114 If multilateral security relationships as 
successful as NATO have had normalizing impacts on its members, then adding Russia to 
the seats at the table in Brussels would seem an appropriate goal. If the Alliance remains 
distrustful of the Russia's policies, then the price of admission should reflect the changes 
desired on the part of both Russia and its members alike. Without some willingness to 
incorporate Russia into the "Euro defense" discussion in a serious and permanent way, 
continued divergence on both policy and action will most likely continue. This effort also 
would have significant advantages when the focus is shifted to resolving other regional 
conflicts as Russia is a part of the equation in virtually every one of them. 
A similar arrangement with China is not as simple to develop as their region has 
no similar NATO structure. However, China has been essential to the process of 
engaging with North Korea on their nuclear program. China's own nuclear program 
while limited in scope compared to others, the opaqueness of their policies, doctrine, 
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force modernization and targeting creates difficulties when other states consider arms 
control. The recent U.S. hosted Nuclear Security Summit invitation was accepted by 
China which along with the upcoming NPT Review Conference allows the United States 
two opportunities to encourage discussion on the future of nuclear weapons in Chinese 
thinking. Given the significant level of interdependence of the U.S. and Chinese 
economies, shaping of the international security agenda to allow China to participate 
actively, to be understood and to be engaged will have lasting benefits both for the region 
as well as globally. Essential to a wider engagement of China by the United States is the 
use of multilateralism such as is being done on the North Korean issue. Without a 
specific international institution that focuses on regional issues important to China and 
her neighbors, the United States will need to carefully seek opportunities to start and 
continue multilateral dialogs that assist in lowering tensions in the region and begin to 
develop positive relationships both among the regional states but also globally. Long 
standing conflicts such as the Kashmir issue, border disputes, terrorism, human rights 
issues have not been resolved through bilateral means but may yield to a renewed 
multilateral effort backed by the United States. 
Engagement of Russia and China must be more than just on a security level to be 
successful but the current nuclear "moment" allows a significant opportunity to attempt 
to broaden engagement with these key states from one of avoiding conflict to one of 
resolving conflict. Engagement with these two states should be done on several parallel 
levels, economic, political, security and social with only loose linking of expectations. 
Quid pro quos should not necessarily be expected in the short run to avoid the "linking of 
issues" problem experienced by Carter when he tied advancement of human rights in the 
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Soviet Union to further arms control negotiations. What can be expected is the 
development of a deeper interaction between the states on a range of issues that is 
designed to at least minimize misunderstandings and open up opportunities for 
cooperation. 
Beyond the immediate goal of reducing strategic nuclear arms, the wider issue of 
the U.S. role and support in efforts to secure nuclear material and reduce weapons below 
the strategic system level remains the more critical issue impacting the health of the NPT 
regime. The NPT regime remains weakened or under stress from proliferators, non-
signatories and breakout states. A lack of complete security on materials and tactical 
nuclear systems contributes to this problem. Despite a great deal of work to deal with 
these problems through programs such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism, a lack of US support to the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference provided mixed signals to the international community on the degree of U.S. 
support to the goals of the treaty. Through the past decade, the U.S. backed both efforts 
to control North Korea and Iran but had a more inconsistent record with respect to other 
states' nuclear programs such as Pakistan and India. With a return to a more focused and 
comprehensive approach to nuclear issues, the United States will need to insure actions 
including appropriate funding support follow words. The U.S. sponsored Nuclear 
Security Summit would seem to be an appropriate "informal" pre-NPT Review 
Conference to gage nuclear weapons states positions, particularly Russia and China, for 
reinforcing the NPT and widening future nuclear security discussions. If the U.S. nuclear 
agenda is to progress, the 2010 NPT Review Conference would seem an important 
moment for the U.S. to positively engage. 
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Assuming the U.S. remains for the immediate future the most powerful state in 
the international system, what can the U.S. do to improve the maintenance of the nuclear 
security regime and the international security environment? As was mentioned earlier, the 
ball is rolling toward implementing the recommendations of President Obama's Prague 
Speech. The key treaty elements of this program are now beginning to take shape 
including the new START agreement signed on the one year anniversary of President 
Obama's Prague Speech, a push to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and a call to negotiate and ratify a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The CTBT and 
the FMCT once completed would essentially place a permanent limit on state's ability to 
produce new nuclear material for weapons and constrain new weapons testing. These two 
processes are seen as essential to further limiting the entrance of any new nuclear states. 
In support of these normative measures for the international community, President 
Obama called for increased support for inspections, primarily through funding of the 
IAEA, the development of a cooperative civilian nuclear fuel bank to assist in 
achievement of the NPT goal of supporting peaceful uses of nuclear energy while 
limiting opportunities for proliferation and consideration of stronger consequences for 
rule breaking of the non-proliferation regime. One example of his commitment to this last 
policy was seen in the President's direct discussions with the Chinese leader Ho Jin Tao 
during another of his stated goals, the U.S. hosted Nuclear Security Summit in April 
2010, where he sought a Chinese commitment to support additional sanctions against 
Iran's nuclear program. 
Additionally the President's nuclear arms policy agenda includes support to 
strengthening the global regime to stop proliferators with specific emphasis on reversing 
North Korea's nuclear program and preventing further proliferation from that state while 
seeking to engage Iran in a multilateral dialog. At present, the latter effort seems to be 
developing into a classic carrot and stick approach as Iran is unwilling to either engage in 
such a dialog or slow its progress toward achieving nuclear weapons capability which 
they continue to categorically deny is the aim of their nuclear program. Beyond dealing 
with these two states, the U.S. President's ultimate policy goal is to prevent terrorist 
groups from possessing a nuclear capability. To achieve this end, the United States is 
supporting all efforts to secure all nuclear material that could be transferred to such 
groups by 2014. During the Washington Nuclear Security Summit at least two states 
offered to have the United States to secure their material immediately while the 
conference concluded with a 47 state commitment to the U.S. goal of complete security 
in four years.115 These policy initiatives demonstrate two parts of the central argument of 
this dissertation in action: U.S. leadership in the international community on the nuclear 
issue and the potential power of multilateral efforts like the Nuclear Security Summit. 
The United States has also stated several policy changes to demonstrate the 
seriousness and long term nature of the commitment being made to the NPT goals. The 
President has stated his full support for having durable international institutions continue 
to assist states in reaching a world free of nuclear terror, most notably in Prague, 
identifying the Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism 
as examples. The actions of the United States at the NPT Review Conference will no 
doubt continue to provide clear support for that multilateral international institution and 
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its non-proliferation regime. The recently released 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report 
provides support to the United States nuclear agenda and echoes the President's Prague 
speech. 
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review while aligning with the Prague Speech nuclear 
agenda was the product of much internal debate between the White House and the 
Department of Defense. In the end, the review reaffirmed the importance still remaining 
for U.S. security of the nuclear deterrent. The review also placed constraints on the 
United States that previous reviews had not been willing to do. The 2010 Nuclear Policy 
Review focused on five objectives that frame U.S. nuclear arms policy: 
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, 
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. ' 
At the center of these objectives is the explicit restatement of the U.S. commitment "to 
bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy 
Agency Safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, 
and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increased proliferation 
risks."117 The Nuclear Policy Review also reaffirmed the Prague goals of aggressively 
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pursuing arms control efforts including the new START agreement, "ratification and 
entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Cutoff Treaty."118 
Included in the Nuclear Policy Review actionable policies was the clarification of 
circumstances where nuclear weapons would not be used, specifically, the United States 
"is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing 'negative security assurance' by 
declaring the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations." This provision has already spurred criticism for departing from 
the long standing position of "having all options on the table" when dealing with 
potential aggressors but as has been earlier discussed, this policy change is fully in line 
with the concept of providing states considering their security from a purely power based 
view a strong incentive to resist selecting nuclear weapons as a means to do so. Equally 
important to reestablishment of the leadership role for the United States, the Nuclear 
Policy Review makes clear the U.S. interest in a permanent extension of the non-use of 
nuclear weapons that has held for 65 years.119 
Among the specific initiatives described in the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review 
Report, the United States has committed to a deepening of bilateral dialogs with Russia 
and China on nuclear issues to seek "strategic stability," conduct follow-on analysis that 
will identify the next set of strategic arms reductions for negotiation with Russia, work 
with Russia to deal with non-strategic nuclear weapons both deployed and non-deployed, 
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and effectiveness of security assurances to our allies and partners. In a clear indication 
of the United States' multilateral intentions, the Nuclear Policy Review Report states that 
allies and partners will be consulted on the appropriate approach to post-New START 
negotiations. The Nuclear Policy Review Report concludes that while the conditions to 
achieve a world without nuclear weapons do not yet exist, the United States believes that 
NPT goal is achievable through working actively to create them. 
GETTING TO UNITY OF EFFORT: EXPANDING MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR 
DISARMAMENT EFFORTS 
United States must also begin to shape the long term security environment in 
terms of progress toward nuclear disarmament beyond the above steps. Specific issues to 
be addressed both in pursuit of above objectives and disarmament in the long run must 
solidify the multilateral nature of the effort which seems to be the goal of the emerging 
United States nuclear arms agenda. As this dissertation has shown, bilateral negotiations 
have limits that can be stronger in the long run than the short term achievements of their 
agreements. The conditions for a stronger and more dynamic multilateral effort with the 
original five nuclear weapons states are in place. The United States leadership is essential 
to moving this group beyond any lingering Cold War rooted political, military or other 
relationship. 
The long term plan for strategic arms reductions should include an effort to bring 
the P5 to a common negotiation which has yet to be suggested formally. These states 
control all but less an estimated 500 of the world's nuclear weapons and no longer 
threaten other members of this group. Combined with their status on the UN Security 
Council, they should seek out means to follow the renewed leadership of the United 
States on strategic nuclear weapons. The April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was 
attended by the leaders of these states and as discussed earlier each has committed to the 
goal of securing the world's nuclear material and are engaged either directly or indirectly 
with the North Korean and Iranian issues. This working relationship should be 
strengthened and made routine to build confidence and trust between them ultimately 
removing any risk of accident or miscalculation among them. Such an arrangement is a 
natural outgrowth of the U.S. Nuclear Policy Review recommendation to further develop 
the Russia and China bilateral relationships with the United States. 
As the original nuclear club shows maturity and forward thinking on 
concentrating their collective efforts to move toward the NPT goals, they will also need 
to work to merge arms control efforts with disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. 
The United States has already identified the initial steps required and has demonstrated a 
significant change in direction from the immediate past. Ultimately, other states must 
cooperate. As this dissertation describes, the example of one state followed by other 
power based states, which each of the P5 are, opens the potential for cooperation toward 
the NPT goals. What remains as a significant challenge for the United States is to 
continuously and steadfastly reinforce the gains each state will derive from the new 
nuclear agenda. As the United States begins to achieve success in lengthening the 
shadows of these states, engagement of the normative based states should quickly align 
all but the few outlying states in working to achieve the NPT goals. The speed at which 
the 47 states attending the U.S. sponsored Nuclear Security Summit is a strong indicator 
of the potential of this concept to succeed. The willingness of Russia and China to work 
to develop "smart sanctions" for Iran shows progress on gaining support from power 
based states as well. 
A range of follow on discussions and activities focused on confidence building 
measures that lead to consensus building where these states work toward common goals 
such as was done in the immediate Cold War period experiences of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty and the NATO Partnership for Peace is the obvious next step. 
Here again the United States is best positioned to organize and lead these activities. Once 
the nuclear agenda shows significant progress the next layer of issues particularly the 
resolution of lingering regional security issues will become most obvious and important 
to resolve. Without unity of international effort, lengthening the shadow of the future for 
Israel, Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan and their neighbors will remain problematic. 
As the United States attempts to begin resetting and eventually maintaining norms 
for nuclear non-proliferation, many if not all states will reexamine their need to claim the 
right to build and deploy nuclear systems. In order to sustain this renewed regime, the 
United States should continue to seek to reestablish moral leadership by returning to 
negotiation table to revive, complete or rebuild nuclear arms control agreements with 
Russia in particular while asserting leadership in multilateral non-proliferation and 
disarmament action plans.121 This effort should be extended to broaden the arms control 
focus of the bilateral efforts through the 2010 NPT Review in order to strengthen and 
support the best multilateral and nearly universal effort to reach a further reduction in 
nuclear arms and eventually reach the goal of total disarmament. 
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This ultimate NPT goal can be reached through support of international 
institutions which in turn can influence states to conform to universal norms like the UN 
Charter as well as specific norms contained within the NPT. Ultimately nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament will succeed only with the universal acceptance of the 
principles, norms and rules with an understanding of the existing power relationships of 
the nuclear states. Among the nuclear states, the United States has a unique position in 
terms of resources, political will and moral responsibility to assist all states in achieving 
the goals of the NPT. The United States has a long tradition of negotiations both 
successful and failed to draw upon to offer better options for achieving nuclear 
disarmament through support of transparency, trust building and multilateralism. The 
2002 withdrawal by the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty provides an 
important reminder of the limitations of bilateral arms control agreements and the 
potential of multilateral agreements especially the NPT to succeed. The next chapter will 
focus on this hallmark agreement of the Cold War period which highlights a number of 
important issues from the earlier nuclear arms control era. 
SUMMARY 
The keystone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970. The three goals of the agreement, no state to 
state transfers of nuclear weapons (Article I), sharing nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes (Article IV), and nuclear disarmament (Article VI) have been almost universally 
accepted in principle by all but a handful of states. In general, these goals have been 
respected and continue to be respected by the vast majority of states. As with any 
multilateral agreement, the NPT has both strengths and weaknesses which have direct 
impact on the successful achievement of its goals. 
This case study of the NPT in the contemporary context contained a discussion of 
the weaknesses in the treaty specifically the IAEA inspection and verification protocols 
are only as effective as states are willing to accept them. A discussion of the current 
Iranian nuclear issue highlighted many of the important problems within the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and the difficulty with reaching total nuclear disarmament. One of 
the important elements in understanding the complexity of the Iranian issue is viewed 
through the concept of how states develop a strategic culture and are influenced by their 
strategic elites. These elites still must work through the calculus of deterrence as the key 
concept to their rationale for developing and deploying nuclear arms. As the added 
complexity of achieving multilateral norms may at times be seen as opposing national 
interests, other means must be sought for convincing states through their elites that the 
loss of perceived power in adherence with such a norm is beneficial in the long run. A 
strengthening of the non-proliferation regime will depend on assisting these elites to 
understand the full impact of acquiring and deployment of nuclear weapons. The near 
term goal of any effort to stem emergent nuclear states would be to find appropriate 
means to engage their leadership in dialog focused on regional security issue resolution. 
The normative power of the NPT can be realized as states work together to this end. 
One potential source of increasing the normative impact of the NPT regime are 
epistemic communities. Epistemic communities have achieved such gains in other issue 
areas such as the environment and international law of the seas and may provide an 
important new dimension toward strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
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leading toward nuclear disarmament. One of the key features of an effective regime lies 
in how states are persuaded to accept a loss of freedom to take actions within the 
international environment for the gains offered by conformance to the regime's norms. 
The leadership of a single state in the non-proliferation regime is seen as essential with 
the United States being the best candidate for the position. The research conducted for 
this case study indicates that the NPT remains the best international agreement in support 
of a regime that promotes non-proliferation and eventual disarmament, requires a means 
to effectively deal with the differing state views of the role of nuclear weapons and will 
rely on the emergence of a single state leader, most likely the United States, that can set 
and persuade compliance with regime norms, rules and procedures. Engagement with 
Russia and China will be essential to building a multilateral consensus. Efforts to 
implement both the CTBT and the FMCT should be among the short term goals of a 
renewed NPT agenda that the United States has identified as policy commitments. 2010 
NPT Review Conference provides an obvious opportunity for the United States to seek to 
lead the international community toward the goals of the NPT. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY: A CASE STUDY ON THE LIMITS OF 
BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 
While the importance of the NPT to the global good of eliminating nuclear 
weapons cannot be overstated, the success of its multilateral effort will eventually draw 
support from the long history of bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons 
between the United States and Russia. Today, these states continue to see value in a 
renewed set of negotiations between the two as they wrestle with the legacy of the arms 
races of the Cold War between them. The first agreement between these first two nuclear 
weapon states, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, provides an appropriate and specific 
case for review of how two states can negotiate and eventually agree to a treaty that 
would last for over three decades. The ABM Treaty also highlights the fragility of a 
bilateral agreement as it was eventually abandoned, first by the United States, as it 
decided in 2002 to pursue missile defenses to deal with potential breakout states like 
North Korea and Iran. Russia would follow suit shortly after. This case provides both 
positive and negative lessons on the importance of U.S. leadership in efforts to control 
nuclear weapons. 
This chapter examines a case study of the ABM Treaty which highlights the 
limitations of bilateral arms control agreements in order to contrast them with the value 
of multilateral agreements and their associated normative regimes. While some specific 
features of agreements between two nations are valuable to any arms control effort, 
bilateral arms control agreements are at the same time easier to establish than multilateral 
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agreements but are also by their nature easier to abandon. The narrow, single weapon 
system focus of the treaty contributed to the ease with which it was negotiated and 
ratified. Despite the thirty year duration of the ABM Treaty, in the end, it was abandoned 
by the United States in 2002 as no longer suitable to that party's security interests. 
Merging bilateral arms control efforts into a wider and more binding multilateral 
disarmament effort is the second element of this dissertation's argument. While 
multilateral efforts to control nuclear arms are preferred theoretically, bilateral 
agreements particularly between the United States and Russia are frequently the only 
means to start an arms control or reduction process. 
OVERVIEW 
Given the nature of the international security environment of the Cold War period 
and the relatively small number of nuclear weapons states and other nuclear states, 
bilateral nuclear arms control agreements, primarily between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, have been used to control the nuclear 
arms of the two largest nuclear arsenals as well as to reach accommodations on nuclear 
related issues. While a certain amount of trust and cooperation between the two parties is 
afforded by such arrangements, other states that might be impacted by the results have no 
voice in how the agreement is negotiated or carried out. The largest number and most 
prominent series of bilateral nuclear agreements have been completed between the United 
States and Russia. One of these agreements, the ABM Treaty, provides an excellent 
example of the limitations of a bilateral nuclear arms control treaty and offers important 
features that any successful multilateral nuclear disarmament regime would incorporate. 
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Given the eventual abandonment of the ABM Treaty in 2002, an agreement that 
lasted over 30 years, prevented a defensive strategic arms race, and provided a useful 
channel for communications between the two most powerful nuclear states, one could 
conclude that the treaty had no value. While the action of the United States to depart from 
the agreement reinforces the key weakness of a bilateral treaty, most observers of the 
treaty have consistently declared it the most successful agreement of the Cold War. This 
research and case study suggests specific features of the ABM Treaty were both 
successful and useful for any future nuclear arms agreement focused on achieving lasting 
progress toward the goal of disarmament beyond just limiting two of the nuclear states. 
Among these useful features are the importance of the negotiations themselves in 
establishing a relationship between potential belligerents which in turn offers the 
opportunity to build understanding, trust and confidence in the words and actions of the 
parties; the establishment of the requirement for inspection and verification processes that 
can be adapted to deal with efforts to defeat them; and a permanent forum to air concerns 
or requests for modifications to the agreement as circumstances change over time. 
The ABM Treaty, an agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., 
ratified by the appropriate parliamentary functions of both signatory states and supported 
by subsequent governments including the successors to the U.S.S.R., represents first 
demonstration of U.S. willingness to abrogate an international agreement which had in 
fact led to other mutually reinforcing agreements on nuclear disarmament. The ABM 
Treaty was developed in conjunction with the strategic arms limitations negotiations that 
began as an outcome of the detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. during the 
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Nixon Administration and remained in force until the United States unilaterally withdrew 
in the winter of 2001-2002. 
The historical record would seem to indicate that the U.S. withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty has reinforced other nations' concerns of the validity of previous U.S. treaty 
obligations especially in the area of nuclear issues, lessened cohesion within the 
international community to develop, agree and enforce similar agreements and likely 
increased the difficulty in reestablishing an increasingly more binding non-proliferation 
regime. Both the historical record and international relations theory support the value of 
continuing and reinforcing arms control agreements like the ABM Treaty and that 
national leadership along with their supporting elites are critical to their initial 
negotiation, ratification and sustainment. Multilateral agreements like the NPT, which by 
their very nature, limit the issue of withdrawal, can be strengthened by incorporating 
processes similar to the best features of the ABM Treaty. With the goal of identifying 
appropriate improvements for the NPT from the legacy of the ABM Treaty, this chapter 
will detail the treaty's history, review the major issues it addresses, and provide a review 
of the valuable features of this agreement than should be adapted to strengthen the NPT 
regime. As this dissertation argues, nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through a 
sustained multilateral effort that is based on universal cooperation, that addresses the 
concerns of both power focused and normative focused states and is led by the United 
States as the best positioned state to do so. 
HISTORY OF ABM TREATY 
One of the key concerns of states from the dawn of state organized armies is that 
of arms races or an escalation of the development, procurement and employment of 
systems of equal or greater quantity or systems that are of superior quality in terms of 
capability of similar but then made obsolete by the newer weapons. In the period just 
prior to the start of negotiations of the ABM Treaty, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
were engaged in a nuclear arms race that would lead both states to possess a staggering 
level of destructive power that continues to the present day in a much lower level of 
quantity. At the time, nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs and their 
submarine launched equivalent or SLBMs) were of varying capabilities in terms of 
warhead lethality and range of the delivery system. One aspect of these missiles was 
common. Each contained a single warhead. This characteristic allowed a relatively 
simple calculation on the part of each defending state in terms of considering the 
requirements for an active missile defense system. 
A system capable of protecting any nation from an attack will have a number of 
technical issues to address to be effective. Key to the eventual debate over the various 
systems envisioned and fielded by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. was the extent 
each was capable of defending. If a missile defense system is capable of defending the 
targets an opponent wishes to strike, then the opponent has to consider develop additional 
forces or improvements to his existing offensive capabilities to overwhelm the defense. 
This is a formula as old as warfare itself. Even a modest system of missile defense was 
seen as potentially triggering a buildup of defensive systems and offensive systems to 
assure the effectiveness of a first strike and survival of a second strike capability. Other 
arguments raised to suggest an anti-ballistic missile system is not viable include the cost 
and technical complexity of any system. The history of missile defenses in the nuclear 
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age is one where all three: potential for arras races, technical feasibility and affordability 
have been constants features of the on-going debates. 
Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. developed and deployed anti-ballistic 
missile systems with the Soviet system in varying upgrades remaining in place around 
Moscow to the present day. The negotiated U.S. system was never fully operational. 
Later advancements in warhead technology specifically the advent of multiple 
independently targetable re-entry vehicles allowed each missile to carry as many as 10 
separate nuclear devices that could destroy an array of targets. As this technology was 
deployed in both the U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, ABM systems of a limited 
nature such as those negotiated under the ABM Treaty were seen as increasingly of only 
a symbolic value. 
Prior to the deployment of MIRVs, a single ABM system either for protection of a 
capital city or an ICBM deployment field was seen as a way to prevent a costly defensive 
arms race to deploy nation or regional ABM systems. An arms race to deploy vast 
defensive systems capable of negating the other side's offensive strike capability was, in 
turn, thought to lead to an increase in deployment of offensive systems to offset any 
defensive advantage. Despite this calculus, the ABM Treaty represented a positive step 
toward breaking the arms race cycle and affording the United States and U.S.S.R. a 
touchstone agreement that would serve to show both the world and each other that arms 
control was possible.' 
In 1967, the United States offered the Soviet Union an initial attempt at an ABM 
treaty which was rejected. This rejection occurred during the largest buildup of ICBMs 
1
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by both sides and continuing series of global conflicts including the Vietnam War and the 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War. The United States was committed to building an ICBM force 
of 1,054 missiles by the end of that year. The Soviets, whose ICBM buildup pace was 
consistently underestimated by the United States, would deploy some 570 missiles in the 
same period. President Johnson's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara was 
convinced that the total capability of the Soviets including submarine and bomber 
delivered nuclear weapons would not reach a size sufficient to overwhelm the U.S. land-
based systems. Many within the United States were not as sure. At the same time, the 
Soviets were believed to be constructing a sophisticated civil defense system which 
included an anti-ballistic missile system to protect Moscow.2 
Faced with the knowledge his predecessors had been only able to delay 
deployment of an ABM system due to a lack of technical capability, President Johnson 
measured growing pressure from the Joint Chief of Staff and the Congress for such a 
deployment and decided he did not want the issue to become a part of the 1968 election 
campaign. Within his administration, his Secretaries of State and Defense, Dean Rusk 
and McNamara, held a common vision to pursue arms control and gaining an agreement 
on limiting defensive systems such as ABMs was a continuation of the results achieved in 
earlier agreements and in the spirit of the soon to be signed NPT.3 Meeting with Johnson 
in December 1966, McNamara offered a compromise plan for Congress in which "a 
contingency fund for ABM preproduction expenditures, linked to two conditions: (1) 
there was no commitment to a specific deployment schedule or plan, and (2) deployment 
would be contingent on the results of an effort to negotiate an ABM deployment freeze 
2
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with the Soviet Union." Within months as Johnson and his Secretary of Defense's power 
to influence within the government and the world at large waned as a result of the 
growing dissatisfaction over the Vietnam War, the President met with the Soviet premier 
who was visiting the UN during the Arab-Israeli War in June 1967.5 
While Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin was focused on the Mid-East war, President 
Johnson was able to have McNamara present his case for limiting ABM deployments. 
The Russian insisted that ABM systems were defensive in nature and that they should be 
linked to offensive nuclear systems. While the President and McNamara made the U.S. 
position was the same as the Soviets, Kosygin returned to the UN and announced that the 
Soviet system was purely defensive in nature to protect the Soviet people. Johnson and 
his administration interpreted the Soviet view as unwilling to negotiate on arms 
reductions of any kind and submitted a budget which included the U.S. ABM system as a 
defense against the emerging Chinese threat and "add protection against the remote 
possibility of an accidental launch" from the Soviets.6 This position was reinforced by the 
first explosion of a Chinese thermonuclear device the same month of the failed ABM 
discussion. On September 18, 1967, McNamara announced the decision to deploy a 
limited ABM system called Sentinel and was based on an Army air defense missile, 
NIKE-X, modified to intercept incoming nuclear warheads.8 
As the time to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty arrived, the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to begin negotiations on limiting strategic nuclear 
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weapon systems. President Johnson announced the beginning of the negotiations as he 
signed the NPT on July 1, 1968.9 As April Carter notes, the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. were able to consider beginning the SALT negotiations as they slowly realized 
they could agree to disagree on related issues while seeking mutual agreement on ABMs. 
From the 1950s onward, both states were pursuing national interests in relation to each 
other's military capabilities which added to their perception of threats to those interests. 
Ideology, domestic audiences, emerging conflicts tended to drive the agenda each state 
pursued or at times derailed those agendas. As seeking a nuclear balance became a 
primary objective of each state, the stage was set for potential agreement on limiting 
specific strategic nuclear systems. The SALT negotiations would be delayed into the 
Nixon Administration when just such an event occurred with the Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Another was the Presidential Election Campaign in 
which Nixon openly campaigned that he would protect the American population from 
Soviet attack. By protection, he saw the deployment of an ABM system as part of his 
ability to show he would deliver on campaign promises and retain the support of the 
conservative wing of the Republican Party. 
ARMS RACING AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES: THE MIRV 
PROBLEM 
The Johnson Administration also contributed to the technology portion of the 
nuclear question by approving and eventually completing a successful test of a multiple 
independently retargetable vehicle (MIRV) equipped ICBM. MIRVs ultimately would 
prove critical to the strategic calculus of offensive versus defensive nuclear systems. A 
9
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MIRVd ICBM or SLBM would dramatically increase the number of available warheads 
the U.S. could use in an attack or retaliation against an adversary. This capability in turn 
could easily overwhelm a limited ABM system even one on the scale the U.S.S.R. had 
already deployed. Such a capability could in theory lead to the U.S.S.R. seeking a similar 
capability having the same effect on the U.S. ABM system being fielded. The theoretical 
result of deployment of MIRV capable systems could be arms racing to build both more 
offensive and defensive systems, a potentially massive buildup of the two arsenals. 
After the Nixon Administration took power in 1969 during one of the most 
turbulent security environments in decades, both the United States and the Soviets were 
interested in efforts that would lead to negotiations on strategic arms limitations. These 
negotiations were an integral and critical part of Nixon's overall foreign policy. 
Somewhat unexpectedly and without a specific plan developed by his advisors, the 
President took the opportunity at the splashdown and recovery ceremony of the first men 
on the moon Apollo 11 mission to outline what would become the Nixon Doctrine. He 
"sought to navigate between overextension and abdication" as the U.S. had previously 
engaged itself in two wars where its vital interests such as survival were not immediately 
threatened and alliances were not as strong as in the World Wars.10 The Nixon Doctrine 
for involvement in any overseas issue would require that the United States follow three 
criteria: 1) keep all treaty commitments; 2) extended deterrence would apply as the U.S. 
would "provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with 
us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security," and 3) when a threat 
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 707-08. 
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was non-nuclear in nature, the threatened nation should provide the lion's share in terms 
of manpower for its defense.11 
Each of these criteria reflects the realities of the situation Nixon inherited and his 
understanding that "East-West relations had reached a dead end."12 Kissinger believed 
Nixon saw the need to adapt foreign policy and containment in particular in a way that 
dropped the requirement for the Soviet system to be converted to democracy as a 
prerequisite to negotiations. According to Kissinger, "Nixon believed that the process of 
negotiations and a long period of peaceful competition would accelerate the 
transformation of the Soviet system and strengthen the democracies."13 Seeking to 
prevent the anti-Vietnam movement from negatively impacting his administration's total 
foreign policy, Nixon created "an era of negotiations" that "served as a strategy for 
enabling America to regain the diplomatic initiative" despite the impact of the Vietnam 
War.14 The key negotiations that would directly move the public focus in this direction 
would be with the Soviets on the issue of strategic nuclear weapons with the ABM 
question squarely within that objective. 
On March 14, 1969, the President announced his administration's intention to 
deploy the Safeguard ABM and turned his efforts to lobbying the Congress to approve 
funding for the deployment. In early 1969, the Vietnam War intensified the debate on 
national security within the U.S. public, the Senate and the Administration. The pressures 
of the international and domestic environments were in part responsible for the reversal 
of the President's campaign rhetoric where he had stated his support for nuclear 
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superiority over the U.S.S.R. One indication of the intensity of this debate was the 
success of the vote for the Safeguard funding bill which was passed with a majority of a 
just a single vote.15 That vote was cast by Vice President Spiro Agnew in his role as 
President of the Senate breaking a tie. In his efforts to rally Senate support for the ABM 
funding, Nixon had used the idea that the Safeguard ABM could be used as a bargaining 
chip during the strategic nuclear arms reduction negotiations to come with the Soviets. 
The problem the President faced how to convince the Soviets that the U.S. backed ABM 
deployment when in fact Americans had wide spread of views of the value of an ABM 
system. The Soviets, while having a greater control on government decision making, also 
were not united on the utility of such a defense. Despite a seeming lack of unified 
domestic support for ABM, the leadership of both of the superpowers saw the advantages 
of reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear systems in general. 
SALT I AND ABM 
The start of initial strategic arms limitation talks that were rebuffed in 
1967 were further delayed beyond the Johnson Administration with the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When the negotiations began on 
November 17, 1969, the United States viewed the talks as an integral part of the 
Administration's concept of detente. Detente with the Soviets in Nixon and 
Kissinger's common view was tied to the Nixon Doctrine adding arms control to 
the issue areas of political and economic cooperation. The talks themselves were 
conducted in two channels, one open to public view and the other in secret. Open 
negotiations were held in alternating venues of Helsinki and Vienna over seven 
15
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sessions led on the U.S. side by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Director Gerald Smith and Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov. '6 
In a pattern of negotiation that would become a hallmark of the Nixon-
Kissinger team, parallel secret negotiations were conducted under Nixon's direction 
in a similar manner to his efforts to reach a conclusion of the Vietnam peace talks. 
For the nuclear arms control talks, the secret rounds were between Kissinger and 
the Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoli Dobrynin and key Soviet officials in 
Moscow. This channel would be the one that enabled agreement over time but the 
communications on each side internally was not similar. The Soviet leadership in 
Moscow kept their negotiators in Vienna and Helsinki updated on all of the content 
of the secret negotiations. On the U.S. side, Kissinger kept some the details of the 
secret negotiations from Smith.17 
Recent declassification of the communications between Kissinger and 
Nixon provide a wider view of the somewhat dysfunctional inner workings of the 
negotiations. One of the key signs of the complex nature of the talks can be seen in 
several documents. As the negotiations continued to be unresolved, Kissinger's 
preparatory memo to Nixon before the scheduled summit in May 1972, when the 
strategic arms agreements were to be completed, provides interesting insight on the 
pressures they faced. Kissinger provided Nixon a number of issues to raise with the 
Soviets including holding them partly responsible for limiting the North 
Vietnamese from any military advances as well as outlining the specific issues 
remaining to be resolved on SALT and ABM. 
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While several issues slowed the SALT I negotiations, the discussions on 
ABM revolved around limits or a total ban that would require a roll back of the 
limited systems already in place and those additional ones in development. The 
Soviets had deployed their initial ABM system to defend Moscow. The United 
States had one ABM system nearing completion and another approved for 
construction, both defending ICBM launch silo fields. The United States wanted to 
limit Soviet anti-aircraft systems from being modified allowing a relatively 
inexpensive but effective ABM capability that some believed would be capable of a 
limited nation-wide missile defense. The crux of the U.S. concern centered on the 
capabilities of Soviet anti-aircraft radars which led to the provisions in Article V. 
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or 
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for 
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each 
launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a 
capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or 
other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.19 
These restrictions would become the central focus of debate a decade later as the United 
States considered the possibilities of new anti-warhead defenses in the Reagan Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). 
Another important technical advance in nuclear weapon technology, the issue of 
MIRV capable missiles would remain among the unconstrained systems in the final 
language of the SALT I agreement. The impact of the limitations of the ABM Treaty 
would remain felt by both sides as each continued to build new strategic nuclear systems 
on a pace far above that of the previous decades continuing well into the 1980s. The 
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fuller extent of the SALT I treaty and later strategic arms negotiations will be treated in 
depth in a following chapter. The key accomplishment of the ABM Treaty was the 
prevention of a defensive nuclear arms race which in turn theoretically kept the offensive 
arms buildups that did occur from being far larger. 
THE ABM TREATY BECOMES A REALITY 
By the time the ABM Treaty was signed at the end of a United States-U.S.S.R. 
summit in Moscow on May 26, 1972, both sides achieved what they desired. Neither side 
believed missile defenses would sufficiently protect their respective populations from 
either a first or retaliatory strike but both firmly saw the danger of having to match the 
adversary move for move. At the same time, each was able to retain sufficient freedom to 
continue to move ahead on offensive systems. Nixon himself believed that this situation 
was a necessary precondition to any future limitations by laying bear to both sides the 
continuing threat of the loss of both sides' populations should a nuclear exchange occur. 
The continuance of this dual extant threat of incomprehensible destruction known as 
Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, would in Nixon's belief place both sides in a 
position to mutually accept the need find a way to eventually eliminate this situation. 
Arms control offered the only sane option despite the lingering belief on some portions of 
U.S. society for the need for a missile defense. 
Once completed, the ABM Treaty contained s.everal important features as well as 
gaps that would become the focus of later debates within the international community 
and drive decisions by the states involved that would test the limits of arms control. Key 
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limitations on systems for intercepting incoming nuclear missiles were described and 
defined in such a way as to prevent either state from rapidly expanding the very limited 
defenses allowed while also prohibiting the use of the agreed capabilities from any more 
than a small area defense against attack. Said another way, the ABM Treaty prohibited 
either the United States or the U.S.S.R. from building a national ABM system. As had 
been the norm in the buildup of offensive systems from the 1950's onward, serious 
concerns of a "breakout" capability to build such a national coverage were addressed in 
the treaty. At the time of signing, the treaty was contained sufficient language to address 
the likely cases where either side could develop a capability that was not in violation of 
the letter of the agreement. Later disputes over the treaty would fall into one of two 
categories: reinterpretation, as with the U.S. SDI developments, and perceived or outright 
violations of the provisions, such as the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk. 
The preamble of the ABM Treaty provides a clear intent to limit ABM systems as 
means to lower the possibility of war breaking out, reduce future arms races and assist in 
achieving additional agreements on limiting strategic nuclear arms. The United States 
and U.S.S.R. also acknowledged their obligations as signatories of the NPT "to achieve at 
the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective 
measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and 
complete disarmament, desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension 
and the strengthening of trust between" them.22 Article I prohibits a national ABM 
system and limits the deployment of any ABM system to those allowed in Article III. 
Article II defined an ABM system as having interceptor missiles, launchers, radars and 
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specified the systems to be those in any state after development. Development is 
addressed in Article IV which limited the number of test launchers on mutually agreed 
test ranges. 
The key limiting provisions of the treaty in terms of the systems allowed are 
contained in Article III. Each side was allowed two systems with an effective range of 
150 kilometers, one covering the national capital and the other an ICBM field. The later 
1974 agreement would cut this to one system per nation, either a national capital or 
ICBM field defense system. Russia has retained their Moscow area ABM system through 
numerous upgrades to the present day.23 The United States would abandon their North 
Dakota based ICBM field defense system within a year of its declared operational 
capability, partly due to the concern over the concept of the use of the nuclear armed 
interceptors. Despite some technical successes with the U.S. system, the political problem 
of additional nuclear warheads residing potentially near major cities would likely have 
prevented any large scale deployments of ABM missiles even if the treaty had not been 
accepted. When combined with the large cost of deploying these systems, a nationwide 
U.S. ABM capability probably never could have been achieved at the time and remained 
a source of debate through later developments such as SDI and the current limited missile 
defense systems.25 
See Time Magazine coverage from late 1960's to 1970 showing the growing anti-ABM views in 
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The type of ABM system allowed was specified as land based through the 
negative language of Article V. The treaty did not allow development, testing or 
deployment of "ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based." Modernization of allowed systems was allowed under 
Article VII. As it was the key to limiting future ABM developments, Article V would be 
the primary source of the "broad" interpretation of the treaty by the'United States in the 
Reagan Administration as SDI was pursued. The negotiations on both sides were 
constantly seeking to attain some slight advantage over the other particularly in this 
area.27 Multiple launchers and rapid reload systems for ABMs were also prohibited. 
One of the most effective provisions of the treaty which can serve as a model for 
other agreements is Article XII which established an effective and permanent forum to 
discuss issues that impact the continuance of the agreement. While not as intrusive as 
verification requirements of later agreements, the Standing Consultative Committee 
provided a forum between the signatory states to assist in confidence building to support 
the treaty, where issues of implementation, compliance, or ambiguities in the treaty itself 
could be identified and addressed. Effectiveness of the committee has been periodically 
challenged, most notably by the Reagan Administration. The evidence of specific 
instances where the Standing Consultative Committee was able to raise and resolve 
significant issues indicates the gains may have outweighed the alternative of some other 
arrangement. Other later agreements which did not have similar arrangements were not as 
26
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effective and in one instance, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the 
United States would have to request one be implemented.28 
The Standing Consultative Committee was of particular importance to support the 
requirement for a formal review of the treaty every five years as set out in Article XIV. 
The Standing Consultative Committee continued to meet at least twice annually and at 
each five year review reconfirmed the parties' intent to continue their commitment to the 
"aims and objectives of the treaty" and that the Standing Consultative Committee was the 
appropriate forum to continue to promote the provisions of the agreement. The Standing 
Consultative Committee did so for thirty years until the U.S. withdrawal in 2002.29 While 
the NPT has a process to review both violations and process improvements, the nearly 
constant contact between the United States and Russia afforded by the Standing 
Consultative Committee offers a potential set of process improvement options to increase 
the frequency and duration of NPT regime parties' interaction. Despite the value added of 
the Standing Consultative Committee , the limited nature of its charter prevented an 
appropriate level of trust to be developed to prevent the party states from seeking to 
develop capabilities that violated the treaty's intent if not its wording. 
STRESS OF THE REAGAN STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ON THE ABM 
TREATY 
In less than a decade after the ABM Treaty went into effect, the U.S. system had 
been discarded and the strategic arms buildup including modernization of existing and 
28
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fielding of new strategic systems on both sides was well underway. The extent of the 
buildup in nuclear weapons was matched with conventional arms increases on both sides 
as well. As Ronald Reagan reached the presidency, the voices for a new ABM defense 
were once again rising. The weaknesses of SALT I had allowed both sides to take 
advantage of the emerging technological advances in both missile and warhead 
technology. In the 1980s, the debate over ABM systems would take on three distinct 
themes: indications that the Soviets were violating the treaty with the main controversy 
over a radar system that did not conform, the Reagan Administration's "broad" 
reinterpretation of the agreement and the development of linkage between the Strategic 
Defense Initiative and the desire to reach an accord on limiting offensive nuclear 
systems.30 
The growth of the overall military capability of the Soviet Union and the growing 
unease over their aggressive foreign policy especially highlighted by their invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980 resulted in a series of U.S. decisions to begin development of new 
ABM systems including capabilities on ship, on the ground, in the air and space. As 
Article V specifically prohibited most of these options, the Reagan Administration had 
committed itself to strategy far different to the Nixon approach but grounded in the 
practicalities of maintaining negotiations in pursuit of arms control. The main focus in 
this area early in the Reagan years was a continuation of that of the Carter Administration 
before it in this regard: focusing on either matching or limiting fielding of strategic and 
now sub-strategic systems allowed under the "seams" in the SALT I and II treaties 
agreement. These specific issues will be addressed in detail in the following chapter. 
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What reentered the debate both in the government and in the public was the idea of ABM 
systems but of a different concept than that of previous administrations. 
For the preceding decade, many among the politically conservative elites within 
the United States were convinced that the concept of detente was totally ineffective when 
measured against the continuing buildup of Soviet offensive arms. President Reagan's 
own campaign rhetoric in both the 1980 and 1984 elections reflected these views. The 
renewed interest in defending the nation stemmed from the deep seated belief among 
these elites including Henry Kissinger that protection of the nation's population overrode 
any other considerations. With the invasion of Afghanistan following the Iranian takeover 
of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, a wounded Carter Administration was followed by a 
president who directed a number of public and secret actions to redress perceived and 
actual security weaknesses. 
Among the secret directives that were written in 1982-1983, as the Reagan 
Administration continued to build national power, were three that formed the key ideas of 
how the United States would regain its balance with the Soviet Union and in time defeat 
its goals. One presidential scholar noted that the Reagan Defense Department's five year 
planning directive and three National Security Decision Directives established U.S. 
policy to make every effort including support to underground movements to undermine 
Soviet control in Eastern Europe (NSDD-32), set forth an economic warfare strategy 
against the U.S.S.R. (NSDD-66), and declared as a U.S. policy objective to make every 
effort to complete a "roll-back of Soviet influence around the world, and ultimately a 
change in the Soviet system itself, to be a key U.S. policy objective."31 While the debate 
31
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over the effectiveness of the U.S. efforts to counter the Soviet Union economically 
continues, the aim of the Reagan Administration to do everything imaginable to counter 
the efforts of the "Evil Empire" was evident. 
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) began as an idea of Ronald Reagan long 
before he entered the White House. He held firm personal beliefs of the moral 
responsibility of the United States to oppose Communism and these beliefs became 
visible as he campaigned for President. Reagan had also believed in the technical prowess 
and superiority of the United States. These beliefs combined when he had discussions 
with Edward Teller who suggested the United States could construct a robust and 
sufficient nuclear defensive shield.32 Although Reagan was elected by a substantial 
margin, a growing and vocal opposition to his hawkish proposals spurred significant 
public support for disarmament. One example is the letter declaring nuclear weapons 
immoral from the American Catholic bishops in 1983. SDI was born to deal with this 
significant political issue while maintaining the President's position as being strong on 
defense. When SDI was announced, the program was described as a research program 
which fit within the parameters of the ABM Treaty.33 
Citing the fatal flaws in the SALT II Treaty, Bud Mac Far lane, Reagan's National 
Security Advisor oversaw a series of events leading to the Presidential announcement of 
SDI in March 1983. Beginning with an advocacy meeting where the Chairman of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff General Vessley recommended a national ballistic missile defense be 
developed based on an input from the Chief of Naval Operations. MacFarlane then tasked 
his U.S. Air Force staff officers on the National Security Council to prepare a presidential 
speech to be given before the month was out. He also won rapid endorsement and 
advocacy from the White House science advisor. Next, the President met with the 
Secretaries of Defense and State and discussed the timing and content of the speech. The 
secretaries despite having been given only a very short notice supported the President. 
President Reagan announced the initiation of SDI on March 23, 1983 just six weeks after 
the JCS briefing.34 
The key to Reagan's political strategy behind SDI was to gain mutual cooperation 
from Russia on a level not previously achieved. He believed that SDI represented an 
opportunity to both reduce nuclear weapons which he abhorred through engagement with 
the Soviets while achieving a high level of support for his presidency at home. From a 
nuclear capability standpoint, SDI was envisioned as a cooperative research and 
development program that both sides would both participate in while reducing the level 
of offensives weapons. The United States believed that a crossover point could be 
reached where defensive systems on both sides would be sufficient to negate the others 
offensive weapons. This concept had not been seriously considered over the course of the 
nuclear era.35 Unfortunately the Soviet leadership under Andropov, the former head of 
the KGB now premier, was not willing to trust the United States at the time so the 






mutual national ballistic missile defenses was beginning to gain some Soviet acceptance 
as Michael Gorbachev became Soviet premier.36 
While the ABM Treaty did not prevent research into new missile defense systems, 
the extent to which SDI was to be "researched" clearly generated grave cause for concern 
within the United States and western countries as well as the Soviets. Specifically, 
opponents of SDI believed that if these systems could eventually succeed technically, the 
United States would rapidly deploy a system. Such a deployment was opposed primarily 
due to the potential to cause an imbalance in the nuclear arena which would in turn 
trigger both an abandonment of the ABM Treaty and a renewed defensive and offensive 
nuclear arms race. 
DISSENT ON THE HILL: THE 1985 SENATE HEARINGS ON THE ABM TREATY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 
In the winter of 1985 as the U.S. Department of Defense submitted its budget for 
the coming year, the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was asked to provide 
Congress with a description of what the SDI program funds would be used to do. 
Secretary Weinberger submitted a brief explanation of the actions he had taken to 
organize the research and what he saw as the objective of the program. First, SDI was a 
"broad research program" that was 
not based on any preconceived notions of what an effective defense 
system would or should look like. A number of different concepts, based 
on a range of promising technologies, are being examined, but no single 
36
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concept or technology has yet been identified as the best or most 
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appropriate one. 
Weinberger believed that the Soviets were rapidly developing a similar capability 
based on their existing strategic surface-to-air missiles and would field a national 
defense system in the near term creating both a breakout of the ABM Treaty as 
well as an imbalance in the defensive arena that the United States could not refuse 
to match. SDI as he described it would provide "a powerful deterrent to a 
potential Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty" based on U.S. intelligence of the 
development of new Soviet radars. He also expressed the Reagan 
Administration's belief that SDI would be a clear statement that "the United 
States takes seriously the Soviet buildup in offensive arms."38 Weinberger stated 
that "(e)effective defenses against ballistic missiles significantly enhance 
deterrence."39 He believed that SDI would be an effective defense in preventing 
the Soviets from even thinking an attack would work. 
"Defenses that could deny to Soviet missiles the objectives of an 
attack, or deny to the Soviets confidence in the achievement of those 
objectives, would discourage them from even considering such an attack, 
and thus be an effective deterrent."40 
While the technical capabilities of the SDI were still to be proven through 
research, by 1987, the requirement for such defenses was subject to continuing debate 
especially on Capitol Hill where both Houses of Congress were in control of the 
Democrats. One series of Joint Committee Hearings were held to discuss the relationship 
37
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of the ABM Treaty to the Constitution. By this time the Reagan Administration was 
openly suggesting that the negotiation record which was not fully released to the Senate 
held important clarification information that would allow the development of SDL The 
only remaining Senator on either the Foreign Relations Committees who was a part of the 
1972 ratification process, Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
suspected that the Reagan Administration was too broadly interpreting the Treaty by 
authorizing the development of systems deployable in other than a fixed ground site as 
allowed in the treaty.41 Senator Joseph Biden believed the Bush Administration was 
potentially violating the ABM Treaty or at least reinterpreting the treaty without the 
constitutionally required advice and consent of the Senate.42 During testimony before the 
Committees, experts from both government and academia provided both eyewitness and 
scholarly research to confirm the appropriate interpretation of the treaty and those 
specifically new ABM systems of any type could be researched but that only land based 
systems like a laser could be tested. The Reagan Administration was believed to be 
seeking to develop and deploy a spaced based ABM system which had both the Senate 
and Premier Gorbachev concerned.43 
Some of the most important confirmations to surface in these hearings were the 
statements President Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the time the ABM Treaty was ratified. 
Both felt that the treaty allowed the opposing sides to enshrine the knowledge that a 
strike by one on the other would lead to each side's destruction in part or more. Even the 
41
 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, and United States. Congress. 
Senate. Committee on the Judiciary., The ABM Treaty and the Constitution : Joint Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundredth 
Congress, First Session, March 11, 26, and April 29, 1987, S. Hrg. (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1987), 1. 
42
 Ibid., 2. 
43
 Ibid., 9. 
limited defenses on either side would at best allow the other to retaliate in some way 
while at the same time preventing further arms races. Years later Kissinger would argue 
that this logic was flawed especially in light of the diffusion of nuclear armed states and 
that the Cold War concept of nuclear deterrence needed to be reviewed due to the 
changes in the strategic makeup of the international environment after the fall of the 
Soviet Union.44 
Notwithstanding Kissinger's later concerns with the viability of deterrence, the 
ABM Treaty had strong supporters even on the conservative side of the American 
spectrum including the Secretary of Defense who testified in support of the treaty's 
ratification, James Schlesinger. By 1985, the former Secretary of Defense noted the 
ABM Treaty's power to inhibit the action and reaction, measure to countermeasure 
relationship that continued to exist on the nuclear level between the United States and 
U.S.S.R.: 
The ABM Treaty has forestalled an explosion of offensive development 
on both sides. Back in the 1960's when the Soviet Union first started to 
deploy defenses around Moscow, the United States government was 
examining expanding offensive forces up to 40-50,000 reentry bodies, or 
warheads, in order to penetrate those defenses. The ABM Treaty has been 
the cornerstone of restraint for the last 13 years.45 
Over the course of the next decade, the SDI and its successors would see a 
declining funding for its programs, a restructuring of its program headquarters and 
an eventual rebirth as a different set of capabilities to protect distant theaters 
where U.S. forces and friendly governments from a limited number of missiles. 
As the years progressed, the U.S. national leadership focused on other more 
44
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pressing issues such as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and the subsequent 
first Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. A 
protracted engagement in Somalia followed by the series of Balkan conflicts 
culminating in the NATO led air war to defeat Serbian aggression in Kosovo, 
slowly but certainly reduced our nation's public concern that the United States 
and Russia would ever attack the other. Despite this seismic shift away from a 
bipolar world, the concepts of continuing to consult with Russia in the ABM 
Standing Consultative Committee. 
By 1999, the United States was interested in reinvigorating strategic arms 
reductions talks that would lead to a START III agreement in concept. A feature 
of these discussions was the distinct disparity between each party's intent. Russia 
was seeking parity with the United States in terms of offensive weapons. The 
United States was after a reopening of the ABM Treaty in order to advance 
development and fielding of a national missile defense capability. This new 
national missile defense was clearly in violation of the treaty.46 As the 
administration changed, the negotiations continued but eventually stalled as 
Russia remained concerned over the implications of a U.S. missile defense. With 
the winner of the 2000 Presidential election, George W. Bush explicitly 
campaigning on his desire to protect the U.S. population from missile attack 
primarily from 'rogue' states like North Korea, a cycle for national missile 
defense of some 32 years was completing.47 This history would seem an 
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interesting full circle journey for the nation, m terms of protecting against a small 
scale attack and in terms of the individual responsible for defending the 
requirement for a ballistic missile defense. As the Secretary of Defense who had 
the responsibility to shut Safeguard down, Donald Rumsfeld would return to 
manage the newer missile defense program through familiar territory. 
BACK TO THE FUTURE: GEORGE W. BUSH WITHDRAWS FROM THE ABM 
TREATY 
Early in his presidency and before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, George W. Bush sounded a similar refrain from the Nixon 1968 campaign as 
he stated his intention to change how the United States viewed nuclear deterrence 
and the government's role in protecting the American people from the growing 
threat of nuclear attack from emerging nuclear states like North Korea. With less 
than a month completed in his first term, the new administration signaled they 
would build adequate missile defenses for the nation.48 In a speech to the students 
and faculty at the National Defense University in May 2001, President Bush stated 
the outline for what would frame his overall strategy for dealing with threats from 
WMD. 
To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and 
friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that 
we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important 
opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new 
ways to keep the peace. Today's world requires a new policy, a broad 
strategy of active non-proliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. We 
must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of 
48
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terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and 
friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can 
inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their 
use. We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and 
defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of 
nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the 
incentive for proliferation. We need a new framework that allows us to 
build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To 
do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM 
Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. 
It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's 
threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend 
ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of 
world peace. This new framework must encourage still further cuts in 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our 
security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the 
composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the 
reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a credible 
deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent 
with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. 
My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States 
will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in 
the world.49 
President Bush provided some glimpses of the preemptive strategy his 
administration would embrace after 9/11 especially when Iraq became a focus. The 
core of his policy was later formalized in the 2002 Nuclear Policy Review 
undertaken by the Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld.50 Active non-
proliferation, counterproliferation, deterrence that includes defenses and a reduction 
in nuclear weapons became the four pillars of a new strategic framework.51 The key 
problem with seeking to break with the past was how to maintain an appropriate 
relationship with the nuclear weapon states especially Russia. 
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In a series of meetings through the summer of 2001, the United States and 
Russian leaders discussed nuclear issues including the U.S. view on departing from 
the ABM Treaty. President Putin was committed to keeping to the treaty while 
benefitting from any mutual cooperation in reducing nuclear weapons.52 After the 
9/11 attacks, the U.S. Administration was unable to accept compromise or even 
discussion on the ABM aspect of the nuclear dialog with Russia. The 2002 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the companion document, The National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) made the U.S. 
position clear that strength of the United States would be made sufficient to deal 
with either terrorists or rogue states who would harm the United States. The NSS 
set out the U.S. policy of preemption as an act of self defense while making clear 
the Bush Administration's intent of remaining strong enough "to dissuade a 
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or 
equaling, the power of the United States." 
This position led directly to the decision to withdraw from the treaty by 
the end of 2001 breaking with a 30 year record of dialog. The impact within the 
international system of a powerful state essentially turning away from a promise 
without worrying about the long term impacts on other existing or future 
agreements is troubling. Given the position of the United States, such a move made 
future efforts at cooperation on nuclear issues far more complicated. Despite its 
untimely end, the ABM Treaty experience has valuable components to future non-
52
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proliferation and disarmament regimes and multilateral agreements based in 
international relations theory. 
ABM TREATY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: EVIDENCE OF 
ARGUMENT SUPPORT 
This dissertation argues that nuclear disarmament is best achieved through an 
effective non-proliferation and disarmament regime supported by an effective multilateral 
agreement and international institutions with the sustained support and leadership of the 
United States. The history of the ABM Treaty demonstrated both the strengths and 
weaknesses of a bilateral arms control agreement and provides evidence of three key 
international relations concepts at work to varying degrees. First, power based theories of 
state interaction suggest the success of the treaty is found in the continuing cost versus 
benefit analysis each party state gave to it over time. In neorealist terms, the United 
States and Russia saw this treaty as limiting the other side's ability to achieve a relative 
gain from the development of an effective national defensive shield. This explanation is 
also useful in showing why the parties continued to negotiate follow on strategic arms 
agreements for three decades and beyond. Some have cited this treaty as the cornerstone 
to the continuation of the NPT and of the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. Second, 
the overall normative narrative of international institutions and the power of agreements 
between states are highly useful in explaining why these two states continued to 
cooperate through continuous consultation for over 30 years. The lack of additional 
parties afforded in a multilateral agreement also explains how a state could decide to 
abandon it. Third, the impact and role of state leadership and their interaction with their 
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constituents is quite evident in this history. While the power of states in this example 
cannot be denied, the traditional realist critique is incomplete when one tries to explain 
the power of the individuals engaged in long term negotiations over the details of this 
agreement. The normative theories provide additional explanation of how to strengthen 
bilateral agreements either by widening involvement in the process beyond the two states 
and considering means to continue to provide better knowledge to state leadership. The 
last of these three concepts, the importance of state leadership, provides significant 
explanation for the effectiveness of the treaty and to a certain degree the U.S. withdrawal 
and later decisions on ballistic missile defense by the George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama Administrations. What can be learned from the ABM Treaty experience is the 
need to foster multilateral agreements in order to avoid the main weakness of a bilateral 
agreement, a lack of normative arrangement that fosters continued cooperation. 
SUMMARY 
The established nuclear arms control agreements when supported and updated by 
the states involved can provide an important foundation for other similar agreements, 
both bilateral and multilateral. The ABM Treaty was an important first step by the two 
largest nuclear states to limit the opportunities for arms racing especially on the defensive 
side of the balance sheet. The history of the agreement does show that a defensive arms 
race was avoided but a similar impact on offensive arms racing did not occur. State 
leadership was a key factor to the relatively easy achievement of agreement. The 
narrowness of the treaty terms itself and the lack of additional parties to improve the level 
of normative binding of the states ultimately led to the U.S. withdrawal. The inability of 
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bilateral treaties to withstand the divergence of two states interests is the main reason 
multilateral treaties remain the best vehicle for lasting international efforts to have an 
impact. As this dissertation argues, state leadership is an essential catalyst to reaching and 
sustaining any arms control agreement but bilateral agreements are not sufficiently robust 
to achieve sufficient and irreversible progress toward a goal like nuclear disarmament. 
While the United States is clearly the best equipped state to negotiate and sustain any 
similar agreement, such a powerful state can walk away from a long term treaty quite 
quickly when the President sees a requirement to do so vice renegotiate. Despite this 
weakness, given the sheer magnitude of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and the 
security environment of the Cold War, the long series of bilateral nuclear arms control 
efforts on their parts allow analysis that shows the progress that can be achieved through 
direct involvement of state leaders. The requirement for this engagement will continue as 
long as these states see their relationship as special and separate from a multilateral 
agreement like the NPT. 
The recent return to serious negotiations of limits on strategic nuclear arms that 
have resulted in the signing of the "new" START Treaty is positive evidence of the 
continuing value and centrality of this relationship to the goal of nuclear disarmament. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, U.S. leadership in this relationship has been the 
essential ingredient, both positively and negatively, in the U.S. and Russian strategic 
arms control process. The third and final case study of this dissertation highlights the 
impact of state leadership on strategic arms control negotiations, agreements and 
legislative ratification of these agreements. Without the positive leadership of the United 
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States in this bilateral relationship, further advancement toward the goals of the NPT will 
be impossible to achieve. 
CHAPTER V 
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
IMPORTANCE OF STATE LEADERSHIP 
Over the course of the second half of the last century, the United States and the 
Soviet Union engaged in the largest arms race in human history. At the center of this 
buildup was the nuclear weapon, the ultimate weapon which would eventually provide 
each side of the Cold War with sufficient destructive power to potentially end all human 
life on the planet. A number of events during this era, particularly the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962, led the leadership of these two nuclear superpowers to seek a relief or at 
least a means to slow the race toward nuclear Armageddon. In time, these states would 
simultaneously compete and negotiate around a range of nuclear systems including the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile systems discussed in the previous chapter. From delivery systems 
and warheads to providing systems to each other to prevent accidents or mistaken threat 
warnings, the United States and Russia attempted to both find advantage while limiting 
the other's capabilities through a series of agreements on strategic nuclear systems. In 
each of these agreements, U.S. leadership was the key to success or failure of each 
agreement. The renewed START Treaty signed in the spring of 2010 provides the latest 
example of how the United States, particularly the President, is essential to progress of 
strategic nuclear arms reductions by these states. This leadership and the positive results 
of the bilateral strategic arms control process sets the tone and example for other 
international nuclear arms control and non-proliferation efforts.1 
1
 This dissertation focuses primarily on the interaction of state leadership between states with the 
formulation and implementation of nuclear arms agreements. While not a primary focus of the argument or 
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This chapter examines a case study of the bilateral strategic arms reduction 
process between the United States and Russia beginning with the SALT negotiations and 
continuing into the current efforts to ratify the "new" START Treaty. This case study 
highlights the impact of state leadership on strategic arms control negotiations, 
agreements and legislative ratification of these agreements. Introduced in the previous 
chapter, this portion of the research will relate the importance of state leadership as a 
catalyst for new agreements and in sustaining the arms control process. As discussed in 
the earlier argument chapter, state leadership is third component of this dissertation's 
argument and the key element of any multilateral effort to reinforce the non-proliferation 
regime, complete interim steps at arms control and sustain an international drive toward 
nuclear disarmament. Additionally, this case study on strategic arms negotiations 
between the United States and Russia provides reinforcement of the limits of bilateral 
agreements as discussed in the previous case study including unilateral withdrawal. The 
issue of proliferation, both horizontal and vertical forms, will be discussed as the 
principle issue arms control seeks to avoid and the role state leadership plays in decision 
making to either allow or prohibit it. While central to the success of achieving agreement, 
state leadership in bilateral agreements is ultimately less effective in the long run than in 
similar multilateral settings. 
research of this dissertation, domestic politics plays an important role in the approval and acceptance of any 
nuclear arms agreement. State leadership is always mindful of the positions of their domestic audience and 
the legislative bodies that reflect these views. In the United States, the Senate has the constitutional power 
to ratify all international treaties and has exercised their power either directly in voting not to ratify or 
indirectly as their likely vote is anticipated by the President who refrains from submitting a signed 
agreement for ratification. Exploration of this aspect of the arms control process would provide for an 
equally interesting project for future research. 
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OVERVIEW 
Among the longest and most prominent arms control efforts since the end of the 
Second World War are the series of negotiations between the United States and Russia on 
limiting strategic nuclear arms. Beginning with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I) in the Nixon Administration and continuing through to the renewed discussions 
following the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on December 
5, 2009, the United States and Russia have been in a lengthy effort to control and reduce 
their massive holdings in strategic nuclear systems. This strategic arms reduction process 
has made substantial progress toward achieving the ultimate goal of the NPT, total 
disarmament. While progress has been slow, a number of significant successes have 
occurred despite significant swings of the political landscape on the part of both nations 
as well as the environment around them. This process, which has had a renewed 
momentum in the last year, displays several key features of a successful arms control 
process that are supported by international relations theory. This chapter will detail the 
strategic nuclear arms reduction process of the past four decades, review the major issues 
associated with strategic arms reduction, provide a review of the contemporary 
discussions of stages of this process and discuss the related international relations theory, 
specifically the potential for regional nuclear arms races, as it relates to the importance of 
future negotiations and strategic arms reduction agreements as well as the impact of state 
leadership in the arms control process. Any successful multilateral disarmament effort 
will include the more valuable features of bilateral arms control as demonstrated by the 
United States and Russia. 
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SALT I: ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT FOR ARMS CONTROL 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the decision by the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. to agree to establish limits on both offensive and defensive nuclear systems 
embodied in the 1972 ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement remain one 
of the most significant arms control achievements of the nuclear era. These documents 
were the culmination of the opening round a more than four decades long dialog between 
the two states that currently possess 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. The SALT I 
negotiations were neither comprehensive in terms of the variety of nuclear systems either 
side possessed nor without detractors within the elites of both signatories. Culminating 
just short of a decade after the Cuban Missile Crisis, these talks established an effective 
foundation for slowing and eventually reversing the growing stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons each possesses. The eventual approval of the agreement was clearly due in large 
part to active engagement of the U.S. presidents. 
While the view from two decades after the end of the Cold War seems to make 
those events of a generation and a half ago seem somewhat obvious as to their outcome, 
the constant problem for U.S. leaders was how to balance the requirement to reduce the 
nuclear threat against the need to check frequently aggressive behavior by the Soviet 
Union in the international environment. During the turbulent period of the late 1960's, a 
new president sought to achieve progress toward a new relationship with the Soviets. 
Richard Nixon, having campaigned on a pledge to equal the Soviets in military might, 
struck a different tone in his Inaugural Address. Speaking to a nation torn apart by an 
undeclared war, the new president stated: 
2
 See Appendix C for the text of this agreement. 
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The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. This 
honor now beckons America—the chance to help lead the world at last out 
of the valley of turmoil, and onto that high ground of peace that man has 
dreamed of since the dawn of civilization. If we succeed, generations to 
come will say of us now living that we mastered our moment, that we 
helped make the world safe for mankind.3 
While history has not been kind to this president, Nixon and his national security vision 
were essential in setting the conditions for eventual curbing of both vertical as well as 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms. 
From the beginning, SALT was an effort among several to further the broader 
agenda of detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, Nixon sought to engage the Soviets in a series of negotiations that 
would eventually lead to a change in the Soviet approach to foreign affairs toward 
peaceful competition. SALT would be the first negotiation effort since inauguration and 
would allow the United States to link arms control to the issue of Vietnam. In his public 
statements, the new president tied beginning SALT to issues at hand in the Middle East 
but in private Vietnam was his focus. By initiating SALT, Nixon, with Kissinger's 
assistance, sought to leverage the Soviets in turn to pressure the North Vietnamese.5 The 
Soviet response to this attempt at influence was to remain silent on Vietnam and that 
SALT or any arms control was not a requirement for them. Nixon and Kissinger believed 
the Soviets had a much stronger influence on the Vietnamese than was the case and did 
not fully support arms control in general due in part to the need to maintain domestic 
political support. This strategy would not appear to be flawed until the period 
3
 Richard M. Nixon, "First Inaugural Address, January, 20, 1969," Bartleby.com website, 2009. 
http://www.bartlebv.com/124/pres58.html (accessed December 16, 2009). 
4
 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 713. According to Kissinger, "Nixon believed that the process of 
negotiations and a long period of peaceful competition would accelerate the transformation of the Soviet 
system and strengthen the democracies. 
5
 Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and 
Coexistence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 243-44. 
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immediately before the signing of the accords in 1972.6 What these two emerging 
superpower states did have in common was a desire to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons to other states. 
Beginning with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 and culminating in 
the signing of the NPT in 1968, the United States and the U.S.S.R. had largely identified 
a common interest in non-proliferation. Each saw non-proliferation as a means to retain 
their status in the international environment in relation to each other as well as all other 
states.7 Shifting from the Johnson Administration's use of a larger elite to develop arms 
control proposals which included the Departments of State and Defense, led by Dean 
Rusk and Robert McNamara respectively, Nixon chose to have the White House control 
the preparations for SALT.8 As mentioned in the previous chapter, two channels of 
negotiations were used by the two sides with Kissinger leading the secret talks with 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington and Soviet leaders in Moscow 
while feeding instructions to the formal negotiation team in Vienna.9 Despite this very 
hands-on approach which stemmed from Nixon and Kissinger's distrust of the Executive 
Branch bureaucracy, SALT I was at best only partially successful. The dominant issue of 
the late 1950s and early 1960's, verification, was quickly agreed to be done using 
"national technical means" or more commonly known as satellites.10 Most of the issues 
that were surfaced in the negotiations dealt with which specific systems in the strategic 
arsenals were to be controlled. 
6
 Ibid., 245. 
7
 Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations, 106-07. 
8
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9
 Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations, 107-08. 
10
 Ibid., 106. 
183 
The key weapons systems in the United States and Soviet strategic nuclear 
arsenals were long-range bombers, land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLMBs). Each system had various specific 
variants in either development or deployment during that period with the United States 
holding a qualitative and quantitative advantage in warhead technology specifically the 
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capable systems. These 
MIRVd missile systems allowed possessing force to complicate the defense planning of 
the opposing force as a single missile could attack a wide number of targets as well as 
carry countermeasures to confuse and potentially overwhelm any defense. At the time of 
the SALT I negotiations, the U.S.S.R. was aware of their deficiencies and was working to 
seek a position where they could either balance their advantages against the United States 
or at least set limits that allowed them to build up to match the United States. MIRVs 
were a key concern for both sides in terms of retaining the ability to develop and deploy. 
Ultimately, both side offered no limits on MIRVs or the development and deployment of 
the emerging technology of long range cruise missiles.11 
The SALT I negotiating teams were determined to reach an agreement while 
preserving the security interests of their nations. The limits imposed were to be on 
launchers as opposed to the missiles themselves as efforts to define classes of ICBMs 
were not successful. Specifically, launchers were defined as the ICBM silos and 
submarines. Once the agreement was completed, both sides agreed not to build any new 
ICBM launchers or any new submarines. Older submarines could be replaced with newer 
"ibid., 110. 
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ones if an equivalent number of ICBM launchers were retired.l2 While the ABM Treaty 
was of unlimited duration, the Interim Agreement, as the document codifying the 
strategic limits was called, was only five years in duration. The United States made its 
intentions clear by issuing a formal statement after the documents were signed that the 
agreement represented a first step in a continuing series of negotiations to reach 
additional and more complete limitations on strategic nuclear systems.13 The negotiations 
centered on three key systems ABM, ICBMs and later SLBMs. 
Key provisions of the Interim Agreement included specifics on construction, 
modernization, verification, and future negotiations. Article I limited the parties from 
beginning construction of new fixed ICBM launchers after July, 1, 1972. The issue of 
mobile missiles was discussed in negotiations and in the weeks before the summit 
deferred by the United States. Article II prohibited conversion of launchers of smaller or 
older ICBMs for use by newer "heavy" ICBMs. The definition of "heavy" ICBMs would 
also become a source of contention for the Soviets which would remain to be resolved in 
future negotiations. The Soviets were interested in preserving their ICBM modernization 
programs that were still in development and were particularly keen on seeking to catch up 
to the United States in MIRV development.14 Modernization and replacement of missiles 
and launchers was allowed under Article IV. National technical means were the 
agreement's verification method "in a manner consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law" and interference was not to be accepted. Article V 
included specifics that interference included covering of any silo or submarine in order to 
12
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prevent satellites from photographing activities that might be in violation of the 
agreement. Negotiations were to continue through the same Standing Consultative 
Commission established under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. 
One example of the difficulties in negotiating specific limits in an arms control 
agreement occurred in April 1972 over the issue of including SLBMs in the agreement. 
On October 12, 1971, Nixon announced his intention to meet with the Soviets in May of 
1972.15 This set a firm boundary to the negotiations which up to the winter of 1971 had 
focused solely on ABM and limiting ICBMs which seemed the best path to reaching an 
agreement even it was not as comprehensive as desired.! Gerard Smith, the lead U.S. 
negotiator, continued to press the Soviets on inclusion of SLBMs in the agreement. The 
Soviets resisted his repeated attempts with a variety of reasons including their views of 
existing SLBM capable submarines as a system similar to mobile ICBMs and aircraft 
carriers with nuclear capable bombers vice ICBMs. Knowing that the United States 
would have to potentially accept limits on forward submarine basing, the Soviets used 
this concept as a means to focus discussions away from SLBMs.17 
The true nature of the negotiations was in fact controlled by the respective 
national leaders. In a move that was indicative of Nixon's view of the Washington 
bureaucracy, Kissinger was sent to Moscow ostensibly to discuss Vietnam with the 
Soviets in April 1972, a month before the summit. The State Department and the SALT 
negotiators were not aware of any prior consultations or preparations for the trip nor was 
15
 Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1985), 318. 
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Kissinger officially authorized to negotiate with the Soviets.18 By this time, Kissinger had 
in fact been passing his views with the agreement of Nixon through the Soviet 
ambassador to the Soviet leadership with SLBM being one of the key issues. 
The meeting in Moscow on April 22, 1972 between Kissinger and Soviet General 
Secretary Brezhnev was both productive in substance as it was dismissive of the role of 
their respective SALT delegations.19 After a cordial discussion, Kissinger was given two 
SALT related statements from the Soviets to carry home to his president. The first 
contained four sentences that would become the key principles of the ABM treaty. The 
second offered specifics on the Soviet view of the strategic balance between the two 
states and stated their concerns over U.S. bases for SLBM submarines located outside of 
U.S. territory.21 This second note was the first official offer after more than two years of 
SALT discussions on SLBMs. The recommendations of the Soviets would provide the 
specifics for Article III of the Interim Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Given the 
outcome, Kissinger's dialog with the Soviet General Secretary at this meeting provides 
substantial evidence of the relative power of both arms control delegations and state 
leadership to achieve desired results. Each has an important role to play but in the end, 
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The issue of SLBMs quantity limits would be explicitly enshrined in Article III of 
the agreement and in the accompanying Protocol with only a slight modification of the 
Soviet April 22 note. Specifically, the limits were clearly not an equal numerical tradeoff 
but the wording of the agreements made no mention of the U.S. basing issue. The 
modification to the Soviet note, which had called for a U.S. limit of 41 SLBM capable 
submarines and nine Allied submarines, was to allow the U.S. a total of 44 submarines 
with as many as 710 launchers. By the very nature of a bilateral agreement, the 
agreement could not placed limits on any third parties so the Soviet desire to limit British 
and French SLBM submarines went unfulfilled. The Soviets would be allowed to have a 
total of 62 submarines with 950 launchers. This limit, effectively established in Article 
III, allowed the parties to retain the number of launchers and submarines that were 
operational and under construction when the agreement was signed. 
The Protocol attached to the agreement and signed at the May 26, 1972 summit 
along with the ABM Treaty provided the limits on SLBM launchers while the agreement 
itself contained the limits on ICBM launchers. In addition to the total numbers limits, 
additional limits on replacement SLBMs were defined: 
Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-
mentioned levels, in the United States — over 656 ballistic missile 
launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R. — over 740 
ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational 
and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal 
numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 
1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines. The 
deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will 
be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the United 
States and the U.S.S.R.22 
See Appendix C for complete document. 
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This wording recognized the need for both specific limits without exact numerical 
equivalents as a first step in achieving future agreements. What success SALT I achieved 
in terms of establishing a foundation for future negotiations between the two superpowers 
was limited by the fact that the specifics of the agreement solidified the already distinct 
advantages the Soviets had in ICBMs and allow them to build a numerical advantage in 
SLBMs as well. These advantages which in reality did not give the Soviets a strategic 
advantage such as the ability to prevail in a nuclear exchange, politically the U.S. public 
and Senate was not likely to readily accept the "simple math" that SALT I achieved. 
Unfortunately, the United States in particular, would experience increasing difficulty in 
explaining the disparities to the public and the Senate.23 The Nixon Administration's 
effort to gain the required advice and consent of the Senate for ratification of the ABM 
Treaty and the Interim Agreement would eventually succeed but would generate the 
"Jackson Amendment" requiring equity in future agreements.2 
The U.S. and Soviet leaders would meet once more in June of 1973 as Russia 
sought to continue the "spirit of detente." No new treaty was readily available but the 
summit produced a signed intent to set both quantitative and qualitative limits within the 
next treaty which was to be completed before 1975. For the United States, Kissinger 
desired this deadline in order to get the U.S. Executive bureaucracy to move forward and 
limit "the endless political posturing at the bargaining table in Geneva." Having 
successfully tabled any agreement on limiting MIRVs, the Soviets were free to continue 
testing their new capabilities with the first MIRV capable missile doing so just two weeks 
23
 Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I, 377. 
24
 Woolf, Nikitin, and Kerr, Arms Control and Non-proliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and 
Agreements. 
25
 Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements, ISIS 
Studies in International Security and Arms Control (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984), 257. 
189 
after the summit.26 Directing the U.S. position, Kissinger pressed the development of 
long range nuclear cruise missiles as bargaining option for the future SALT II 
negotiations. The one true accomplishment of this final summit involving Nixon was 
the limiting agreement, the "Additional Protocol," which allows both parties only one 
ABM system. 
Two other agreements occurred during the SALT negotiations which were not as 
contentious as the others but have contributed to the effort to bind the two largest nuclear 
powers together through cooperation. The agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of 
Outbreak of Nuclear War provided the United States and the U.S.S.R. a more specific 
agreement to outline the types of events that each side should communicate to the other 
in order to prevent escalation to nuclear war.28 This agreement was seen as a natural 
extension and codification of the intent of both in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962. The agreement on Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Direct 
Communications Link dovetailed with the other agreement and provided specific 
measure for technological upgrades to the "hotline" established in the immediate post 
Cuban Missile Crisis period.29 This link is still available and tested daily some six 
decades after its establishment. Without continuing efforts to negotiate, whether between 
leaders or negotiation teams, no agreements would have been reached. Leaders are often 
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SALT II: THE IMPACT OF USING OF PUBLIC OPINION TO INFLUENCE ARMS 
CONTROL 
Agreement between the U.S and the Soviet Union on the SALT II Treaty 
followed seven years of negotiations and reflected the growing power of the Senate over 
the President as well as the shifting political scene both domestically and internationally. 
SALT II would never be ratified by the Senate due to President Carter's withdrawal of 
the treaty from Senate consideration after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 
1979. The length and complexity of the negotiations, weaknesses in the SALT I 
agreement, the turbulent domestic political scene in the post-Nixon, post-Vietnam era and 
Soviet aggressive behavior internationally all combined to weaken support for arms 
control in general and efforts to negotiate with the Soviets specifically. In the 
background, both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals were increasing in capability both in 
quantity and quality of systems limited by SALT I as well as in newer systems not 
subject to limitations. Mobile ICBMs, nuclear cruise missiles, new bombers, and 
advanced MIRV capability for missiles of all types dominated the development and 
deployment programs of both SALT I parties. These follow-on negotiations provide 
additional visibility into the relationship between arms control and arms racing as well as 
the impact state leadership have on each. 
Immediately after the White House announced the successful completion of the 
SALT I agreements in May 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird would assure the 
Senate Armed Services Committee that the treaty and the negotiation process for SALT 
II enhanced U.S. security, slowed Soviet missile deployments and possessed adequate 
verification. He also stated that his support of the agreement was based on his assumption 
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that Congress would provide full support of current and future strategic programs 
proposed by the Administration. The Soviets during this period seemed to play the role 
many opponents of arms control in the United States expected them to do: take advantage 
if not violate the agreement. The seven years of SALT II negotiations were in fact a 
period of growth for both the United States and the U.S.S.R with the Soviets making 
every effort to modernize and build up to the limits of SALT I but did not actually exceed 
those limits.31 Confrontation with the Soviets by the late 1970's had taken on a life of its 
own with the West frequently seeing the Soviet threat as disproportionately large to 
reality. Even at the negotiation table, the Soviets were not as successful as many 
believed.32 Importantly, the two states would agree in 1977 to extend the SALT I limits 
until SALT II was completed.33 
The SALT II Treaty contained a number of important limits that built upon SALT 
I and dealt directly with issues deferred in the earlier talks. The key failure of the SALT I 
agreement was a lack of limits on MIRVs.34 Other issues deferred included cruise 
missiles and heavy bombers. At a 1974 summit in Vladivostok between President Gerald 
Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, a basic set of limits were reached that lead to 
another five years of refinement. The basic framework achieved was in accordance with 
the Jackson Amendment and set an equal limit of 2,400 ICBM launchers, SLBM 
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launchers and heavy bombers with the total eventually reaching 2,250 by January 1, 
1981. The MIRV issue was directly addressed with limits on MIRV capable missile 
launchers as well as MIRV capable air-to-surface ballistic missiles which would be 
dropped by heavy bombers. Cruise missiles would become a major facet of the later 
negotiations after being saved from the Defense Department budget axe by Kissinger. 
The understanding at Vladivostok limited MIRV systems to no more than 1,320 
of the 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which included 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.36 Each side would also agree to a total ban on 
construction of new land-based ICBM launchers as well to be determined limits on 
deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms. Additionally, the key important 
elements of the Interim Agreement, such as verification, the SSC and the ability to 
withdraw with appropriate notice, would be a part of the new agreement. The treaty end 
date was also established as 1985, a significantly longer period than SALT I. Despite the 
obvious momentum of the summit, the issue of MIRV warheads was not addressed. 
Subsequent negotiations would establish agreement not to modify existing missiles to 
increase the number of MIRV warheads. New MIRV capable ICBMs would be limited to 
10 warheads while new SLBMs were also to be limited to 14 warheads. 
What was evident from the beginning of the SALT II negotiations was the 
inherent difficulty of achieving an agreement on strategic nuclear arms that met all of the 
interests of the two parties. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. sought to reach an 
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agreement that set both quantitative and qualitative limits on all strategic nuclear weapon 
systems. From the U.S. side, two competing avenues of approach to the agreement 
emerged. One saw the firm requirement to reach an agreement based on a calculus of 
each side's total nuclear throw-weight which these proponents saw as largely in the 
Soviets favor post SALT I. The other desired to retain the U.S. technological advantages 
especially in MIRVs and SLBMs. The Soviets prior to Vladivostok were concerned on 
offsetting their perception of U.S. advantages strategically and geographically. The 
Soviets main concerns were the newest systems being developed in the United States to 
include the Trident SLBM capable submarine, the B-l bomber and nuclear capable long-
range cruise missiles. At the time, concern for at least freezing the level of capabilities in 
each state was acute but specific limits on all systems were avoided by both sides. ° 
SALT II negotiations would continue through the Ford Administration and 
eventually conclude with a signed treaty in 1979 during President Carter's term. One of 
the key issues from Vladivostok to the eventual signing was how to count Soviet Backfire 
bombers and the U.S. cruise missiles. Kissinger was able to reach a tentative agreement 
with Foreign Secretary Gromyko that would have set limits on the numbers of Backfires 
to be deployed and counting limits on cruise missiles as MIRVs on U.S. bombers. These 
limits were politically unacceptable in the United States as they were reached during the 
highly intense political atmosphere of the 1976 Presidential election. A separate three 
year protocol for these limits would be reached before the SALT II Treaty signed in 
1979.41 
Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations, 137. 
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During the final phase of the SALT II negotiations, changes in the U.S. domestic 
and international landscapes caused the issue of nuclear arms control to shift from the 
center of attention in each arena to the periphery. Three main causes for this shift 
included changes in verification technology, U.S. public views on Soviet motives, and 
Soviet decisions to continue to build up their strategic capabilities. With the rapid growth 
and dispersal of MIRV and cruise missile systems, both sides began to lose their ability to 
use national technical means to verify treaty compliance. Cooperative verification to 
include on-site inspection became the best means to detect either compliance or cheating. 
The growing mutual distrust of the parties' motives in many areas made any expansion of 
intrusive inspections difficult to implement. This distrust was most pronounced on the 
U.S. side as the Soviets became involved in conflicts in Africa along with their clients the 
Cubans. These "client wars" activities on the part of the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970's led 
many in the U.S. Congress who opposed arms control to conclude that if the Soviets were 
working to expand their power globally after they had agreed to not do so.42 
The final issue that ultimately caused a nearly total rejection of arms control with 
the Soviets was their continued buildup of strategic systems throughout the latter part of 
the decade. This buildup while obviously approved by Soviet leadership was in part to 
reach parity with the United States in MIRV and SLBM systems. The buildup had 
exactly the impact that one might expect on the United States as most intelligence 
assessments placed the Soviet capabilities as eventually placing the U.S. ICBM force at 
risk of a preemptive attack. Evidence of this renewed concerns over the Soviet threat can 
be seen in calls for renewed efforts to construct less vulnerable systems like the MX 
Ibid., 261. On particular focus was the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations agreement in which 
the U.S. and the Soviets had agreed not to work to gain a unilateral advantage over the other. 
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system with its 10 MIRV capability and optional rail mobile capability.43 The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided either part or the complete catalyst for 
President Carter to remove the signed SALT II from Senate consideration. 
One of more interesting stories within the negotiations of the treaty itself is how 
the changing views of U.S. leadership and the political style of the President impacted the 
willingness of the Soviets to cooperate. The first meeting between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R after the Carter Inauguration provides a strong example of the limitations of 
attempting to influence a negotiating partner in public prior to formally discussing a 
formal proposal. After a change of leadership in 1977, the White House chose to 
dominate the strategy and policy determination process for arms control as Nixon had 
earlier. Jimmy Carter, a former nuclear submarine officer, a strong advocate of human 
rights and a populist politician, had a good technical understanding of nuclear issues and 
a strong desire to rally public opinion to his efforts. He chose a process of publically 
announcing his arms control aims publically before entering into discussions with the 
Soviets. In his first major policy speech delivered at the United Nations General 
Assembly, Carter stated the U.S. goals as looking to cap both sides at current technology 
combined with a substantial reduction in total arms, if no agreement could be quickly 
reached on these ideas, then the principles of Vladivostok would be accepted.44 
President Carter made several statements after the UN speech that offered the 
Soviets sufficient reason to reject any U.S. proposal.45 The White House had also kept the 
wording of this first Carter proposal a secret from all but his inner circle which contained 
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concessions options if the Soviets showed willingness to negotiate.46 When the Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance met with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow days later, the 
Soviets firmly rejected the U.S. proposal. They did this on several counts including a 
rebuke of the Carter's human rights campaign as unnecessary meddling in another state's 
domestic affairs. The Soviet leadership also believed his UN statements were not 
respectful of the SALT process in general and the Vladivostok accords specifically. 
Several days of talks on SALT II ended in no agreements and two separate press 
conferences with Vance prior to departing Moscow stating the Soviets rejected the U.S. 
proposals while offering none of their own. Foreign Minister Gromyko not only 
reprimanded the U.S. offer but for the first time in any SALT discussion publically 
revealed the specific limits proposed in the U.S. "comprehensive proposal."47 Eventually, 
the United States would select a dual track approach to negotiations with the Soviets 
similar to the Nixon-Kissinger era and abandon President Carter's public influence 
strategy. 
The entire affair exposed weaknesses in both a "public approach" to influencing 
arms control negotiations and the U.S. internal policy development apparatus involving 
the National Security Council and the State Department. Additionally, this series of 
events would continue to influence public opinion on the issues of arms control and the 
U.S. relationship with the Soviets. From a U.S. prospective, as SALT II went forward, 
momentum for Senate passage was ultimately unachievable due to pressure from those 
who believed the treaty was flawed as well as from those who believed the Soviets were 
not capable of living up to their obligations. Public opinion in the end on both sides of the 
Ibid., 68-69. 
Ibid., 70. 
political spectrum was divided in the reason to dislike SALT II but united in their 
disapproval. Ultimately, what was needed was the ability to develop sufficient public 
support for separating the issues of Soviet behavior in the international environment in 
areas not related to nuclear arms and the requirement to reduce the number of nuclear 
arms in the world. The one responsible office for this effort is the President of the United 
States. 
START I: BALANCING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS 
After campaigning on a platform to deal with the Soviet threat, Ronald Reagan 
was committed to returning the U.S. military capability to a position of strength 
compared to the Soviets after a "decade of neglect." As was discussed in the previous 
chapter on the ABM Treaty, Reagan would seek a set of capabilities to protect the 
American people from any missile attack with the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. In 
the immediate post-inauguration period, the Reagan Administration developed a program 
of defense improvements designed to place the United States in a position of strength in 
order to provide advantages in negotiations with the Soviets.48 This position would cause 
the United States to refrain from returning to arms control for 18 months. The 
negotiations would continue with interruptions twice by the Soviets through Reagan's 
two terms and complete during George H. W. Bush's term. The first Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I) would be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union 
onJuly31,1991.49 
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The START I treaty ratification process and implementation would survive the 
demise of one of the signatories and continue to be the basis for significant reductions in 
nuclear arms for nearly two decades. The United States was first to approve the treaty 
with the Senate giving its consent on October 1, 1992. The Russian Parliament, the 
Soviet successor, while consenting to ratification on November 4, 1992, had reservations 
on exchanging the instruments of the treaty until the three former Soviet republics that 
had possessed Soviet nuclear weapons did so as well.50 START has also served as the 
basis for follow-on negotiations that have the potential of achieving the desired goals of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States and Russia exchanged the 
instruments of ratification on December 5, 1994 signaling the beginning of the 
enforcement of START I with a 25 year duration.51 At the time of this writing, the 
START I Treaty has expired but the parties are working to rapidly develop and approve a 
follow on agreement. 
The follow on to SALT, START I achieved significant reductions in both 
numbers of warheads and delivery systems including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy 
bombers. While actual missiles removed from service were not required to be destroyed, 
their associated launchers were. Limits allowed each side to deploy up to 6,000 attributed 
warheads on these systems where attributed numbers were those warheads designated by 
the owning state to be carried by a particular system. This means of defining counting 
50
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limits actually allowed each side to carry as many as 3,000 more warheads than the limit 
as some weapons carried on bombers were not subject to the 6000 warhead limit. For 
ICBMs and SLBMs, START I limited each side to a maximum of 4,900 warheads. 
START I also for the first time contained a limit on "heavy" ICBMs at 1,540 warheads. 
Given the levels of total warheads each possess at end of the Cold War, these limits were 
a logical continuation of the relationship that was undergoing dramatic changes. The 
likelihood of such dramatic reductions was far from the position of each of the parties 
when in the aftermath of SALT II and the election of Reagan. 
President Reagan entered office without any positive desires to continue the arms 
control agenda of previous administrations. His defense budgets continued to build on the 
initial increases Carter had approved in an attempt to win support for SALT II and 
resurrected the cancelled B-l bomber as a part of a renewed modernization of the nuclear 
triad. Public and congressional reaction was increasingly less enthusiastic with each new 
proposal for new weapons unless the Reagan Administration was willing to also engage 
in arms control.52 The combined difficulty of providing sufficient resolution of the basing 
mode of the new MX ICBM to assure its survivability and the growing issue of 
intermediate nuclear forces in Europe to congressional satisfaction led Reagan to 
announce his proposal for renewed strategic arms talks called START. Reagan's team 
sought to refocus the center of the negotiations away from reducing launchers to reducing 
missiles and warheads.53 At the same time, Soviet leadership was unable to effectively 
control the agenda of arms to meet either side's expectations. 
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At the end of the SALT II process, the Soviets were interested in continuing 
negotiations as a means to limit the likely deployment of intermediate range nuclear 
missiles in Europe by NATO. Soviet leaders had grown increasingly upset at the nearly 
continuous anti-U.S.S.R. rhetoric in Reagan's speeches from the election campaign 
onward. In one notable speech given by Reagan to a religious group in the United States 
in 1983, the president characterized the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."54 In a similar 
manner to Carter's populist public speaking as a means to influence the negotiation 
process, Reagan sought the support of external audiences to influence the Soviets. At the 
same time, he elected to continue deployment of nuclear IRBM and ground-launched 
cruise missiles to Europe proposed during the last year of the Carter Administration. 
The Soviet reaction to both the style and substance of these U.S. policies was to 
commit to deployment of their own systems as a counter. European nations, especially 
Germany, found themselves caught between their commitments to the NATO alliance 
and the growing outrage of their publics. The INF negotiations would provide a parallel 
tension to the larger issue of strategic arms reductions for the first five years of the 
Reagan Administration. April Carter in her analysis of this period places the 
responsibility for the eventual impasse reached in INF and START between 1983 and 
1985 on the parties' national leaders. Their purpose for the negotiations was not 
compatible with the goals of negotiations because "the real problem of the INF and 
START negotiations was not the openness with which the talks were conducted, but the 
propagandistic intent of the heads of government and the basic unwillingness to make 
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genuine concessions." Carter cites each side's "essentially bargaining in public" during 
this period as damaging and a merging of the two talks in a less public forum as a more 
successful alternative. One could also attribute a great deal of Reagan's position to his 
personal beliefs and the domestic political pressure to maintain his "negotiate from a 
position of strength" policies. 
With a change in Soviet leadership to Michael Gorbachev in March 1985, a new 
approach to nuclear issues was achieved leading to an agreement on elimination of an 
entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear systems with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
Treaty. The parties would eventually complete the destruction of all missiles and 
associated support systems with a range of between 300 and 3400 miles by May 1991.56 
Some 1750 Soviet and 846 U.S. missiles would be eliminated under a program with the 
most extensive verification protocol in any agreement to that time. Verification measures 
included sharing of data, up to 20 short notice on-site inspections of agreed facilities and 
"a continuous portal monitoring" capability at one assembly plant in each country. The 
United States agreed to use the same facility in Russia that had been established in 
START I.57 The INF Treaty negotiations after 1985 provide a counterpoint to the 
previous period and offer an example of the positive impact leadership can have on arms 
control negotiations. 
The key to the new atmosphere in which the INF and START I were concluded 
was the attitude of the new Soviet General Secretary who was deeply concerned with 
issue of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Michael Gorbachev was not a 
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technical expert on nuclear arms but saw the possibility of asymmetrical disarmament as 
a means to break out of the dead end the Cold War and the most recent arms talks had 
reached. Beginning with the summit in Geneva between Gorbachev and Reagan in the 
fall of 1985, the Soviet leader chose to direct the Soviet state toward a position of 
acceptance of the growing international climate of globalization. In this new world, 
C O 
according to Gorbachev's vision nuclear arms had no proper role. 
The events of Chernobyl and the German pilot flying unnoticed through Soviet 
airspace eventually landing in Red Square offered the General Secretary the necessary 
moments to first release the Soviet nuclear community and next the Soviet military's 
respective grasps on arms control and disarmament. Unlike his U.S. counterpart, the 
General Secretary had the necessary power to force the Soviet bureaucracy to accept his 
vision. With this power in mind, Gorbachev consistently offered proposal after proposal 
that called for more rapid reductions on the Soviet side than the United States was willing 
to reciprocate leading up to the momentous Reykjavik Summit in 1986.59 In the Soviet 
case, leadership was emerging as at least a catalyst of reforms that were needed. 
Some have argued that this period has ample validation of either Reagan or 
Gorbachev's leadership as key to the eventual demise of the Soviet system. The common 
theme held in the United States was that the Reagan military buildup was unmatchable by 
the Soviets. Others believe Gorbachev's leadership vision was the principle reason for the 
unraveling of the Soviet state. The Soviet leadership was taking steps even before 
Gorbachev took power, as early as 1983, to find areas of accommodation with the United 
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States including release of political prisoners, cultural exchanges, and a long term grain 
deal.60 
The return of Reagan for a second term combined with an increasingly strong 
movement away from conservative elements within the Soviet leadership forced the 
Soviets to continue to find ways to improve relations. This effort was a reaction of the 
Soviet leadership to the dramatic shift by Reagan to confrontation with the Soviets while 
they had believed, as far back as the beginning days of detente that the U.S.S.R. would 
eventually emerge as the global leader not the United States The new Reagan positions 
resulted in a dramatic re-evaluation of how the Soviets would deal with more than just 
the military or economic dimensions the international situation changes posed by Reagan 
but to deal with what they now saw as a direct challenge to their political existence.61 
By the time Reagan announced SDI in 1983, the Soviet leadership recognized 
how poorly their technological abilities were developing in comparison to the United 
States as they had been working on a similar system since 1976 with little success. 
Internally, voices of reform began to criticize the "adventurism" of the Brezhnev era 
citing the Soviet-Cuban operation in Angola, the deployment of SS-20s and the 
Afghanistan invasion as evidence of why the Reagan position in the United States came 
to exist. Military spending to match the U.S. challenge in the early Reagan period was 
already seen as a dead end as Gorbachev came to be the Soviet General Secretary. 
Robert G. Patman, "Reagan, Gorbachev and the Emergence of 'New Political Thinking'," 
Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 589. 
61
 Ibid., 591-95. 
62
 Ibid., 596. 
63
 Ibid., 599-600. 
REAGAN AND GORBACHEV: A NEW FRIENDSHIP LEADS TO PROGRESS 
Shortly after the start of the second Reagan Administration in 1985, the two states 
agreed to once again begin to negotiate in Geneva on the three central issues in arms 
control at the time: INF, strategic weapons and space weapons. Begun as a 
comprehensive negotiation in March 1985, the two states quickly decided to divide these 
talks into three working groups with each taking on one of the issues. The discussions on 
space weapons were the most contentious with the beginning Soviet position calling for a 
complete ban. The other talks started with both sides at the same positions as when the 
talks were suspended in 1983 with the Soviet walkout. Negotiations did not progress well 
during the year despite a number of new proposals from both sides in each working 
group.64 As had been the custom in the past, both leaders sought summitry as a means to 
bring about movement in arms control. Two summits were crucial to the developing of 
new arms control agreements and fostered the growing friendship of Reagan and 
Gorbachev: Geneva in November 1985 and Reykjavik in October 1986. 
Reagan was first to initiate a dialog with the new General Secretary when he sent 
him a letter on March 11,1985 the day of Gorbachev's election to the position. Sending 
Vice President Bush to deliver the letter, Reagan spoke of his "hope" for "a more stable 
and constructive relationship between our two countries."65 He went on to say that he 
viewed the Geneva negotiations as "a genuine chance to make progress toward our 
common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons."66 Gorbachev's advisors were 
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suggesting a positive but not hasty response within an effort on the Soviets part to 
confirm "our active approach to reviving the detente processes."67 The first of two 
summits to achieve their mutual aims occurred in Geneva on November, 19-20, 1985 and 
did little more than allow the leaders to begin to develop a personal relationship that 
would prove important to later agreements. 
Each believed that he would convince the other to agree to his view with Reagan 
seeking to preserve SDI and push the Soviet on human rights. Gorbachev hoped to gain 
some acknowledgement of the need to ratify SALT II and with it agreement to hold to the 
ABM Treaty. The latter effort would effectively make SDI illegal.68 In the end, the 
leaders agreed in principle to seek a 50% reduction in strategic arms and a step toward a 
full INF agreement.69 On the SDI issue, Reagan began to understand Gorbachev's basic 
concern about space weapons and offered to share the technology with the Soviets. 
Senior observers on both sides believed this was a strategic error on Gorbachev's behalf 
as he remained too focused on abolition of space weapons.70 Today, this summit can be 
viewed as the opening moment of the "new detente" each sought, placed each leaders' 
believe that nuclear weapons should be eliminated in the center of the discussion and lead 
to the INF and START Treaties.71 
The period following the Geneva summit was not as successful as the leaders had 
hoped. Negotiations in Geneva gained little during the winter and spring of 1985-1986. 
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In a speech in January, 1986, the Secretary General proposed the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons by the turn of the century. In his plan, the proposed Geneva summit 
50% cut would be accomplished first along with a complete elimination of all INF 
weapons. Gorbachev suggested British and French nuclear weapons be frozen at current 
levels during this first stage of the eliminations. Reagan's response was less than 
enthusiastic as he dismissed most of the Soviet proposal as not useful to their discussions, 
detailed past problems of treaty compliance on the part of the Soviets and the problem of 
conventional force asymmetries that would occur as the nuclear arms were eliminated.72 
Reagan did propose a staged elimination of INF missiles which the Soviets in Geneva 
rejected during later negotiations. Other international events including the U.S. bombing 
raid on the Soviet client Libya and the ongoing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan served 
as incentives to slow arms control negotiations.73 
When the Soviet leader wrote to Reagan proposing a summit in October which 
would be held in Reykjavik, negotiators were incentivized to provide their leaders with 
something to offer the other side. Recently released documentation of the summit from 
both sides has confirmed several significant beliefs expressed at the time and outline in 
stark detail the opportunities missed that would not appear again for quite some time. 
First, with the call coming in September for an October meeting, the U.S. administration 
was unable in the time available to provide the President with a firm set of proposals for 
the Soviets. The opposite was true in the Soviets case with Gorbachev arriving and 
delivering specific sets of reductions and timelines.74 Along with a lack of proposal 
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support to the President, the pre-summit U.S. analysis of the Soviet position did not 
identify Gorbachev's strong desire to completely eliminate all nuclear weapons which 
became a key issue during the summit and almost the central agreement. The final and 
most significant missed opportunity was the unwillingness of the Soviets to yield on SDI 
at the Summit. The U.S. proposal, to retain testing rights on SDI while eliminating all 
ballistic missiles in 10 years and eventually all offensive weapons, was rejected by the 
Soviets at the summit. At one point in the talks, the Soviets told the U.S. team that to 
accept the proposal would demand an "exceptional level of trust" that they were not 
prepared to give. Soviet records provide confirmation that within two weeks after the 
summit Gorbachev had reconsidered their position on SDI but were unable to get U.S. 
agreement as the Reagan Administration was distracted by other events.75 In the end, SDI 
was in the end the only issue that prevented agreement to fully disarm in 1986 at 
Reykjavik.76 
Post summit, Allied and military staffs reaction to the potential of a total 
disarmament raised by Reykjavik was almost completely negative with Margaret 
Thatcher, Britain's Prime Minister making a trip to Washington to personally express her 
concern to Reagan.77 In public, the United States and the U.S.S.R. traded accusations on 
whether or not the United States had accepted the total ban. At the negotiations in 
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total elimination of ballistic missiles on the part of the US would require Britain to "follow suit," as she 
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Geneva, proposals to reach agreement on the INF ban accelerated. Eager to gain a "win" 
in the foreign policy arena and divert attention from growing scandals within his 
administration, Reagan would meet Gorbachev again in December of 1987 in 
Washington to sign the INF Treaty, the first nuclear treaty to completely and verifiably 
eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. START I negotiations would not regain 
significant momentum during Reagan's term. 
The lesson of the Reagan era of the START process would seem to be the power 
of the national leader's personal vision and involvement on both sides of the negotiation 
or summit table. Winning office on a political platform of returning America to a position 
of strength and leadership in the world, Ronald Reagan had little trust in the process of 
nuclear arms control. By the end of his second term, not only would a significant arms 
control agreement be signed but the critical groundwork for future agreements was 
completed. Significant during this period was the rapid transformation of the leadership 
view on the part of the Soviets embodied in Gorbachev's Perestroika and his shared 
belief of the absolute requirement to "liquidate" nuclear arms of all kinds. Despite the 
obvious impact of a "renewed detente," the fleeting moments of potential dramatic gains 
in disarmament are subject to the powerful forces of history, distrust and lack of 
transparency. 
START II: CONTINUING THE WORK WITH A NEW PARTNER 
One of the fastest agreements from initial negotiation to approval, the START II 
Treaty was signed by President George H.W. Bush in the last weeks of his presidency 
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993 in Moscow. START II was able 
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to deal with one of the long deferred and much debated issues within the strategic arms 
control efforts between the two nuclear powers: MIRVs on ICBMs. SALT II had 
included limited provisions to control MIRVs at 10 maximum for ICBMs, this only 
served as a rationale for each side to build up to those limits. As SALT II was never 
ratified by the United States, the question of limiting MIRVs as a means of slowing arms 
racing remained open. START II would call for the total elimination of MIRVs on 
ICBMs, limited SLBMs to 1,750 on each side. The treaty also set limits on the total 
attributable warheads to a total number between 3,000 and 3,500.79 The treaty would 
eventually be overcome by events with Russia placing approval contingent on United 
States providing assurances to continue the ABM Treaty and the unilateral withdrawal 
from it in 2002. 
The realities of the changed international environment, the rise of the formidable 
U.S. advantage in conventional modern warfare as demonstrated in the 1991 ejection of 
Iraq from Kuwait, and the economic conditions in both the United States and the new 
Russian Federation combined to forge an uneven momentum for nuclear force reductions 
in the 1990's. START II would serve as a useful framework for reductions toward the 
defined limits while offering a quick start for further reductions. In terms of reductions, 
START II would be complied with by both sides to a limited extent while each sought to 
find ways to continue to modernize key systems. After the election of George W. Bush in 
2000, the United States would seek to limit the amount of transparency and irreversible 
reductions within its nuclear force. Russia's reductions would keep pace due in large part 
to the elimination of the strategic systems in the three newly independent republics. 
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Full compliance with START II would "de-MIRV" both parties ICBM forces by 
2003. The United States would completely eliminate all 50 of its 10 MIRV capable MX 
Peacekeeper ICBM launchers while removing all but one of the warheads on the 500 
missile Minuteman fleet. The Minuteman system was capable of up to three warheads per 
missile. The "downloaded" Minutemen would no longer have the ability to rapidly return 
to a MIRV capability. Russia would eliminate all launchers for the SS-24 and SS-18 
ICBM, the removal of the latter being the long sought goal of the United States In a 
similar "de-MIRVing" program, Russia would reconfigure 105 SS-19 ICBMs, a 6 
warhead missile, to a single warhead configuration with the option to eliminate these 
missiles completely.80 In addition to ICBMs, each side would limit SLBMs as well. 
The planned U.S. fleet contained of 18 Trident capable submarines, each with 24 
missiles. After the treaty signing, the United States reduced the SLBM capable fleet by 
four submarines converting these boats to non-nuclear missions. The missiles on the 
remaining 14 submarines would be downloaded from eight to five warheads each.81 With 
a far smaller SLBM fleet, Russia, having relied on a larger ICBM fleet with a significant 
amount of MIRVs, committed to SLBM reductions as well. For Russia, their SLBM cuts 
when combined with the rest of their reductions would place them well below the 3,500 
warhead limit causing them to seek additional limits in START III.82 These lower limits 
from their point of view would allow a rough parity to be achieved. These limits were 
built on the solid foundation fostered by the Reagan-Gorbachev "new detente" that would 
begin to diminish as the international situation underwent dramatic changes. 
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Despite the slower pace of START negotiations during 1987, both states sought 
out incremental agreements beyond the INF Treaty that would allow a sense of 
continuing confidence building essential to each side's agenda. These efforts would 
continue despite the dramatic events that would eventually lead to the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Along with the establishment of a robust inspection protocol with the INF Treaty, 
the states signed the Agreement on the Notification of Missile Launches in May 1987. 
This agreement lessened the likelihood of increased tensions due to a misidentified 
launch as it required each side to provide 24 hours of advance notice of any test launch of 
an ICBM or SLBM.83 By the fall of 1987, shortly after the INF Treaty went into force, 
both sides had completed joint monitoring of one of each side's underground nuclear 
tests. These joint monitoring operations would lead to both states ceasing to conduct 
underground tests. The last Soviet test would occur in 1988 and the United States in 
1992.84 
DEALING WITH THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: ARMS CONTROL SLOWLY 
MOVES FORWARD 
Despite these advances which resulted in a slowing of each sides' previous arms 
buildups, the most significant issue impacting the START negotiations was the rapid 
pace of the fall of the Communist Block beginning with the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989. While the impact of the changing of the governments in Eastern Europe was not 
inevitable, Soviet leadership could not overcome the democratic forces sweeping away 
the older order. Just as communism had failed to fully adapt to the forces of globalization 
Diehl and Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation: A Reference Handbook, 134. 
in economic, social and political, the Soviet state was unable to resist the call for a new 
openness. During this critical period of multiple formations of political power in the 
former Soviet Union, negotiations on one of the very sources of power of the state, 
nuclear arms were of limited value. 
With the rapid end of the Soviet Union beginning with the August Coup and 
ending with Gorbachev's stepping down on Christmas Day 1991, a new period of 
relatively quick negotiations and agreements would occur culminating with the signature 
of START II by Presidents Bush and Yeltzin on January 3, 1993. Full consideration of 
START II by the U.S. Senate was delayed until START I went into force at the end of 
1994. Ratification was further delayed due to a protracted internal debate over the 
relevance and future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with its functions 
eventually delegated to the State Department. The U.S. Senate would ratify the START II 
Treaty by a vote of 87-4 on January 26, 1996.85 The Russian approval would take even 
longer. 
Once the Russian political status became clear and well established, the Duma 
provided the appropriate legislative body for consideration of treaties. In a more 
democratized environment, a broader discussion of arms control agreements became the 
norm. The Russian attitude did not in the end change dramatically as the Duma saw 
START II in a similar light as all past agreements between Russia and the United States. 
The Duma became concerned with a combination of the economic burden START would 
place on the Russian Federation and future the status of the ABM Treaty. The United 
States in this period continued to seek agreements that would allow further research on 
85
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space based defense systems which many Russian politicians saw as illegal under the 
ABM Treaty. The United States for its part offered Russia a delay in the required systems 
elimination deadlines in START II which in turn would lower the costs over time for 
Russia. Seeking to further incentivize in order to reach agreement, the United States 
agreed to negotiate further reductions in a START III agreement after START II came 
into force.86 
As the effort slowed to gain START II ratification in 1997, Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltzin would seek to negotiate a START III agreement with an even further set of 
reductions below the START II limits.87 Events of 1999, particularly the request by the 
United States to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty and the U.S. led NATO war 
against Serbian aggression in Kosovo, heightened tensions between the two START 
partners and further delayed Duma action. By early in 2000, President Yeltzin was able to 
convince the Duma to approve the treaty but only after providing assurances that the 
Russian Federation was committed to withdraw from the ABM Treaty should the United 
States do so. As a double edged sword, Russian law prevented allowing the treaty to enter 
into force until the United States had ratified their amendments to the ABM Treaty. 
Fearing defeat in the Senate, the Clinton Administration would never submit these 
amendments for approval. As the George W. Bush Administration that followed would 
return to a similarly negative view of arms control in general and a positive view of the 
value of missile defenses as in Reagan's first term, START II never had a chance at 
ratification. With the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the Russian 
Ibid. 
government announced its withdrawal from START II and its intention of not following 
through with the negotiated reductions. 
START III: FAILURE TO AGREE BUT PROGRESS 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, both states were eager in early post Cold 
War period to rapidly reduce the number of operational offensive nuclear systems. 
Russia's objective for these reductions was primarily based on their economic status and 
a desire to retain a sufficient, minimal force for their future. The best path to achieve this 
objective was to set START II aside and move to lower limits. The Clinton 
Administration, with a strong desire to attain the long time U.S. objective of elimination 
of Russian MIRVd ICBMs, wanted to hold negotiations on START III after START II 
came into force. In To Agree or Not to Agree, Lisa Baglione points out that due to 
Yeltzin's poor health and the falling perception of Russian power during this period, 
Clinton was in a unique position where he did not have to be forceful with Russia on 
arms control.89 Several rounds of START III negotiations were conducted between the 
1997 agreement and the end of the Clinton Administration in 2001 with no final 
agreement being reached. START III would have established another lower level for 
deployed warheads at 2,000 to 2,500 but it would never enter into force due to the demise 
of START II. In a significant development in the negotiations, for the first time in an 
offensive arm treaty language was included to destroy delivery vehicles and warheads in 
an effort "to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid 
Lisa A. Baglione, To Agree or Not to Agree: Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 144-45. 
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increase in the number of warheads."90 Despite some evidence of progress, Russia would 
delay any serious nuclear talks until the Bush Administration took power in 2001. 
By the time George W. Bush took office, the on-going effort to reduce the world's 
two largest strategic nuclear inventories now embodied in the START treaties had 
achieved great progress in reductions even without formal treaty ratification. Since the 
height of the Cold War, the United States had reduced their deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads from 10,563 in September 1990 to 7,519 in July 2000 in compliance with 
START I protocols. Russia had made similar strides with a reduction from 10,271 to 
6,464 warheads in the same period. The 1997 Helsinki summit which saw both nations 
agree to pursue further reductions in line with START HI levels of 2,000-2,500 deployed 
strategic warheads remains the starting point for the current negotiations. Almost a 
decade ago, the Russian government had proposed further reductions to 1,500 warheads 
which the United States did not accept. 
SORT: AGREEING TO REDUCE WITHOUT EXACTING RULES 
During a summit of the G-8 in Genoa, Italy in July 2001, Presidents Bush and 
Putin announced the beginning of a new round of nuclear negotiations. When they met 
again in November of that year, Bush announced that the United States "would reduce its 
'operationally deployed' strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 
warheads in the next decade."91 Putin wanted to negotiate within the formal arms control 
Arms Control Association, "U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a 
Glance," Arms Control Association website, March 2010. 
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process in order to reach "a reliable and verifiable agreement."92 These talks would result 
in the Moscow Treaty known officially to the United States as the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions (SORT). Bush and Putin signed the treaty on May 24, 2002, after 
less than a year of negotiations.93 
The basic limits of the treaty established a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons 
to a range vice a specific limit of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 
2012. A relatively rapid and intense ratification period occurred in both nations' 
legislatures. In less than ten months, on March 6, 2003, the U.S. Senate gave its advice 
and consent to ratification. On May 14, 2003, the Russian Duma followed suit with the 
Treaty then entering into force on June 1, 2003.94 The resulting agreement offered only 
the limit proposed by the United States which appears in Article I. The treaty contains 
most of the features Russia sought, specifically they insisted the treaty become a '"legally 
binding document' that would provide 'predictability and transparency' and ensure the 
'irreversibility of the reduction of nuclear forces.'"95 Without significant pressure from 
the U.S. Senate, the Bush Administration would have sought just an exchange of letters 
vice a formal treaty requiring ratification. 
While strategic offensive arms negotiations have always been about achieving a 
common understanding, since the end of the cold war and the lack of an overt 
confrontational situation between two opposing political systems, each side has preferred 
to have agreements that allow for different options for each side to achieve the goals. 
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achieved significant reductions but not necessarily due to external pressures as much as 
fiscal realities. This financial impact on the levels of arms combined with the Bush 
Administrations distaste for arms control in general to slow any large steps to achieve 
total disarmament. The rise in impact of non-state actors especially terrorist groups in the 
international security environment, most prominently evidenced in the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the United States, spurred a renewed focus away from state on state 
nuclear options toward the possibilities of a terrorist nuclear attack.96 
One of the issues that shadowed the post Soviet period of arms control 
negotiations and agreements, is the lingering and unresolved confrontational relationship 
that had existed in the Cold War. The United States had not fully abandoned the concern 
over what kind of state Russia would become. Two U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews during 
this period (1994 and 2002) mentioned the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack but 
remained consistent in their views that state threats remained paramount. In reference to 
Russia, an unofficial copy of the classified 2002 report contained the following 
statement: 
Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the 
United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. 
There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, 
as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more 
cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-
of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual 
See Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2005). This is the most prominent work to date on the topic but a proliferation of non-fiction, 
fiction works and film have raised the public conscious about the possibility of a terrorist sponsored nuclear 
event while the factual evidence and theoretical discussion on the likelihood indicate this type of attack as 
remote. 
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distrust and hostility. As a result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving 
Russia, while plausible, is not expected. 
Interestingly, a similar statement was provided in the text on China, a state that 
during this period was becoming the second largest trading partner of the United 
States: 
Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and 
its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a 
country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency. 
When the 2002 Review was presented to Congress, many were divided on the 
direction the Bush Administration was taking. Given the growing concern over 
Saddam's Iraq WMD inspections issues, the long march to a lower level of 
nuclear weapons became a secondary discussion to the policies that may have 
been subject to change regarding first use, testing, new weapons development and 
whether or not the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons against any 
form of WMD attack. 
Both Russia and China were vocal in their negative reactions to the 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review. China demanded clarification from the United States on 
the Review specifically as it implied targeting of seven countries including 
them.100 The excerpted copy of the report mentioned the potential requirement for 
nuclear weapons use in response to a Taiwan crisis involving China.101 The 
Russian response was also similar as their foreign Minister called upon the U.S. 
98
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for an explanation of the report's intent. 02 This hedging of bets by the United 
States on nuclear reductions seemed to fit within their overall security concerns in 
the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks of 9/11 but also reflected the 
lingering concerns of long time Cold Warriors within Bush's inner circle. Russia 
was most interested in rebuilding some sense of their former global power status 
but saw nuclear weapons as a necessary component that had to be reduced for 
economic reasons. 
One of the areas that displeased Russia most was the stated U.S. policy to 
place the warheads removed from the eliminated systems under START and 
SORT in storage vice elimination. Russia believed this position in SORT would 
not fit their desire for irreversibility and allow the United States to place these 
warheads back in service on newer systems in a relatively short time.103 The U.S. 
position was intentionally developed in order to preserve strategic options 
including those that related to missile defenses, another of Russia concerns as the 
planning for deployment of such systems outside of the United States was in an 
advanced stage of development.104 Domestic pressure in the U.S. Senate proved 
critical to moving the Bush Administration to accept SORT as a formal treaty 
requiring advice and consent to ratify it.105 
At the core of the U.S. resistance to formalizing SORT was the counting 
rules each side would have to agree to enforce. Russia preferred to continue the 
rules and methods in use under START while the United States wanted a new set 
102
 Michael Wines, "Russia Assails U.S. Stance on Arms Reduction," New York Times, March 12, 
2002. 
103
 Woolf, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 2-3. 
104
 Ibid., 3. 
105
 Ibid., 4. 
of less strict procedures. The counting rules under START were based on an 
agreement of the number of "assigned" warheads in a specific system such as an 
ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber. These rules required one of three choices to 
reduce the number of warheads to the agreed limits: 1) cut back the number of 
deployed warheads on missiles, 2) change the number of "attributed" warheads, 
or 3) destroy the delivery vehicle itself. Determining the total warheads allowed 
under START was a simple multiplication of the number of systems by their 
attributed warhead number to determine the overall limit. Under START 
protocols, elimination compliance required destruction of the missile silo for 
ICBMs, removal of the launch tubes from the parent submarine for SLBMs and 
either cutting off the wings and tails or a complete conversion to non-nuclear 
capability of heavy bombers.106 
The United States had no intention of signing a treaty that would limit any 
of the options for deployment or reconfiguration of existing systems. One of these 
"adaptable" systems was the Trident submarine of which four were being 
converted to conventional and special warfare support missions. Part of the 
redesign of these submarines included the ability to launch conventional cruise 
missiles from the tubes that had held the SLBMs. START rules would have 
required their removal and as a result a major redesign and potentially a new 
submarine.107 While the conversion may have had critics of the future utility of 
the system, by complying with START limits with the conversion, 800 SLBM 
carried warheads would be eliminated. Additionally, the United States would have 
106
 See Appendix C, 320. 
107
 Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 22, 2008), 1-2. 
two SLBM capable Tridents in for overhaul at any time and did not wish to have 
these warheads counted as a part of the START limits. Concerns over the cost of 
permanent conversion of heavy bombers to just conventional roles provided 
another U.S. reason to avoid START counting rules in any new agreement. If the 
United States were to use START counting rules, some 4,000 warheads would 
remain vice the desired 1,700 to 2,200. 
Ultimately, Russia saw they would gain no agreement if they insisted on 
the START counting rules. The Joint Declaration issued at the signing on May 24, 
2002 stated that the verification of the agreement would be the subject of a 
continuing discussion between the two parties. This position was "negotiated" 
with a skeptical Senate Foreign Relations Committee by then Secretary of State 
Powell. At the hearings on the subject, Powell assured the committee that 
"sufficient opportunities to collect needed data" existed through the "growing 
level of cooperation" as evidenced by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program.108 Despite their initial diverging views of the need for formal 
arms control agreements, United States and Russia continued to reduce their 
respective deployed systems in line with the existing agreements with only minor 
levels of concerns over deviations. As long as each side reaches the 2,200 
warhead limit by December 31, 2012, the only specific requirement of the treaty 
will be achieved. 
SORT is the first in the on-going series of strategic arms treaties in which 
the United States does not attempt to shape the Russian force structure or insist on 
a verification regime. The new treaty also contains no language referring to the 
108
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START II agreement which both sides have de facto abandoned. Key in the 
demise of START II is the loss of the complete elimination of Russian MIRVd 
heavy ICBMs that the United States had sought for so long.109 Of additional 
growing concern in both states beyond the strategic nuclear arms reductions 
issues are what to do about non-strategic nuclear weapons. An estimated 8,000 of 
these weapons may exist in Russia with a portion stored where there is a risk of 
theft or attack. The Bush Administration noted these concerns but took no steps to 
enter into discussions to limit these weapons with Russia.110 
In terms of verification, a Bilateral Implementation Commission was 
included in the agreement but had no real purpose or actionable agenda with no 
agreed verification protocol. Russia and the United States did form a strategic 
offensive transparency working group for a period. Each side had been effectively 
using the START verification regime which may have served well enough for 
SORT purposes. The SORT working group would eventually be replaced by the 
current channel of discussions to deal with the now expired START Treaty. These 
discussions were initiated shortly before the end of the Bush presidency.111 The 
Obama agenda seems to be one of reaching another reduction agreement to 
replace START and go beyond the limits of SORT. The new president has stated 
his ultimate goal as being total disarmament in line with the NPT.112 The table 
below provides a summary of the major agreements discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 1: Selected Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements113 
A NEW START: A YEAR AFTER PRAGUE, A NEW AGREEMENT 
With the expiration of START I in December 2009, the United States and Russia 
were under additional pressure to demonstrate their mutual commitment to further 
strategic arms control. Negotiations continued into 2010 with an agreement announced on 
March 26th that each side intended to lower the agreed limit on operationally deployed 
weapons to 1,550.114 According to the White House, "The Presidents agreed that the new 
Treaty demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United States and Russia - the 
world's two largest nuclear powers - to reduce their nuclear arsenals consistent with their 
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such actions invigorate our 
mutual efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and convince other 
113
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countries to help curb proliferation." With formal agreement set for April, 2010 near 
the timing of President Obama's global nuclear security summit, this new START treaty 
contains limits significantly below the limits established in START I and by the Moscow 
Treaty of 2002. Specifically the new START treaty specifies limits of: 
• 1,550 deployed warheads, approximately 30% lower than the upper warhead limit 
of the Moscow Treaty; 
• 800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
launchers, submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; and 
• 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
weapons.116 
The White House has reported that the verification regime for the new treaty "will 
provide the ability to monitor all aspects of the Treaty."117 Ratification of the agreement 
in each state remains problematic but given renewed emphasis on improving relations 
between the party states and the practical nature of the current security environment the 
reductions will likely occur in any case. 
Today, further arms control discussions begun in the George W. Bush 
Administration continue to work on the right answer to how low the next limit should be. 
The April 2010 new START bilateral agreement that is designed to replace the lapsed 
START I agreement has set a new limit of 1,550 warheads. While the full details of the 
new treaty remain to be finalized, the new agreement is similar in approach to that of the 
115
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Moscow Treaty of 2002 in terms of setting limits. What is likely to emerge is a less 
intrusive level of inspection and verification procedures as START I where teams from 
each side were present in each other's nuclear disassembly facilities. Advancements in 
national technical means combined with an agreed on site inspection protocol are seen 
Preliminary assessments of the agreement have been generally positive as it is seen as 
advancing U.S. national security interests, allowing the U.S. to retain a viable nuclear 
deterrent force, and enabling sufficient warning through on site inspections of any 
significant violations in order to allow time for an appropriate response. 
This important breakthrough in the bilateral arms control relationship 
demonstrates the importance of state leadership in furthering the agenda of arms control 
and non-proliferation. The new START agreement allowed President Obama to elevate 
the importance of the U.S. relationship with Russia and reestablish bilateral arms control 
as an important ingredient in a wider agenda of global nuclear non-proliferation. For 
those concerned with the security of the United States, the new treaty is expected to 
reduce the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal available to potentially target U.S. nuclear 
capabilities by 30%. Inspections and agreement not to interfere with each other's national 
technical means will provide each side with additional transparency and predictability of 
each other's strategic force deployments. One key concern of the past now less so are 
Russian mobile missile units which are better understood in terms of locations and 
doctrinal deployments based on 20 years of U.S. observation since START I. On the 
wider non-proliferation and arms control agenda, the United States and Russia have 
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actively demonstrated their support of the NPT and can now press other states to follow 
their lead. 
GOING BEYOND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: PROSPECTS FOR 
MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
While United States and Russian policies have continued to differ over the past 
decade, other states have reacted to the changing strategic environment especially the 
U.S. position on continuing to develop missile defenses. Seeing a different world after the 
Cold War, the other major nuclear states whose strategic warhead inventories are well 
below even the Russian Proposal, China (about 300 strategic warheads), France (less than 
500), and the United Kingdom (less than 200) continue to re-evaluate the role nuclear 
weapons play in their defense strategies.119 Progress certainly but complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons by any of the original five is still too distant to see. Despite the 
dramatic changes in the international environment since the end of the Cold War 
including the increasing can be expected which in turn can only serve to reinforce other 
nations' desire to retain a nuclear deterrent and give emerging nations reason to continue 
their efforts. 
During the period of the end of the Clinton Administration through the beginning 
of the George W. Bush presidency, the relationship between the United States and other 
nuclear powers was not supportive of nuclear arms control. As had happened frequently 
in the Cold War, events on the international stage heavily influenced the climate for 
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seeking to limit nuclear weapons. The growing strain of U.S.-Sino relations that 
continued into the 21st century beginning with the accidental bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War (1999), the collision of a U.S. surveillance 
plane and a Chinese fighter, statements by President Bush identifying China as a 
"strategic competitor" vice the previous Clinton view of China as a "strategic partner" 
made any nuclear arms control effort that involves China problematic. The on-going 
cooling of U.S.-Russian relations that began with NATO's campaign against Serbia, 
continued with U.S. statements against Russian military actions in Chechnya, the U.S. 
policy of fielding a "National Missile Defense" had all served to make the likelihood of 
serious continuance of talks to reduce nuclear or other arms small. The national missile 
defense issue has caused China to state that they would consider developing additional 
nuclear arms that would counter theater or national missile defenses. 
The potential still exists for a multi-national effort to develop mutually acceptable 
avenues to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons as the NPT envisions but recent events 
have clouded any prospects. As far as Russian-U.S. bilateral agreements, the NATO 
campaign against Serbia derailed any near-term hopes for START II. Continuing 
disagreements on the impact of the stated desire of the United States to deploy a national 
missile defense system raised questions of the viability of the ABM treaty until George 
W. Bush ended the debate. China remains unwilling to enter any nuclear arms talks until 
the United States and Russia agree to cut their arsenals to a level below 500 warheads or 
roughly equivalent to their capability. U.S. efforts to field a national missile defense or to 
provide even a theater missile defense for Taiwan would likely push China into building 
a larger nuclear force. After talking past each other for almost a decade, a change in U.S. 
leadership seems to offer the possibility of a new discussion. France and Britain settled 
on limited nuclear options a decade ago and are likely to delay any direct debate on 
nuclear issues until discussions on European defense integration mature.120 The United 
Kingdom reacted favorably to the new START Agreement of 2010 with British Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband stating, "As soon as it becomes useful to do so, the U.K. stands 
ready to include our nuclear arsenal in a future multilateral disarmament process."121 
What remains of primary concern in the nuclear arms control arena is the potential for a 
renewed level of arms racing between a number of states for similar reasons as those that 
propelled the two primary opponents in the Cold War. The May 2010 NPT Review 
Conference will no doubt provide the United States an opportunity to widen the 
discussion on future nuclear reductions to the N5 within view of the international 
community. 
CONTROLLING FUTURE ARMS RACES: THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR 
ERA 
If the bilateral negotiations history of the U.S. and Russia has yet to reach a 
conclusion, what can one derive from it? As was discussed in the ABM Treaty chapter 
previously, these agreements are more fragile than multilateral agreements and are most 
directly impacted by state leadership. One could argue that the current concerns over the 
emerging nuclear states have their roots in the unresolved disarmament of the NPT 
Nuclear Weapon States. Other views of the drive for nuclear capability see these states 
desires tied to issues of sovereignty, extant or perceived extant threats, regional 
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hegemonic desires or a combination of these. Within each of these situations lies both the 
potential for continued horizontal and vertical proliferation or arms races. Both forms are 
directly influenced by state leadership both as they occur and as they are reversed. 
There is ample evidence to discount the issue of dramatic horizontal state 
proliferation compared to the world that President Kennedy warned against four five 
decades ago. Proliferation to non-state actors has been frequently stated as the greatest 
concern in the nuclear arena today. To date, the record on the ground would argue that 
surveillance and enforcement of existing legalities has limited this possibility. Vertical 
proliferation or arms races between existing and emerging nuclear states would seem to 
be the greater likelihood at the state level. The case presented in this chapter shows a 
complex but useful series of events to determine the potential international relations 
framework to address this issue. The issue remains on how to assist both nuclear and 
emerging nuclear states to adhere to the principles of the NPT. State leaders will be 
responsible for the decisions made that result from their assessment of the security 
environment and the responses they should provide to perceived threats. 
MOVING FORWARD: UNITED STATES, THE NEW START AND BEYOND 
For the immediate future, the United States must continue to responsibly negotiate 
beyond the recently agreed new START treaty continuing reductions in two largest 
nuclear inventories (U.S. and Russia) adding international verification while increasing 
irreversibility and transparency. This negotiation should begin immediately to capitalize 
on the momentum of this "nuclear moment." The history of successful strategic nuclear 
arms control negotiations does not favor pauses in their process. The 2010 Nuclear Policy 
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Review suggests the United States is committed to further reductions and inclusion of 
sub-strategic weapons which are the most likely objects of theft, accident or other 
incident. What has become apparent in the last forty years of arms control and reductions 
especially in the post Cold War experience is that the economic component of the process 
dominates. The Nunn-Luger efforts and others have provided both the model and 
economic path to remove any incentives to resist reductions due to a lack of host nation 
funding. The United States needs to find the resources to continue these efforts to 
conclusion in a manner that eliminates any fluctuation based on shifts in political support. 
The most important byproduct of this modernized bilateral relationship is sustained 
"adult like" behavior on the part of both states which in turn serves as example to all 
states of need to continue toward goals of the NPT and uphold the related international 
agreements. U.S. State Department has reportedly been given this guidance from the 
President but at the moment there is uncertainty as to Russian willingness to build on the 
current momentum. One means of gaining Russian support for the nuclear agenda would 
be a further "embrace" of Russia in the European security discussion. The NATO 
Secretary General has suggested the Alliance move rapidly toward doing so.122 
As the relationship between the P5 modernizes, the United States must be willing 
to take the lead under international supervision serve as the recipient of any international 
nuclear materials for conversion from military use or to prevent such use. If a state 
wishes to retain nuclear material, the United States needs to be ready to provide any 
assistance required to insure these materials remain secure and out of military use. The 
nearly immediate acceptance of assistance from Mexico, Ukraine and (another state, see 
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news) during the Nuclear Security Summit shows the requirement and the United States 
needs to be prepared to respond with all available speed. This was the standard during the 
immediate post Cold War period when the three former Soviet Republics denuclearized 
and should be fully embraced in this renewed period of nuclear non-proliferation activity. 
If the United States is unable or unwilling to do so, reinforcement of President Obama's 
stated policy and goals will become very difficult. A similar emphasis on providing other 
states with experts who can assist in developing the appropriate documents and political 
rationales for negotiating and ratifying the CTBT and FMCT should be led by the U.S. 
Department of State. This outreach effort would not only demonstrate the positive nature 
and commitment of the United States to its stated agenda to the international community, 
it would potentially provide reinforcement of the value of U.S. leadership to the members 
of the Senate who would need to be convinced of the need to ratify these treaties. 
The United States should also demonstrate leadership by more than calling for 
more financial support of the IAEA by supporting the placing of this critical UN agency 
at the center of providing transparency of all states engaged in nuclear programs. As a 
part of its efforts to widen the multilateral nature of arms control leading to non-
proliferation and eventual disarmament, the United States must seek wider international 
acceptance of IAEA as controlling authority of nuclear arms inspections, verification, 
destruction, and governing of appropriate procedures for civilian nuclear energy 
programs. One of the keys to this effort would be increased transparency of U.S. 
programs to international inspection. The United States need to continue to allow all the 
same processes it has asked other states to accept on their programs as a clear 
demonstration of support for the IAEA, a rejection of any "do as I say, no as I do" 
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attitude. As the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review has stated, the United States does not intend 
to modernize any existing systems beyond requirements to assure their continued 
reliability which the IAEA can and should monitor. The United States is committed to 
both continued security and reliability of its nuclear deterrent and should leverage IAEA 
oversight throughout these efforts to reinforce the new nuclear agenda. Along with this 
security and surety commitment, the United States needs to allow the IAEA to verify that 
the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review commitment not to build any new nuclear systems, to 
refrain from any testing of weapons. 
Support for UN and IAEA efforts to widen nuclear and alternative energy sources 
with sufficient restrictions and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear materials to 
weapons development is another significant area which U.S. support and expertise will be 
critical to the nuclear non-proliferation agenda. President Obama's suggestion of an 
international nuclear fuel bank open to all states with a desire for nuclear energy 
production is well within the realm of the possible. One former Soviet plant is already in 
place for this function and producing fuel for a number of states. The dual goal of such a 
project is to solve the nuclear fuel supply problem to NPT compliant states while 
negating need or desire to build national capability to produce fuel. As was seen in the 
Soviet example, states can choose to build dual use nuclear facilities that would only 
increase the requirement for international controls and at the same time continue to 
provide states the opportunity to defect from the NPT regime. 
As has been seen in the decade of combating terrorism, keeping those groups who 
do not want to operate within the rules and norms of the international system are difficult 
to fully interdict. Several groups have stated their desire to acquire nuclear weapons by 
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any means. Preventing this circumstance is the stated goal of the United States with the 
near universal support of the international community. Each of the non-proliferation 
efforts described in this chapter are ultimately aimed in eliminating the use of nuclear 
weapons completely. States remain the dominant powers in the international system to 
deal with this threat. The United States has led international efforts in a number of ways, 
some accepted, and some not as much to deal with terrorism and so far the international 
community has not suffered a nuclear terrorist attack. Continued leadership of the United 
States to secure all nuclear material, support the growth of durable international 
institutions such as the PSI, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and most 
importantly the UN and the IAEA while seeking to increase the binding together of 
individual states to prevent nuclear capabilities from reaching these groups is essential. 
The United States leadership on UNSCRs 1540 and 1887 are a clear demonstration of 
U.S. support for a multilateralist approach to nuclear issues. Both of these UNSCRs 
align and are mutually reinforcing of the NPT and the policies of the U.S. nuclear agenda. 
As the state that brought the world both the nuclear weapon and the UN, continued 
support through this international institution is essential to fostering the required 
increasing interdependence and cooperation of the international community to finally 
remove the fear of nuclear threats and destruction. 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREAT BRINGS OLD WARRIORS IN FROM THE 
COLD WAR 
Even before the renewed U.S. nuclear agenda was in place, one prominent group 
of U.S. Cold War leaders including two former Secretaries of State, a Secretary of 
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Defense and a former Senator joined together to call for immediate and complete 
disarmament of nuclear weapons with the nuclear terrorist threat as central to their 
argument. George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn in a series of 
Wall Street opinion editorial pieces and most recently an hour long video appeal have 
highlighted the much changed international security environment and suggested a number 
of requirements to ultimately eliminate this emerging threat of nuclear terrorism.123 Many 
of the current policies of the U.S. renewed nuclear agenda are supported by these 
statesmen. Their appeal calls for U.S. leadership in a multilateral effort which includes 
the stated goals of the Obama Administration to secure of worldwide stocks of nuclear 
material, implement substantial reductions of existing nuclear arsenals including 
elimination of short range battlefield nuclear weapons, identifying the requirement for the 
CTBT and strengthening verification and enforcement capabilities. Their effort in support 
of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, called the Nuclear Security Project (NSP), also 
recommends developing cooperative missile defense and early warning systems, 
developing a new international system to manage the risks of producing fuel for nuclear 
power, and phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce. The NSP 
group's potentially most controversial recommendation was their call for discarding Cold 
War practices for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to decrease the danger of accidental, 
mistaken or unauthorized launch. Essentially, this last recommendation would "de-alert" 
or stand down those nuclear systems that remain on alert for rapid response and launch. 
Their argument is supported by the difficulty of using these systems to retaliate against a 
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terrorist attack if this scenario seems to be rising over time as the fear of a nuclear war for 
which the alert is designed to respond fades. 
Understanding the value of state leadership that this case study highlights in order 
to reassess the legacy of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms race and continuing slow 
reductions is essential to developing a framework to restore the NPT regime. Among the 
most important steps to provide an example to the international system is to determine the 
best course to reduce and secure the two largest nuclear stockpiles. With the momentum 
toward this intermediate goal now building again, the United States is best positioned to 
encourage Russia and other states to support the effort. A framework for reestablishing 
the non-proliferation regime and continuing reductions in nuclear weapons led by the 
United States will be examined as a part of the analysis to be found in the concluding 
chapter. 
SUMMARY 
This case study of the bilateral strategic arms reduction process beginning with 
the SALT negotiations and continuing into the current negotiations to a follow-on 
agreement to START I Treaty highlights the impact of state leadership on negotiations, 
agreements and legislative ratification of any arms control agreement. Expanding on the 
concept and importance of state leadership as a catalyst for new agreements and in 
sustaining the arms control process, this key component to the reinforcement of the non-
proliferation regime, arms control and sustaining an international drive to nuclear 
disarmament is essential to the success of any arms control process. By focusing on the 
more than 40 years of history of the strategic arms negotiations between the United States 
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and Russia, this case study provides reinforcement of the limits of bilateral agreements 
including unilateral withdrawal, the problems with linking other foreign policy issues to 
the negotiation process and the difficulties in gaining ratification from party states' 
legislatures. The strength of this bilateral process as pointed out in the case study lies in 
the long term commitment of states to the process, a common desire to control 
proliferation in general and arms races between the states in particular. The issue of 
proliferation, both horizontal and vertical forms, was discussed as the principle issue 
arms control seeks to avoid and the role state leadership plays in decision making to 
either allow or prohibit it. 
Among the longest and most prominent arms control efforts since the end of the 
Second World War are the series of negotiations between the United States and Russia on 
limiting strategic nuclear arms. Beginning with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I) in the Nixon Administration and continuing through to the renewed discussions 
following the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on December 
5, 2009, the United States and Russia have been in a lengthy effort to control and reduce 
their massive holdings in strategic nuclear systems. This strategic arms reduction process 
has made substantial progress toward achieving the ultimate goal of the NPT, total 
disarmament. While progress has been slow, a number of significant successes have 
occurred despite significant swings of the political landscape on the part of both nations 
as well as the environment around them. This process, which has had a renewed 
momentum in the last year, displays several key features of a successful arms control 
process that are supported by international relations theory. The April 2010 joint U.S. and 
Russia announcement of a new START agreement to further reduce operational strategic 
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nuclear systems to 1,550 on each side further validates the willingness of both states to 
support an arms control agenda that enables a path toward disarmament as well as a 
commitment to the principles of non-proliferation. State leadership continues to play a 
central role in this process with both Presidents Obama and Medvedev driving their 
negotiators to reach a successful agreement. 
The essential value of a long term relationship like that of the United States and 
Russia in forwarding a significant arms control process especially one that seeks to deal 
with strategic nuclear systems cannot be overestimated. This relationship demonstrates 
both the difficulties as well as the gains that can be achieved from such a relationship. 
The norm of seeking to limit and eventually reduce strategic nuclear weapons has proven 
a powerful force that binds these states to their mutual obligations in the NPT. These two 
states also represent both the owners of the legacy of the arms control process as well as 
the most experienced at how the process can work well. This bilateral relationship despite 
its weaknesses has endured. 
In order to achieve the goals of the NPT, participation of both will be essential in 
any strengthening efforts in support of the non-proliferation regime. Of them, the United 
States, through the policies and actions of the current president, is best positioned to lead 
those efforts. Without the active participation of state leadership in furthering the goals of 
the NPT, either in bilateral arms control or in a wider multilateral effort that includes the 
nuclear states at a minimum, the international environment remains far more at risk of an 
unnecessary nuclear event. State leadership when engaged in a multilateral effort to 
reduce the risks of a nuclear event such as reinforcing the NPT is key to sustaining any 
drive to both enforce the regime's norms as well as achieve its goals. The concluding 
chapter will provide a reinforcement of these concepts with a summary analysis of each 
case study. With this analysis in view, the dissertation argument will be reviewed and 
used as a basis to recommend future research in international relations on how best to 
achieve multilateral movement toward nuclear disarmament. This conclusion will also 
review the appropriate next steps on the part of the United States in a leadership role 
towards the goals of the NPT as suggested by this research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Given the historical record of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, what are 
the prospects for a reenergized global effort led by the United States to achieve the goals 
of the NPT? What has emerged from this period is an outline of both theory and practice 
that offers opportunities for theorists and states to work toward improvements in 
institutions, regimes and supporting international relations theory, particularly in the issue 
area of nuclear weapons. While there remains a wide range of views on the purpose of 
nuclear weapons and the utility of the NPT, explanations and potential solutions that have 
been discussed in this dissertation can be analyzed to determine if a new theoretical 
ground can be staked out. This new ground would potentially provide new support for 
efforts to fashion a means to control, reduce and potentially eliminate nuclear weapons. 
One clear result of this research is that the power of states remains important within the 
international system and within the nuclear issue area, the United States has emerged as 
the best positioned state to lead any significant effort to further control nuclear weapons. 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the research contained in this dissertation 
as well as provide a conclusion that supports and extends the dissertation argument. 
Within the analysis portion of the chapter a summary the key findings of the preceding 
case studies will be provided. Next, the analysis will outline the significant international 
relations theoretical foundations for the current environment related to the nuclear issue 
area. Once the findings and theoretical foundations have been identified, a suggested 
new theoretical framework that attempts to explain the current and future security 
environment states will operate within and be able to seek lasting arrangements that will 
deal effectively with the nuclear issue area will be suggested. Finally, the analysis will 
provide a discussion of the appropriate U.S. role as the leader within this environment. 
THE NPT REGIME: DURABLE TREATY STILL STANDS 
The NPT stands as the first and most inclusive nuclear agreement and establishes 
an important foundation for multilateral efforts to control nuclear weapons, enable future 
nuclear disarmament and foster civilian uses for nuclear power. What is most significant 
about the treaty is the degree to which the signatories have been able to establish a 
significant international norm. Among the most criticized of the regime setting 
agreements, the NPT has endured as a goal that has been slowly being accepted. Critics 
have pointed to a number of limitations of the treaty that when combined offer evidence 
of the demise of the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, proponents offer that 
despite the lack of universal acceptance and obvious issues such as dual use of nuclear 
fuel, the treaty has served the important of overcoming the hurdle of establishing a 
regime that can be evolved. 
Given that all but a handful of states are signatories of the treaty, one cannot 
easily dismiss the NPT's value to establishing the non-proliferation regime. The 1970 
agreement set out a universal set of rules, norms and goals with respect to nuclear power 
both for military and civil uses. Compliance has been generally far better than 
expectations in the 1960s such as President Kennedy's stated concern that by now there 
would be 25 nuclear weapons states. In fact, after continuing to steadily rise during the 
Cold War, several states nuclear programs have been reversed including the United States 
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and Russia. A small number have been completely shut down including Libya, South 
Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and the three former nuclear Soviet states, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
The emerging nuclear proliferation "challenger" states have slowed to a handful 
with each garnering both international condemnation and sanctions from the P5 as well as 
the UN in general. The P5 have been active in developing negotiation strategies and 
options to address these breakout states. Thousands of nuclear weapons have been 
disassembled and their nuclear components reprocessed. One estimate provides the 
ability to truly turn sword in to plowshares as an estimated 10% of all electric power in 
the United States today is powered with reprocessed former Soviet nuclear weapons 
material. All of the weapons on both sides of the INF Treaty have been destroyed. No 
open air tests of nuclear devices have been conducted since 1980 and only North Korea 
has done any testing since non-signatories India and Pakistan "traded" tests in 1998. 
The right of any state to gain from the nuclear possessing states the benefits of 
nuclear energy for civilian is enshrined in the NPT. This right has also been the source of 
friction within the international community due to the weakness of the treaty and its 
inspection protocols. This issue is as much the fault of the P5 as it is the newer nuclear 
states. Each of the original P5 were responsible for providing nuclear technology to the 
other 39 nations that possess nuclear power plants for energy. A lack of transparency in 
many of these exchanges to the broader international nuclear energy community, the 
IAEA in particular, has inhibited efforts to control improper transfers of technology and 
fuel to weapons programs. Several states have historically not followed the "no transfer 
rule" which prohibited nuclear weapons states from providing the means, technology or 
actual weapons to non-nuclear weapons and levied the responsibility on these states to 
refuse accepting the same from nuclear weapons states. Today's international 
environment may be generating sufficient cause for these former provider states to 
support the NPT in an effort to roll back these transfers. Even if no improper transfer of 
nuclear technology for weapons development had taken place, secrecy surrounding many 
nations' nuclear enterprises has led to unintended consequences and tragedy. 
As an obvious example, Russian electric power became a byproduct of their 
nuclear arms program as every Soviet nuclear reactor was specifically designed to both 
generate energy and produce weapons grade material for warheads. The disaster in the 
reactor at Chernobyl was in part due to the dual nature of its design. In order to have 
access to the nuclear reactor for removing weapons material, the design was weaker than 
most western designs preventing significant containment of the fire and nuclear 
contamination. Experts within the Russian scientific community had convinced national 
leadership and themselves that the design and their procedures were safe. 
Despite these problems, the value of the norm enforcement function of the NPT 
has been proven and emanates from the original five tenets. These tenets included the 
desire to create an agreement that allowed no proliferation loopholes, a need to balance 
the responsibilities and obligations of nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states, a step toward total disarmament including nuclear weapons, provisions that are 
"acceptable and workable," and no limits on nuclear weapons free zones. What now 
seems essential to getting all but a few states to agree is the "width" of the space the 
agreement created. Over time, appropriate changes like placing the IAEA within the 
verification structure of the treaty is consistent with regime theory. Within this space was 
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Article VI which anticipated and supported continuing negotiations that would further 
bind the signatories together in pursuit of the goal. Some have argued that the recent 
bilateral agreement between the United States and India is an appropriate means to 
engage one of the NPT holdout states. If the eventual result is adherence to the NPT 
norms than the cause of the treaty is forwarded but bilateral agreements do not have the 
same value as multilateral from a normative view. 
The NPT's most distant goal of total disarmament is still elusive due in part to the 
size of the problem created by the arms racing of the United States and U.S.S.R. in the 
Cold War. The on again, off again nature of negotiations between these states since the 
end of the Cold War has also contributed to a negative atmosphere within the 
international community with respect to reducing nuclear weapons. At the same time, the 
regime has had a positive impact on strengthening rules and norms especially in the area 
of inspections and verification. All states now allow some form of IAEA inspections of 
their nuclear activities with except Cuba. Strengthened and wider acceptance of IAEA 
protocols occurred after the first gulf war that ejected Saddam's Iraq from Kuwait. 
Despite being outside of the NPT, Israel, Pakistan and India have established IAEA 
relationships demonstrating the willingness to comply with the intent if not the letter of 
the treaty. Non-compliance of IAEA protocols has been extensively publicized, 
especially in the cases of Iran and North Korea, which serves the norm of the regime 
equally well. Without the NPT, states would be free to pursue any course of action as 
their national interests dictate. 
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NPT LIMITATIONS: ISSUES WITHIN THE REGIME 
Despite the accomplishments of the non-proliferation regime, a number of serious 
limitations remain. Among these issues are explaining why nuclear weapons persist 
despite conclusion of the Cold War, the issue of status conferred on nuclear weapons 
states over those that do not possess nuclear weapons, a rise of a second tier of nuclear 
weapons states and others seeking similar protections they believe nuclear weapons 
provide due to continuing regional conflicts, "undereducated" security elites and the 
impact of a strategic culture on nuclear decision making. Each issue is both interrelated 
and difficult to address with a single solution. 
Nuclear weapons grew from the requirement to find an ultimate weapon that 
would serve the cause of defeating the Axis Powers in World War II. The fear that the 
Nazis would produce a weapon and use it before the Allies could counter it served as an 
embryonic example of the fear and power based major state competition that was to 
follow. Now that the security competition between the P5 has all but passed, the rationale 
for the existence for large stockpiles and hair-trigger alert forces has been weakened. The 
security dilemma that was the hallmark of the Cold War period seems to have shifted 
down to a second tier of states with unresolved regional conflicts such as North Korea, 
Iran, Israel, India and Pakistan. But are these conflicts sufficient conditions to justify 
deployment of nuclear weapons? Are the territorial integrity of any of these states at 
sufficient risk that nuclear weapons are required to hold a would be aggressor at bay? 
What are the long term implications of allowing states with histories of unstable and 
violent changes in national leadership to develop and possess nuclear weapons? The NPT 
remains the best foundation to build a consensus effort to reverse these situations. 
Another issue limiting the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime rests with 
the traditional power status nuclear weapons conferred on the P5. Nuclear armed states 
get to make the rules frequently within the international system. While the limits of this 
power have been on display in recent years, the fact that the P5 are permanent members 
of the UN Security Council is not lost on other states. Reform of the UNSC has been a 
focus of recent UN efforts but has not received broad acceptance from the P5.1 As has 
been demonstrated repeatedly the range of power based options in the security dimension 
of state influence within the international system. This imbalance of power compounds 
the non nuclear weapon state's security dilemma which is frequently based on regional 
threats including overwhelming conventional military power demonstrated by P5 states 
most notably the United States and the Russian Federation. Seeking similar status and 
counterbalancing regional threats, emerging nuclear weapon states are driven to acquire 
the ultimate weapon. 
The role of deterrence theory in the Cold War was so dominant within academic 
and policy elites within the Cold War. This shadow of deterrence lingers today from 
decisions on force sizing and budgets to sustain existing nuclear systems to the political 
dimension of what deterrence means given the shift from Cold War relationships to a 
focus on deterring rogue states and terrorists. While the evidence of a lack of any nuclear 
attack since 1946 is powerful, does this history provide sufficient support for a 
continuation of this logic? T. V. Paul recently explored this issue of the power of the 
1
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"nuclear taboo" but found that awareness of the concept was no guarantee of continued 
security.2 Complicating the post Cold War security environment is the problem of 
terrorist use of nuclear weapons which provide states difficulty in warning, mitigation, 
and retaliation which were relatively simple issues at the state on state level. Just how 
accurate and timely will identification of an attacker be in a terrorist attack? Once 
identified, how does the victim state retaliate? Would nuclear weapons be the appropriate 
response against a non-state group even if a specific location target was identified as this 
would reside inside a state's boundaries? How would the retaliating state assure allies, 
other nuclear weapons states and adversaries that the response was not directed against 
them? Add to these issues the obvious physical, political, economic and social fallout 
from the response and the new world of nuclear calculus in relation to terrorists is 
complex. 
Does Waltz's view that "more is better" extend to terrorist groups? Rational 
deterrence theory was based on the concept that spreading nuclear weapons to more 
states drives up the cost of going to war. While this theory may hold at the state level, its 
power decreases dramatically when the traditional structures between states are not in 
view. When one adds in the experiences of proliferation rings like A.Q. Khan, the logic 
that more states with potentially less stable government structures being added to the 
ranks of nuclear weapons states seems weak at best. Given the lack of goodness of fit of 
deterrence theory to the terrorist issue, a growing number of voices are beginning to 
2
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advocate that the best option to prevent such an attack lies in securing all nuclear material 
through the NPT and parallel risk reduction efforts.4 These efforts are founded on the 
NPT norm that nuclear material should only be used for peaceful purposes. Achieving 
complete or nearly complete control of nuclear material would be seemingly impossible 
to accomplish but would serve to at least support the norms of the NPT and likely attract 
other parallel efforts by both state and corporate entities. Without such a global, 
multilateral project, the likelihood of miscalculation or accident rises with the unchecked 
spread of nuclear material. The result of the April 2010 U.S. sponsored Nuclear Security 
Summit provides renewed optimism with respect to this goal.5 
Even if one allowed for state development of nuclear capabilities to deal with the 
security dilemma such as Pakistan and India, questions still remain on the ability of these 
states to learn the appropriate "lessons" from the Cold War. When one combines the 
advice of Sagan in contrast to Waltz's suggestion of a nuclear free for all approach and 
view it through Jack Snyder's work on strategic cultures, the risk added to the 
international security environment of new members of the nuclear club having to "learn 
while doing would seem far higher than most states would be willing to accept. If one 
accepts that Pakistan and India have sufficiently well educated and serious leaders who 
fully comprehend the weight of responsibility nuclear weapons require, does this extend 
to military junta controlled states like Myanmar? Sagan's advice about the improper 
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influence of military leadership over civilian decision makers certainly applies to these 
states, the less civilians control the nuclear enterprise, the higher the likelihood of 
security failures and accidents. Given the passage of time since the end of the Cold War, 
when is it likely that the required consensus to move the NPT agenda forward will 
reappear? 
The current environment contains both concerns and positive indications that the 
NPT agenda remains in place and active. The North Korea nuclear question now nearing 
two full decades of ever increasing distance from the goal of a nuclear free peninsula is 
being addressed by a multilateral forum. Iran, seemingly following a similar path, has 
also been confronted by UNSC sanctions and another multilateral negotiation effort. With 
indications of cooperation between the two states and recent interdiction of a North 
Korea transport aircraft thought to be carrying military hardware to Iran, the international 
community has presented a substantial effort to sustain the non-proliferation regime. 
Continued expansion of these efforts along with a new more positive and proactive U.S. 
administration view on arms control, the upcoming 2010 Review of the NPT and 
renewed bilateral efforts to reach agreement on United States and Russian nuclear arms 
control would seem to indicate a strengthening of the regime with the United States in the 
lead state role. 
The history of the non-proliferation regime and arms control in general offer some 
important perspectives that have been discussed in the case studies on the ABM Treaty 
and strategic arms reductions. First, the NPT did not stop the arms race between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. In fact, the bilateral talks established between the two 
Cold War opponents set limits on defensive systems (ABM) that each continued to 
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disrespect if even only in limited ways. Offensive systems were limited and in one case 
an entire class eliminated but new systems were built. Some capabilities that were not 
specifically limited or prohibited allowed each state to continue to expand their arsenals 
to sizes that dwarfed the nearest competitor by two orders of magnitude. The NPT did not 
formally guide or directly influence these agreements. Proliferation norms seemed to 
apply to other states during the Cold War. 
Today the antagonism between the west and Russia is far less than during the 
Cold War. Once the United States and Russia reach a new set of limits that approach the 
levels of the other P5 states, the potential for serious consideration of global disarmament 
would seem highly improved. Of key interest to all states is just exactly how far they will 
reduce, what verification measures will be implemented and what level of transparency 
and trust can be built as they reduce. The history of bilateral negotiations and the 
limitations of their agreements would suggest the need for a broader involvement of 
international institutions in acknowledgement of the impact these states have on the 
international system. 
The evidence that historic antagonisms can be resolved with either existing or 
emergent nuclear programs being abandoned exists. From Libya as the most recent 
example, the three former Soviet republics, South Africa, as well as nearly a dozen more 
who considered nuclear programs, the momentum away from seeking nuclear answers to 
perceived security dilemmas seems to indicate a significant shift since the Cold War 
ended. As discussed in argument chapter, Cerny believes the traditional security dilemma 
has changed and if so, state based solutions may be insufficient to fully address the future 
conflicts arising from nuclear emergent states. Some states with unresolved regional 
security issues remain on a path toward nuclear weapons states status. With the upcoming 
2010 NPT Review, an opportunity exists to further solidify recent gains in non-
proliferation and reinforce the vision and norms of the treaty. 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO WEAKNESSES IN THE NPT 
As was addressed in the argument chapter, regimes are difficult to bring into 
existence but easier to sustain over time. For the NPT, both Jervis and Krasner's early 
definitions hold sufficient explanatory power. For Jervis, security regimes are 
those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in 
their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept 
implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a 
form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-
interest the fact that neither superpower attacks the other is a form of 
cooperation, but not a regime. The links between the states' restraint and 
their immediate self-interest are too direct and unproblematic to invoke the 
concept.7 
Steven Krasner defined them similarly as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations."8 The definition Krasner uses narrows the concept to 
a single issue between two or more states. The NPT is the bedrock of the most important 
security regime. What has been elusive is how to sustain multilateral discussions on how 
to achieve the treaty's goal. Moving beyond cooperation of short-term self interest is the 
next step to increase the power of the non-proliferation regime. 
6
 Cerny, "The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era." 
7
 Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357. 
8
 Krasner, International Regimes, 2. 
251 
The specific actions that are currently ongoing that will continue to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime include expanding seeking opportunities to start or expand 
membership of multilateral talks to slow and reverse emergence of potential nuclear 
weapons states. The Six Party talks on the North Korean issue and the seven nation EU 
supported talks with Iran are an important evolution from the Cold War example of 
bilateral arms control. Each time the focus states of these talks have attempted to obstruct 
or break down the size of the effort, relative solidarity of the parties has reinforced the 
norms of the NPT for the participating states if not on the nuclear emergent state. The 
continuing and expanded use of the IAEA to verify compliance, the willingness of states 
to use sanctions individually or through the UN to force compliance and the ability of 
states to offer incentives when appropriate to do so are all important to the deepening of 
the regime. 
While the environment that generated the original NPT has passed, nuclear 
weapons still have the ability to transform the security calculus among states. States that 
have relatively less power than the P5 and who have no aspirations to acquire nuclear 
weapons have always been either on the periphery or excluded from arms control or 
specific non-proliferation efforts. When they are included, their role is typically to assist 
the stronger powers in achieving their interests. Alignment of interests is frequent in these 
situations but the results are typically most beneficial to the most powerful states. As the 
direct security concerns of the powerful states begin to recede, other more regional 
conflicts become prominent. These conflicts more directly impact the less powerful states 
than the original nuclear states. Traditional realist based explanations make the solution 
set to these issues simple but potentially too narrow. 
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MERGING THEORIES TO ALLOW SOLUTION FORMATION 
This research has exposed two distinct theoretical explanations for how the 
nuclear question has been traditionally discussed: power-based explanations which fit the 
nuclear capable states interaction and cognitive-based explanations that expand the 
visibility of all states particularly those without traditional levels of power. The non-
proliferation regime needs to address a range of issues that drive traditional state security 
concerns in order to further bond as many states in the international environment as 
possible to effectively achieve and sustain the goals of the NPT. One example of these 
issues is what to do with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe which have a 
source of increasing criticism from both NATO and non-NATO countries in recent 
years.9 As the United States and Russia have reached another agreement on strategic 
weapons, an obvious moment for further discussions that take into account broader, 
regional interests of neighboring states may have arrived. 
Specific recommendations to strengthen the NPT above would have to include 
finding enhancements to existing treaties that relate to non-proliferation. Enforcement of 
UNSCR 1540, which requires both states and non-state actors to ensure weapons of mass 
destruction are not proliferated, would substantially support and extend the NPT norms 
beyond the state level. The United States has expressed full support for the resolution, has 
completed a national action plan to implement its provisions and has provided an 
9
 Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, "Next, the Tactical Nukes," The New York Times, On-line 
Edition, February 2, 2010, http://www.nvtimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-
edbildt.html?scp=1 &sq=&st=nvt (accessed February 2, 2010). Authors argue that remaining tactical 
nuclear weapons be withdrawn from areas near the EU as they endanger a common future for the EU and 
Russia. An agreement that covers these weapons similar to that being discussed for strategic weapons be 
completed. Authors are the former prime ministers of Sweden and Poland respectively. 
overview of the plan to the UNSCR 1540 Committee.1 Another important effort that 
would strengthen the NPT involves the IAEA. 
Universal acceptance of IAEA inspections and combined with improvements to 
those protocols would be a critical part of strengthening the NPT regime. The use of non-
state groups, organizations and individuals to report on violations, criminal activity and 
suspected proliferation activity would likely provide a dramatic increase in transparency. 
Experiences from the environmental regimes have demonstrated that states are frequently 
ill equipped, unwilling or unable to identify activities that are against the norms and rules 
of a specific regime. States with greater resources should be encouraged to volunteer to 
assist those in need as will likely be done as a result of the global nuclear material 
securing effort. Additionally, efforts must be undertaken to determine and implement the 
appropriate comprehensive approach to close the nuclear "loophole" in the NPT that 
encourages spreading nuclear technology to promote nuclear power plant construction 
and operation for the generation of electrical power. The history of proliferation of 
nuclear technology for weapons has obvious links and drawn opaqueness from this 
weakness in the NPT. Universal acceptance of the IAEA and improved protocols will 
dramatically improve transparency of nuclear technology transfers. 
OPERATIONALIZING THE NORMS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
Regimes have been successful in a number of issue areas apart from security but 
within the security area the NPT still stands as the gold standard. Among the pressing 
non-proliferation concerns is just how to operationalize the norms of the regime. In 
Department of State, "Overview of United States National Action Plan for Implementation of 
Resolution 1540 (2004)," Department of State website, 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86372.pdf (accessed February 2, 2010). 
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Tipping Point, Campbell and Einhorn provide five recommendations including stopping 
North Korea and Iran from going nuclear. Given that one has gone as far as testing and 
the other seems determined to do all it can to position itself to emerge, these states are 
serving as test cases of the ability of the international community to adapt and expand the 
non-proliferation regime. Next, they believe the United States should take the 
international lead in dealing with regional security concerns including the Middle East, 
India-Pakistan, and the Korean Peninsula. Campbell and Einhorn find the United States 
best positioned to fill the gap in NPT dual use through a multilateral effort to control the 
nuclear fuel cycle process within a limited and internationally controlled plants. This 
effort should provide both security of the material and a guaranteed source of nuclear fuel 
for the 44 states now operating nuclear power plants. Improved analytical and 
intelligence capabilities at the multinational level which would require expanded sharing 
of classified data would improve transparency in the nuclear issue area. 
As discussed in Chapter III, another NPT proponent and expert, William Walker, 
recommended a number of actions to reinforce the NPT. Walker sees the key to 
improving the NPT lies in working out the natural tension between realist and 
constitutional views of international relations. Certain concepts at the core of the NPT are 
still valid and should be embraced by all nations. All of these are simple but often 
ignored when states are unwilling to alter their view of their interests or subordinate them 
to those of the common good. Respecting reciprocal obligations and the requirement to 
exercise restraint are among these responsibilities Walker notes as key to the NPT's 
success. Walker stresses the fact that the signatories all agreed to work toward 
elimination of all weapons, both conventional and nuclear, and that states agreed to 
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constrain production and deployment of these systems. Without this specific restraint on 
the production side, the temptation for states to divert resources and violate the terms of 
the NPT and other international obligations such as the UN Charter remains strong. 
Walker's back to basics approach to international cooperation which is at the core of the 
NPT includes the requirements for states to value and promote the supremacy of 
diplomacy over war and a multilateral willingness to adhere to international law. 
NPT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The solution set that will enable long term enhancement of the NPT, a permanent 
reduction of nuclear arms and eventual total disarmament, includes efforts to find 
common ground for nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states in terms of 
resolving the underlying security issues. Theoretical approaches that are acceptable to 
nuclear capable states have to be tempered with acceptance of activities that engage all 
states in an equitable arrangement and result in a realignment of the international security 
environment. Dealing with cheating within the non-proliferation regime, outdated 
rationales for possession of nuclear weapons and states unwilling to address 
abandonment of the weapons remain significant issues in reducing the power of the Cold 
War deterrent shadow on national security elites. As the secretary general of the French 
Foreign Ministry responded to a question on the idea of nuclear disarmament, "France's 
nuclear deterrent has protected our country very well for many years," these P5 states and 
those who seek similar answers to their security dilemmas will be the core problem for 
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the NPT regime in the years to come.'l Efforts that go beyond the traditional state level 
of analysis and actual interaction can provide needed catalysts for positive action in 
disarmament. 
ABM TREATY: BEST AGREEMENT ABANDONED AS ENVIRONMENT 
CHANGED 
Frequently noted as the most durable of U.S. and Soviet agreements, the ABM 
treaty also proved in the end unable to suit the short-term interests of the United States. 
Was the 2002 abandonment of the treaty by the United States inevitable? Where the 
changes in the international security environment sufficient to justify the negative 
impacts on a 30 year relationship? Specifically, did concern about an emerging threat of a 
single missile attack from a third party "rogue" state warrant rejection of the treaty? Were 
the changes in the political structure of Russia a significant factor in the U.S. decision? 
The research conducted in this dissertation provides only partial answers to these 
questions but does offer insights on the limitations of a bilateral arms control agreement 
over time. 
The ABM Treaty enshrined mutual assured destruction for the two Cold War 
superpowers by limiting defensive systems to the point of merely a fig leaf for each 
other's capital and a small but sufficient counterforce. Over time, the bargain would be 
further limited to a single defensive area on each side. The United States would construct 
their system only to abandon it a year after it became operational. The Soviet Union 
would build their ABM system to protect Moscow and continue to maintain it. Each side 
11
 Angela Charlton, "Disarmament Talks Strained Over Mideast, Russia," Washington Post, 
February 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dvn/content/article/2010/02/02/AR2010020200596.htm (accessed February 2, 2010). 
frequently accused the other of cheating on the agreement. In the end, each was correct in 
their concern. The Soviet Union did in fact construct a radar system that was designed as 
an ABM component and as such violated the treaty. Virtually all of the U.S. research and 
systems developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative and its successor program 
names were at least counter to the intent if not outright violations of the agreement. 
If neither side was intent on holding up their side of the bargain, what value could 
be gained from maintaining the treaty so long? The answer is found in the fundamental 
structures the agreement established which served as a foundation for all future 
negotiations and agreements. The ABM Treaty was the first specific limitation on any 
nuclear system and committed the two states to continue the work of limiting offensive 
weapons having "solved" the issue of defensive and offensive arms races simultaneously 
occurring. The establishment of the Strategic Consultative Committee still stands as the 
greatest strength of the treaty that unfortunately was not equaled in later agreements. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the Standing Consultative Committee, as set out in 
Article XII, can serve as a model for other agreements as it established an effective and 
permanent forum to discuss issues that impact the continuance of the agreement. While 
not as intrusive as some verification requirements of later agreements, the Standing 
Consultative Committee provided a forum between the signatory states, held in 
confidence, where issues of implementation, compliance, or ambiguities in the treaty 
itself could be identified and addressed. Effectiveness of the committee had been 
periodically challenged, most notably by the Reagan Administration. The evidence of 
specific instances where the Standing Consultative Committee was able to raise and 
resolve significant issues indicates the gains may have outweighed the alternative of 
some other arrangement. Other later agreements which did not have similar committees 
were not as effective and in one instance, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF), the United States would have to request one be implemented.12 
The Standing Consultative Committee was of particular importance to support the 
requirement for a formal review of the treaty every five years as set out in Article XIV. 
The Standing Consultative Committee continued to meet at least twice annually and at 
each five year review reconfirmed the parties' intent to continue their commitment to the 
"aims and objectives of the treaty" and that the Standing Consultative Committee was the 
appropriate forum to continue to promote the provisions of the agreement. The Standing 
1 "^  
Consultative Committee did so for thirty years until the U.S. withdrawal in 2002. The 
lasting value of the Standing Consultative Committee from a normative perspective was 
its ability to increase transparency, build trust between the negotiators and facilitate 
knowledgeable and orderly reviews of the treaty at regular intervals. The value of the 
Standing Consultative Committee was not likely fully appreciated until it no longer 
existed. One could speculate that the difficulties experienced the recent new START 
negotiations as evidenced by the failure to reach an agreement before START I expired 
might have been lessened had the Standing Consultative Committee still existed. 
A number of issues from the ABM Treaty era impacted the overall arms control 
environment and provide insights that remain applicable for future arms control and 
disarmament efforts. Technology advancements had a significant impact on the treaty 
over time. Leadership statements and changes in personalities and policies were at times 
12
 Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security, 77. 
13
 Ibid., 168. Bunn provides a summary of the six major follow on agreements reached between 
the parties which included issues of procedures for replacing ABM components, statements of mutual 
agreement of the successful operation of the treaty, and the controversial Soviet radar at Kamchatka. 
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supporting and others damaging to the image of the treaty within elites as well as public 
support for its approval and continuance. Linkage of arms control efforts like the ABM 
Treaty and the companion SALT agreements to follow to other issues and events was a 
frequent occurrence which often significantly damaged the painstaking work of the 
negotiations and almost negated the Senate vote for ratification. 
From a technology perspective, the inability of the ABM systems and the treaty 
itself to fully satisfy each state's concerns related to MIRVs proved a major liability in 
the long run, at first for the Soviets and later the United States as well. The frequent 
problem of each state's leader making public statements in an attempt to leverage the 
other's actions frequently set back negotiations and accelerated development of newer 
systems. One example was President Johnson's miscommunications with Soviet Premier 
Kosygin in 1967 resulting in a delay in further arms control talks until the Nixon 
Administration and a delay in an approval to build the U.S. ABM system, both actions 
that would have long term impacts on the strategic environment. Others included halts in 
negotiations on various agreements whenever the Soviets either were unresponsive to 
U.S. interests in Vietnam or invaded another country such as Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 
Afghanistan in 1979. Leadership policies and public statements frequently had a direct 
and negative impact on negotiations. The result in the case of the ABM Treaty was a one 
vote majority in the U.S. Senate in favor of ratification. 
The ABM Treaty would have theoretically kept offensive systems deployments 
limited and prevented a defensive arms race. Unfortunately, theory does not fully explain 
later U.S. and Soviet offensive buildups except as a product of the limitation of bilateral 
agreements. If two states are unable to build additional trust and lengthen the shadow of 
the future, each will likely choose to match the other step for step in offensive weapons 
and seek to cheat on defensive systems as well. The history of the 1970s and 1980s 
would seem to provide adequate evidence of the negative impact of the security dilemma. 
The rise of SDI can be explained as a result of basic distrust of the Soviets that their 
"adventures" and expansion of offensive strategic arms did little to abate. On the Soviet 
side, below the state leadership level, scientists raised doubt about the effectiveness of 
SDI but their distrust of the United States was equally powerful. As a result both states 
hedged and continued both defensive and offensive nuclear systems development and 
deployments through the 1980's. Elites within both states emerged to drive state policy 
making toward short-term state interests which did not follow the norm of the original 
agreement. 
ABM ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The history of the ABM Treaty provides an example of the weaknesses inherent 
in a bilateral security treaty. The binding effects of multiple states interacting as occurs 
within the NPT is absent in these types of agreements. International relations theory 
rooted in realist assumptions is similarly less capable of explaining the activities below 
the state level that can extend and strengthen or weaken and destroy such agreements. 
The third case study explores the follow-on strategic arms agreements further on this 
point showing that despite leadership willingness, future agreements tended to be less 
specific and therefore less binding than the ABM Treaty. Realist based theory would 
support the concept of protection of state interests through self help but offer no ability to 
reach a less Hobbsian solution set in the long term. 
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If states prefer bilateral agreements that rely on mutual trust to work, then one 
must ask what additional "glue" might be useful to sustain the relationship. Governments 
are subject to changes in political will as their leadership and domestic support changes. 
The closeness of the vote to ratify the ABM Treaty as well as the shifting policy stances 
of subsequent leaders in both states bear witness to this issue. Short of seeking a 
multilateral approach to future agreements, states could consider the value added of 
widening the contact between government and non-government elites within and between 
the states. These groups, both formal and informal, increase the opportunities for 
improved transparency and trust below the level of the state. Confidence building 
measures and information exchanges on the nuclear issue would reduce the opportunities 
for negative competition on security and economic issues related to weapons and electric 
power generation. This trust building system of networks can be fostered by third party 
states as well as international institutions.14 
Due in part to today's changed and increasingly robust transnational or globalized 
environment, new explanations beyond traditional realist views are emerging. Security 
dilemma or power-based explanations from the Cold War period are useful to explain the 
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM in 2002 if one substitutes another state such as North 
Korea or Iran for the Soviet Union. But what power-based theory explains the almost 
immediate and continuing loss of respect for the new Russia on the part of the United 
States and the west? Once the direct confrontation ended, a developing knowledge based 
relationship between the two Cold War foes was all but abandoned. The conclusion one 
14
 One example of cooperation on research sponsored by both governments but at the academic 
level is the Joint Coordinating Committee for Radiation Effects Research (JCCER) sponsored in the U.S. 
by the Department of Energy. The Committee is focused on assisting efforts in the Russian Federation to 
study the long term effects of nuclear radiation. Established in 1994 and renewed through 2009, this is the 
first large study on the subject since the post war studies on Japanese survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
262 
could draw is the United States slowly began to act as if a non-threatening Russia no 
longer mattered. Certainly the commonly held belief that the United States was the "sole 
remaining superpower" could not have been useful to a new relationship. After the Cold 
War ended, the United States by its action if not statements indicated that Russia were no 
longer central to matters of international security or U.S. security interests. If they were 
not longer a threat then there was no need to negotiate anything more than a protocol on 
arms reductions. 
If the one feature from the ABM Treaty that is in common with the NPT, a review 
forum such as the Standing Consultative Committee, could be adapted and included in all 
bilateral agreements along with an inspection and verification protocol administered by 
the IAEA, then a bilateral agreement would more likely to succeed and endure. The 
history of the ABM clearly demonstrates the power of individuals to both positively and 
negatively influence the success and failures of a bilateral agreement as well as the limits 
of power-based theories to explain state behavior. Theories that explain interaction 
between states below the state level are not new but need to be reexamined in an effort to 
better describe how states deal with a security "hangover" from a now passed era. A 
worthy research effort would seek to explain how to get states to accept and sustain 
bilateral agreements that were assisted by third parties such as states, institutions and 
non-government organizations. 
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SORT TO START: THE SLOW DECLINE OF BOTH NUCLEAR ARMS AND ARMS 
CONTROL 
The legacy of the more than four decades of negotiations on strategic offensive 
weapons between the United States and Russia continues to be in development. These 
bilateral agreements have resulted in an effective foundation for slowing and reversing 
the once growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons that together still account for 95% of the 
world's supply. The latest chapter of the saga includes the effort to determine how to 
extend and lower the START I limits. These discussions took on increased intensity as 
the expiration date for START I passed in December 2009. Each state is committed to 
achieving the limits proposed under SORT of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads by 
December 31, 2012. The limits from the new START agreement signed in April 2010 are 
some 650 warheads less than START I and a cut of 50% of the remaining launchers to 
800. 15 The common interest that drove both the Cold War arms races and the parallel 
15
 Tom Z. Collina, "U.S. Russia Poised for Arsenal Cuts," Arms Control Association website, 
December 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009 12/USRussiaArsenalCuts (accessed February 3, 2010). 
Collina reports that the new START treaty will "significantly tighten bilateral limits on the number of 
strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles each side can deploy. Under START and the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), Russia and the United States are limited to deploying 2,200 strategic 
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With regard to deployed strategic warheads, the Department of State reported in July 2009 that the United 
States had met its SORT limit of 2,200 three years early. Russia is believed to have about 2,800 warheads, 
according to independent estimates." To meet these new limits, the U.S. would be reducing warheads by 
almost 30% and Russia by 42%. Collina reports the "new limit of 800 strategic delivery vehicles (long-
range missiles and bombers) will not directly affect current forces because Russia and the United States are 
at or below these limits already. The United States is believed to deploy about 800 (the same number 
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each. Reflecting these preferences, Russia originally proposed that the two sides agree to keep only 500 
launchers apiece, while the United States first proposed 1,100." 
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arms control efforts were the states desires to protect their population from the perceived 
threat of the other. Each state at times believed the other would strike first and even when 
this was not a primary concern, they continued to both modernize and negotiate to control 
each other's nuclear arsenal. This common interest to control each other's arsenal began 
with the Partial Test Ban Treaty and continues through the current SORT and post-
START III negotiations. In the long view, these states have committed to a long term 
arrangement that could lead to complete nuclear disarmament. Most importantly, the 
continuation toward the goal by these states remains essential as they provide an 
appropriate example for other states to follow.16 
The history of the strategic arms negotiations contains a number of technical 
issues that became the key problem areas for all negotiations: technical advances that 
challenged the other side's ability to monitor them and drove decisions to compete, 
restrictions on systems were never fully encompassing until the INF Treaty, no other 
states were limited in any way, national leadership and domestic politics were a constant 
factor on progress and approval. Each of these issues presented separate but related 
difficulties to achieving a lasting and comprehensive treaty. As a result, each succeeding 
agreement whether ratified or not by the states legislatures reflected the realities of the 
moment. In the end, nuclear arsenals were reduced over time from the massive heights of 
the Cold War but remain far larger than any other states and still present significant 
challenges to the required monitoring, security and verification processes. 
As the Cold War progressed, both the United States and U.S.S.R. were presented 
with the issue of how to monitor the other's development and deployment of strategic 
16
 For an assessment of the new START agreement, see Daryl G. Kimball, "New START Good 
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nuclear systems. National technical means, the use of aircraft and later satellites as well 
as other systems, provided sufficient awareness and verification of each state's efforts. 
Construction of missile silos and submarines were relatively easy subjects to monitor. 
With the introduction of MIRVs, cruise missiles and increasingly more stealthy 
submarines, these monitoring systems could no longer determine exactly how many 
weapons either side might have available. Inspection and verification became 
increasingly more important and equally resisted by each state. 
Each of the negotiations of this era focused limiting specific systems but did not 
fully restrict all delivery platforms specifically heavy bombers, cruise missiles, and 
MIRVs. Early on in the period, submarines were also a focus of the Soviets while 
limiting heavy ICBMs captured U.S. attention. Negotiations often were delayed or 
stopped over specific details of these systems often as each side sought to either buy time 
for their own counter program or to slow development and deployment of the other states 
system that they had no rival. At the same time, technology can provide a means of 
deepening a bilateral security arrangement between antagonists. 
In 1962, the United States and the Soviets saw the importance of having 
permanent and effective open lines of communications to prevent a crisis from escalating. 
The implementation of the "hot line" after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the follow on 
"Hotline Agreement" provided a significant example for other states to follow. Today 
there are similar arrangements between most of the P5 states. India and Pakistan have had 
one in place since 2004 and are interested in expanding discussions on nuclear issues to 
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include all of the nuclear states.17 The U.S. and Russian hotline continues to exist and has 
been repeatedly upgraded as communications have advanced over the years.18 
State leadership always played a central role in the strategic arms control process 
from initiation to approval or rejection of agreements. SALT II was the obvious follow 
on to the initial agreements in 1972 that required significant adjustments and would 
continue to lower the levels of each side's weapons. Domestic political environments, 
particularly the U.S. 1976 Presidential election, would prove too difficult for state leaders 
to overcome in order achieve agreement. Of particular concern on the U.S. side was how 
to go forward with an agreement if intrusive verification in addition to NTM could not be 
a part of the treaty. Negative perception of Soviet activities overseas and their increasing 
production and deployment of nuclear systems within the United States ultimately proved 
impossible to overcome. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the key event 
that caused the United States to withdraw from further consideration of any agreement. 
This shadow would cement the U.S. negative view of arms control for the next five years, 
the period during which President Reagan initiated SDI and called the Soviet Union an 
"evil empire." The security dilemma enhanced by distrust of the other state's motives 
remained a powerful explanation for the weakness of a bilateral agreement process. 
The U.S. and Soviet relationship became so dysfunctional as to cause an eighteen 
month break in negotiations on the INF and START. April Carter's analysis of strategic 
arms control negotiations of this period places the responsibility for the impasse with the 
states' leaders. Each was actively using every opportunity to trade propaganda missiles 
17
 Jawed Naqvi, "Nuclear hotline to be set up: Pakistan, India to continue test ban," Dawn Internet 
Edition, June 21, 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/21/topl.com (accessed February, 4, 2010). 
18
 Another joint effort to improve coordination on nuclear issues was initiated in 1999 establishing 
temporary monitoring capability to guard against any impacts of the anticipated year 2000 computer issue. 
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with each other. The negotiations before this moment were conducted in an appropriate 
manner however; the national leaders chose to be "essentially bargaining in public."19 
Once the two negotiations were combined and restarted after the Soviet leadership 
changed with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, progress was rapid. The danger in a national 
leader tying a separate issue to arms control negotiations in an effort to leverage the other 
state to move on both lies in the potential of a failure to gain anything in either. This 
problem can be heightened when national leadership tries to communicate through the 
press. 
Another significant aspect of this era is the impact of ideas on national leadership. 
Both Reagan and Gorbachev held similar personal views of their roles as leaders within 
their states and on the utility of nuclear weapons. Each saw themselves as an agent of 
change to lead their nation into the future. Reagan sought to strengthen the United States 
through a rebuilding of public confidence through a rebuilt military. In his view, America 
should always negotiate from a position of strength. He also saw that nuclear weapons 
were a part of that strength but at the same time believed they unnecessarily held the 
ability to destroy mankind. Gorbachev had similar views but his main concern was to 
reform the Soviet system to better survive in the emerging globalized world. He also saw 
no use for nuclear weapons in this new world. Interestingly, SDI was in the end the only 
issue that prevented agreement to fully disarm in 1986 at Reykjavik.20 The impact of 
these individuals on their systems, the opposing state, and the international system in 
terms of changing the status quo was significant and not well explained by traditional 
power based international relations theories. 
19
 Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations, 198. 
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House, 2005), 246. 
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The INF Treaty provided the bridge to reestablishing offensive arms control as an 
appropriate venue for interaction between the United States and the Soviets. Key 
elements of the INF Treaty that would provide lasting value for future agreements 
included improved verification methods and on-site inspections. START I verifications 
methods and protocols remained in place and active for the 25 year period of the 
agreement until the expiration in December 2009. So successful was the INF 
breakthrough, the spirit of eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons directly 
impacted the state leaders as they met in Reykjavik in 1986. The opportunity to go 
beyond partial reductions in nuclear systems over time and eliminate all weapons with 
one agreement was briefly and now famously offered at this summit. In the end, this leap 
of faith was too difficult to accept. The Soviet leader also passed on the offer to share 
SDI technology which could have possible opened lines of communication and education 
previously unimaginable. In the end, the tie of nuclear capability to the state's conception 
of power proved too strong a bond to break even when personal beliefs might have 
suggested another path. These lost opportunities and concerns over further restricting of 
Soviet strategic arms would result in the INF Treaty being the last agreement of the 
Soviet era. Momentum for further agreements was slowed by a continuing lack of trust 
between the two states.21 
With the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and 
Russia was different and the succeeding agreements reflected the dramatic shift in the 
international environment. These agreements beginning with START I continued the 
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trend to reduce strategic arms but with far less other constraints than during the Cold War 
period. START I was deferred in Reagan's term but would eventually be approved and 
reductions fully completed by December 2001. Key to this agreement was the use of on-
site inspections, information exchanges and national technical means all of which 
remained in place until shortly after the expiration of the treaty in December 2009. At a 
July 2009 summit in Moscow, the U.S. and Russian presidents agreed to continue to 
negotiate even after the treaty expired if necessary in order to conclude a follow-on 
agreement. By April 2010, a new START agreement would be signed and awaiting 
ratification. 
START II achieved the long elusive goal of limiting MIRVs and had a range to 
limit warheads vice a specific number each had to reach. Although never entering into 
force, START II was a demonstration of the willingness of the states to continue the 
dialog despite the dramatic political changes taking place in Russia. Later issues with 
U.S. unwillingness to accept Russian requests for amendments to the ABM Treaty as a 
precondition to the Duma's allowing the treaty to go into force caused President Clinton 
to decide to not risk a failure to ratify the agreement in the Senate. The unilateral U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty ended any chance of START II surviving. 
START III would have established another lower level for deployed warheads at 
2,000 to 2,500 but it would never enter into force due to the demise of START II. In a 
significant development in the negotiations, for the first time in an offensive arm treaty 
language was included to destroy delivery vehicles and warheads in an effort "to promote 
the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the 
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number of warheads."22 Initially discussed in START II, the concept of limiting systems, 
while allowing modernization, became a part of START III establishing both reductions 
and hedge for the future. In the end, both states lowered their arsenals for mostly 
economic reasons. The START agreements were most valuable as they opened the door 
to increased transparency in verification and irreversible reductions. 
During the George W. Bush presidency, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
caused a dramatic shift away from a slow fading of Cold War relationships. Concerns 
about terrorist groups dominated the security thinking of this administration. Chief 
among these concerns was the potential for terrorist acquisition and use of a nuclear 
device. Additionally, two U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews, in particular the 2002 review, 
identified the People's Republic of China and Russia as "plausible" nuclear 
contingencies. This assessment may have been useful for domestic military budgeting 
and policy reasons, the subjects of these comments were negatively energized by them. 
Further actions by the Bush Administration in terms of strategic arms control negotiations 
made plain the U.S. view on arms control had shifted. Specifically during this period, the 
United States was insisting on storage of warheads removed from deployment vice 
destruction as had been done in earlier agreements. The United States also insisted on 
less restrictive rules on weapons counting, development and deployment. 
This swing to a more realist stance on the part of the United States would result in 
a far less productive relationship. One example of this environment was the START 
Bilateral Implementation Commission that unlike the SALT era Standing Consultative 
Committee was unusable without agenda or verification protocol. Verification protocols 
22
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became subject to continuing discussion without any specific set of rules becoming a part 
of the SORT process. One positive aspect of this era was growing levels of cooperation 
through the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. With a change in U.S. 
Administrations and the expiration of START I, a renewed emphasis on continuing to 
eliminate nuclear weapons has energized both states to support negotiations as well as 
widen and reenergize the international discussion on the nuclear issue. 
ARMS RACES LEGACY 
One of the major features of the Cold War, nuclear arms races remain a serious 
concern especially among those states with regional security concerns and limited 
conventional means. While the scale of confrontation between regional competitors who 
do not have the resources to rebuild the enormous nuclear arsenals of the Cold War, the 
risk of repeating a similar condition with billions of people in the target zones should be 
avoided with every means available to the non-proliferation and disarmament movement. 
As the decision logics of the Cold War still hold great power for those who may not 
understand the costs, the cost of miscalculation with nuclear weapons due to traditional 
hatreds is far higher than during the past. 
A portion of this case study, the period from 1967 to the end of the Cold War in 
1991, encapsulates the largest arms race in human history in terms of cost, lethality and 
difficulty to control and reverse. The post Cold War period provides both a period of 
strategic drift in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet state and its allies 
and a return to threat focused policy formation and use of force to respond to aggression 
after September 11, 2001. What does emerge from the post Cold War period continuing 
until the current U.S. Administration is the devaluation of the strategic relationship that 
existed between the Cold War superpowers. Despite the disparity in economic terms and 
incomplete transformation of the Soviet state to viable western style democratic nation, 
Russia remains key to the nuclear agenda and essential to achievement of additional arms 
control and non-proliferation goals. The United States and Russia have an obligation to 
educate and dissuade other state elites from replicating the past. 
The theoretical debate of more nuclear weapons in more states yields stability in 
the international security environment is difficult to support given the recent history of 
states rejecting these weapons. One could argue that the current concerns over the 
emerging nuclear states have their roots in the unresolved disarmament of the NPT 
nuclear weapons states. Other explanations for the drive for nuclear capability by a 
growing number of states, North Korea and Iran being the latest examples, see these 
states' nuclear desires tied to issues of sovereignty, extant or perceived extant threats, 
regional hegemonic aspirations or a combination of these. Within each of these situations 
lies both the potential for continued horizontal and vertical proliferation. 
The Waltz and Sagan proliferation debate highlights a number of explanations for 
why states acquire nuclear weapons that are useful in understanding the current nuclear 
environment.23 Waltz's explanation as one would expect is framed in a realist tradition. 
States are socialized by an anarchical system marked by each approaching its security 
concerns in a "self-help" fashion. In this system, states accept that the balance of terror is 
a permanent condition. States act with rational behavior in this anarchical system seek to 
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maintain the balance with nuclear arms being the ultimate expression of a state's ability 
to secure itself. In Sagan's view, deterrence, long a prominent feature of the Cold War, 
has been replaced by pre-emption and counter-proliferation activities, with the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq being the most prominent example. In addition to purely security 
reasons, Sagan suggests states acquire nuclear weapons to satisfy domestic political or 
bureaucratic struggles. Economic considerations are another possibility using logic 
similar to that used by the U.S. military in the 1950's where nuclear forces were the 
"answer" to winning wars more cheaply than conventional forces. States look to nuclear 
weapons to gain leverage in foreign affairs, to legitimize their power in the eyes of both 
domestic and foreign audiences. Nuclear weapons provide states with prestige and 
respect for seeking to be a modern nation capable of scientific achievements on a level 
with other "great" powers. Although each of these rationalizations for seeking nuclear 
power may be seen as legitimate, the increased risk of escalation to war, a nuclear 
accident, theft or support to non-state groups in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons is 
the most likely result of increased horizontal nuclear proliferation. 
Security, domestic politics, norms based explanations such as prestige of nuclear 
weapons shaping a state's self-image all offer interesting if incomplete explanations for 
the utility of nuclear weapons in the increasingly globalized international environment. 
This terrorist challenge was not considered significant in the Cold War but has become 
the central focus of the renewed nuclear non-proliferation and arms control agenda led by 
the United States. Ultimately, states must work together to negate the nuclear terrorist 
threat. 
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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
This long history of bilateral if imperfect negotiations seeking to control and 
reduce strategic offensive nuclear arms offers a numbers of valuable insights for both 
theory and future negotiations. First, bilateral negotiations and agreements rise and fall on 
the strength of the relationship between the party states. Any change in attitude or 
behavior in one or both of the states can have a profound (and usually negative) impact 
on both short term discussions and long term results. This simple fact accounts for the 
frequent rise in distrust of motives and actions of both states featured in the strategic arms 
control case study. The concerns of other states while frequently considered in the 
broader nuclear and security considerations of these two superpowers but were not 
offered the opportunity to directly impact them. With the passing of the Soviet state, the 
realist or power-based theories of how arms control relations worked began to lose their 
explanatory power but not their hold on states and their security thinking. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. view of extant threat 
shifted or more appropriately was refocused primarily on the possibility of a non-state 
actor attack with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, the 
deterrence calculus of the Cold War error does not fit well below the state level of 
analysis. How does a state threaten retaliation in kind when targeting of the aggressor is 
impossible to accurately be accomplished? Can a state retaliate on a non-state actor inside 
another sovereign state? If so, nuclear weapons are not likely the response of choice. The 
changing and expanding globalization of international relations and commerce may also 
have negated the legitimacy or utility of nuclear weapons themselves. If citizens from a 
non-belligerent state are caught in the potential impact area or are subject to fallout from 
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nuclear exchanges, what rights do they have to object or intervene a priori? The answer 
would seem to be found in multilateral discussions vice bilateral talks. 
The shifted security environment of the post-9/11 world combined with the rapid 
globalization of communications and commerce likely has reduced the explanatory power 
of theories that fit the security environment of the Cold War. The weaknesses in these 
theories was hidden during the immediate post Cold War period but now the balance 
between them and more normative based explanations may have shifted. If smaller 
power states are able to capture the non-proliferation agenda by shifting the discussion to 
one based on the legality and morality of nuclear weapons, nuclear states will be unable 
to so easily ignore them absent an extant and plausible threat. The era of any state 
selecting to build a massive nuclear arsenal of a size beyond a few hundred weapons has 
passed but not without leaving a lingering shadow on the international security landscape. 
The next set of negotiations beyond the new START agreement that builds on to START 
I and SORT is likely to bring the other nuclear weapons states into the global lens. While 
a discussion at the level of the P5 plus India and Pakistan would be useful and likely 
more able to bond the participants to the NPT norms, a wider involvement of undeclared, 
emergent nuclear states and the rest of the international community will be needed to 
achieve the stated goals of United States and Russia as well as the NPT, total 
disarmament. 
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NEW FRAMEWORK FOR MERGING ARMS CONTROL AND NON-
PROLIFERATION 
Three central findings have emerged from this research. First, multilateral treaties 
that establish an issue based regime, like the NPT, tend to be difficult to achieve initially, 
if properly developed around an appropriate set of rules and norms, and reviewed 
frequently and equitably, will last significantly longer than bilateral treaties among 
powerful states. Second, for any international agreement on nuclear weapons to succeed, 
it must be supported by the United States. Finally, power-based international relations 
theories seem to be losing their explanatory power in the increasingly globalized 
environment of the post Cold War world while normative theories have yet to completely 
replace them. A significant factor in the issue area of nuclear disarmament is the merging 
of arms control efforts into the overall non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. 
In an effort to bridge the gap between the two schools of international relations 
that bear on the nuclear issue area, this research suggests the formation of a hybrid theory 
which provides the potential to allow nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states including emergent or undeclared nuclear states to develop a more frequent 
multilateral dialog to support efforts to achieve the goals of the NPT. First, the issue of 
eventual extinction of nuclear weapons has clearly been decided as early as 1970. Even 
the non-signatories of the NPT have from time to time indicated their willingness to 
eliminate nuclear weapons under the assumption that the regional issues that placed them 
in the security dilemmas driving their requirements for the weapons are resolved. The 
majority of the world's states do not possess any nuclear capabilities either for security or 
electric power generation. Most of the world's states do not face an extant security threat 
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and as a result have no need for nuclear weapons. So how does one resolve the issue of 
the needs of the few outweighing the needs of the rest? 
A framework that explains the need to eliminate nuclear weapons would have to 
be able to explain the requirement in a power-based way for nuclear weapons states and 
regionally threatened states while adding in normative based procedures that provide 
appropriate transparency and irreversibility to reassure the rest of the international 
system. As an example of initial steps taken by the United States and Russia, efforts like 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, offer appropriate economics 
based incentives to comply with treaty requirements while building a sufficient level of 
trust between the participants. Removal of the Libyan WMD programs under 
international supervision is another example. States have to see the alignment of short-
term interests with long term international goals in order to decide to comply with 
established multilateral norms. Regardless of the internal rationale for making the 
decision to disarm, the international community must be prepared to support that decision 
in the long term. Financial and political incentives are likely key to such efforts. 
Nuclear weapons states like the P5 will find it difficult to disarm without 
sufficient mutually reinforcing behaviors on the part of the other states. For example, the 
United States would have to refrain from attempting to describe China or Russia as a 
potential military competitor in such documents like its Nuclear Policy Review. The 
recently completed 2010 Nuclear Policy Review is far more nuanced in describing 
potential adversaries than previous reviews. De-alerting nuclear forces and allowing 
IAEA or at least bilateral confidence building, inspection and verification efforts to 
become routine practices among all nuclear states would be essential to advancing toward 
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the NPT goal. Support for these activities is well within the power-based side of 
international relations theory and are proven methods that were used in completion of the 
INF Treaty as well as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty provides a better fit for any multilateral nuclear disarmament 
program than the bilateral INF Treaty. 
The non-nuclear weapons states would provide a ready pool of support for the 
development of additional inspectors and negotiators who could offer and insist on 
changes to strengthen the NPT. Efforts in the past have been stalled by nuclear weapons 
states that were for a number of reasons unable or unwilling to commit to changes that 
did not seem to reassure them that the potential for cheating was eliminated. Given the far 
more integrated international environment, efforts to educate state elites on the history, 
theory and implications of nuclear weapons to all states are likely far more influential and 
simplified than during the Cold War. In a recent NPT Review workshop held in the 
Philippines, the Republic's Foreign Secretary expressed concern for the need to work for 
an improved NPT in order " to benefit Filipinos, especially those living and working 
overseas." 
His nation was proud to lead the effort "because it is in our national interest to 
strive for a world free from the threat of these devastating and inhumane weapons. There 
is not a single corner in this small world of ours where you will not find a Filipino who 
could be adversely affected with the use of nuclear weapons."24 This view is likely felt by 
a majority of non-nuclear weapons states and contains both the norm of disarmament 
enshrined in the NPT as well as alignment of state interest in protecting its people from 
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nuclear threats without using military force as a response. Leadership in the NPT Review 
by a non-nuclear weapons state is a significant opportunity for the normative focused 
states to engage the nuclear weapons states in a common effort to disarm. Support in this 
effort from the United States and other nuclear weapons states will be critical. Access to 
other states academic research, historical studies, as well as cultural experiences that 
would help states with little knowledge of the impact of nuclear weapons both from a 
security or power based perspective as well as a societal or social impact such as that of 
the Japanese, Russians and Americans. Reform of the United Nations Security Council to 
allow increased influence of states with a normative view of security issues might be 
another important step toward the goals of the UN Charter and NPT. 
Full U.S. support to the NPT community and its goal of total disarmament would 
have to be a prerequisite to the required further bonding of all states to the norms of this 
regime. From the NPT's initiation through each of its key stages including the 1995 
decision to permanently extend its mandate, each positive step has occurred with the full 
support of the United States. The current difficulties in further solidifying the treaty's 
norms have also been in part due to incomplete U.S. support for these initiatives. The 
upcoming 2010 NPT Review will likely succeed or fail on U.S. support for any 
recommended changes. The U.S. sponsored initiatives spring from President Obama's 
April 2009 Prague speech provide growing reason for optimism. 
A security regime that is strengthened by universal state acceptance and 
evidenced by state behavior in compliance with its rules and norms is seen to be 
providing a needed public good to participating states. How states' view of their future in 
terms of security is important to how they will likely behave in reaction to this view. 
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Robert Axelrod's description of cooperation among states or "lengthening the shadow of 
the future" is useful for both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states in 
terms of how they will view future NPT efforts. The United States must seek to reinforce 
the NPT through a range of activities that both reduce the threat of a nuclear event in the 
near term and eventually eliminate it altogether thus lengthening the shadow of the future 
for all states. The public goods that this leadership would produce include freedom from 
nuclear threats, attacks or accidents as well as opening up the opportunities for economic 
benefits that come from nuclear power based electricity production. The United States 
has the requisite position and power to help all states adjust their cost versus benefit 
calculation of trading in weapons for economic property and the security that comes with 
increased wealth. Similarly, the United States should continue the tradition of bilateral 
negotiations with Russia until these states' arsenals reach an equivalent level with the 
other nuclear weapons states when an increasingly multilateral negotiation under the NPT 
norms should be developed. 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined the hypothesis that the United States must reassert 
a position of leadership through multilateral cooperation to develop appropriate nuclear 
arms policies that effectively reestablish worldwide controls, continue reduction of 
nuclear arms toward the NPT goal of nuclear disarmament. Without the development of a 
set of U.S. national policies to support the reestablishment and sustainment an 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, U.S. attempts at leadership in the nuclear 
issue area will not likely be fully effective and are likely to result in a continuation of the 
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weakened nuclear non-proliferation regime. Without significant renewed efforts to do so, 
the United States and its allies will likely be faced with increasingly complex and 
persistent challenges to the nuclear "rules of the road." From a social science perspective, 
this study examined the interaction of international nuclear treaties as a dependent 
variable and U.S. leadership in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation as an 
independent variable. Specifically, this study is based on the idea that the degree to 
which the United States forms and implements effective policies that lead to participation 
in nuclear arms control will result in a direct, positive enhancement of international 
security from the threat of renewed proliferation and potential use of nuclear weapons. 
Said another way, states will more likely adhere to a nuclear arms control regime, 
rejecting the pursuit of nuclear arms as the United States increases its participation in 
nuclear arms control and disarmament. One key finding of this research is the inherent 
weaknesses of bilateral treaties should lead states to overcome the difficulty of 
establishing multilateral agreements on nuclear arms. Bilateral treaties can serve as an 
important building block for multilateral efforts toward disarmament but must eventually 
be widened to include more states. One can envision the nuclear issues consolidated into 
a single regime where Jervis' definition, "those principles, rules, and norms that permit 
nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate."25 
These issues can and should be treated together in order to reach a level of cooperation 
that is more than operationalizing short-term interest of certain states as Jervis suggests. 
The case studies provide evidence that power does still matter but states can and 
should consider the long term implications of placing their pursuit for relative gains for 
their individual security in the short run over the absolute gains such as disarmament 
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provides to all states. Recent statements of the President and Vice President backed by 
actions such as the new START agreement and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
indicate that the United States is once re-energizing U.S. Nuclear Arms Policy and acting 
as a leader in the international community toward the NPT goals. If one accepts as the 
NPT preamble statements, "Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the 
danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing 
that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear 
war," then given the current security environment, a rational acting nuclear weapons 
states would have difficulty seeing the requirement for nuclear weapons on purely 
security concerns. Additionally, if one accepts the power of one state to influence the 
nuclear issue area as dramatically as the United States has, then one should expect other 
states including Russia also seek to influence as well. What is needed in this era of 
globalization where polarity has decreasing explanatory power is an agenda set by one of 
the more powerful states that can lead others to cooperate and ultimately engage all states 
in a common goal, in this case nuclear arms reduction leading to disarmament. This 
research has suggested both a theoretical and a practical framework for achieving the 
non-proliferation goals of the NPT, a stated goal of all but a handful of states and now the 
restated goal of the United States. Additionally, this research suggests that the existing 
bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia provides a useful example of 
cooperation below the multilateral level that can be useful in setting an example for other 
states to follow on reducing the value each place on nuclear weapons as a part of their 
national security policies. 
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RE-ENERGIZED U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
SUSTAINED PROGRESS 
Recent events and activities, primarily from the United States, are both a positive 
indication of a return to the unfinished business of the post Cold War and an awakening 
of the international community of the requirement to complete the work of the NPT. The 
Obama Administration as this dissertation suggests is best positioned to lead multilateral 
effort to eliminate nuclear weapons and can serve as facilitator of increased dialog 
between power and normative framed states. The United States in the last year has called 
for a renewed agenda of arms control and non-proliferation leading toward eventual 
disarmament beginning with President Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague and 
continuing through the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. This short period has 
witnessed a new START Treaty being signed by the U.S. and Russian presidents, the 
completion of the third U.S. Nuclear Posture Review which called for a renewed focus on 
non-proliferation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an unprecedented U.S. hosted Nuclear 
Security Summit where 47 nations committed to securing the world's nuclear material 
within the next four years and the NPT Review Conference. After more than a decade of 
little to no progress on nuclear arms control and a number of disturbing developments in 
proliferation of nuclear technology and even nuclear testing, this renewed focus on the 
nuclear issue is both supported by this research and cautiously welcomed by the 
international community. What remains to be seen is whether or not these steps will 
continue to build into a sustained march toward the NPT goals. If the United States is to 
retain its leadership position as this research recommends, a broader policy framework 
which includes the current U.S. stated policies and more is required. 
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The United States will need to work to reinforce and sustain non-proliferation 
regime which is the foundation of the needed actions required to achieve nuclear 
disarmament and to assist the international environment to remain "nuclear arms free." 
As a part of this effort, the United States will need to simultaneously support overall 
security of all states while improving bilateral relations with Russia and China in order to 
gain their cooperation on regional issues. This is both a part of the President's stated 
policy from the Prague Speech and is a prominent part of the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review. As this dissertation argues, the United States as the "strongest" power based 
(neorealist framed) state, is best equipped to assist in increasing complex interdependence 
among both power based and normative states. This unique position also provides the 
United States with opportunities to offer solutions to regional security issues in 
cooperation with other power based states like Russia and China. The central focus of the 
U.S. effort should be to lengthen the shadow of the future for power based states such as 
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea as well as their neighbors. As the level 
of nuclear arms held by the United States and Russia falls to a level nearly equal to the 
other major nuclear weapons states, the regional issues become the only significant state 
level security concerns that would prompt their elites to require nuclear weapons as a 
counter to those threats. At time unique but multilateral formations of states such as those 
currently dealing with the Iranian and North Korean issues will be required with support 
of the United States key to their success. 
Even if successful in developing consensus among power based states, the United 
States will have to also offer support to normative based states (neoliberal institutionalist 
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framed) through appropriate for a which will remind power based states of their 
international obligations and the benefits available in other areas than military security 
from cooperation. If the United States is successful in dealing with only a limited amount 
of states on both nuclear issues and regional conflicts, those normative based states that 
do not see any benefits could potentially determine that a change to power based views 
and associated military solutions is the best means of lengthening their shadows of the 
future. As the world's largest economic power, the United States, despite its current 
economic downturn, is most able to leverage its substantial economic and political power 
to limit the requirement for military power in these states. While the advantages of 
conventional military power will likely become more apparent as nuclear weapons are 
eliminated, the United States will need to become adept at leveraging the rising 
international credibility gained from all efforts to shift the international community from 
conflict to cooperation. The series of activities on nuclear issues currently underway 
should eventually result in the United States being recognized as the only state to have 
recently offered a public plan to reach nuclear disarmament and acted on those stated 
intentions. This state leadership should result in the United States gaining international 
moral authority and respect reversing a decade of decline in both. 
ENGAGING RUSSIA AND CHINA: KEY TO MULTILATERAL SUCCESS 
To succeed in shifting the international agenda from primarily focusing on 
security threats which nuclear weapons represent the ultimate response to them, the 
United States will need to continue to engage Russia and China. As has been argued in 
this dissertation, the return to prominence of arms control between Russia and the United 
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States will likely have the beneficial impact of restoring a long neglected strategic 
relationship formerly between opponents. As the United States considers how to continue 
to engage Russia, the renewed relationship should be update to an appropriate form that 
fits with the current environment. From a security perspective, the United States needs to 
assist its NATO Allies to develop a more useful relationship with Russia as has been 
suggested by the NATO Secretary General.27 If multilateral security relationships as 
successful as NATO have had normalizing impacts on its members, then adding Russia to 
the seats at the table in Brussels would seem an appropriate goal. If the Alliance remains 
distrustful of the Russia's policies, then the price of admission should reflect the changes 
desired on the part of both Russia and its members alike. Without some willingness to 
incorporate Russia into the "Euro defense" discussion in a serious and permanent way, 
continued divergence on both policy and action will most likely continue. This effort also 
would have significant advantages when the focus is shifted to resolving other regional 
conflicts as Russia is a part of the equation in virtually every one of them. 
In a recent speech , NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen outlined his vision for an 
improved NATO/Russia relationship, "But continuing NATO's Open Door policy is only part of the answer 
to Europe's consolidation. We also need a new relationship with Russia. Indeed, I firmly believe that a 
much improved relationship between NATO and Russia would be the best reassurance of all, to all our 
nations. That is why I have invested a lot of time and effort, ever since I took office, in building better 
relations with Russia. There has been progress in a number of areas, including our joint review of common 
threats and challenges. But there is a lot of work still left to do. We continue to have our differences, not 
least about NATO's Open Door policy. There are also profound concerns, all across our Alliance, about 
Russia's policy vis-a-vis Georgia. We think Russia sends the wrong kind of signal by conducting military 
exercises that rehearse the invasion of a smaller NATO member. Let me stress, NATO is not a threat to 
Russia and will never invade Russia. Nor do we consider Russia a threat to NATO. That is why Russia's 
new military doctrine does not reflect the real world. It contains a very outdated notion about the nature and 
role of NATO. But we must not let these differences hold the entire NATO-Russia relationship hostage. 
After all, NATO and Russia also have many common interests - in Afghanistan, in combating terrorism, 
and in preventing nuclear proliferation. We need a NATO-Russia relationship that allows us to pursue these 
common interests, and which will not de-rail every time we disagree. I will continue to work for such a 
strong, trustful NATO-Russia relationship. And I am confident that NATO's new Strategic Concept will 
underline the determination of all our nations to make it a reality." Excerpted from SECGEN Speech, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions 62143.htm (accessed April 7, 2010). 
A similar arrangement with China is not as simple to develop as their region has 
no similar NATO structure. However, China has been essential to the process of 
engaging with North Korea on their nuclear program. China's own nuclear program 
while limited in scope compared to others, the opaqueness of their policies, doctrine, 
force modernization and targeting creates difficulties when other states consider arms 
control. The recent U.S. hosted Nuclear Security Summit invitation was accepted by 
China which along with the upcoming NPT Review Conference allows the United States 
two opportunities to encourage discussion on the future of nuclear weapons in Chinese 
thinking. Given the significant level of interdependence of the U.S. and Chinese 
economies, shaping of the international security agenda to allow China to participate 
actively, to be understood and to be engaged will have lasting benefits both for the region 
as well as globally. Essential to a wider engagement of China by the United States is the 
use of multilateralism such as is being done on the North Korean issue. Without a 
specific international institution that focuses on regional issues important to China and 
her neighbors, the United States will need to carefully seek opportunities to start and 
continue multilateral dialogs that assist in lowering tensions in the region and begin to 
develop positive relationships both among the regional states but also globally. Long 
standing conflicts such as the Kashmir issue, border disputes, terrorism, human rights 
issues have not been resolved through bilateral means but may yield to a renewed 
multilateral effort backed by the United States. 
Engagement of Russia and China must be more than just on a security level to be 
successful but the current nuclear "moment" allows a significant opportunity to attempt 
to broaden engagement with these key states from one of avoiding conflict to one of 
resolving conflict. Engagement with these two states should be done on several parallel 
levels, economic, political, security and social with only loose linking of expectations. 
Quid pro quos should not necessarily be expected in the short run to avoid the "linking of 
issues" problem experienced by Carter when he tied advancement of human rights in the 
Soviet Union to further arms control negotiations. What can be expected is the 
development of a deeper interaction between the states on a range of issues that is 
designed to at least minimize misunderstandings and open up opportunities for 
cooperation. 
MORAL OBLIGATION TO LEAD: RISKS REMAIN DRIVING A BROADER U.S. 
NUCLEAR AGENDA 
While responsible for nearly half of all nuclear weapons produced, the United 
States has been in the lead of every successful attempt to limit nuclear arms and seems 
once again assuming that role. As President Obama has observed the goal of nuclear 
disarmament will not likely be achieved in his lifetime, the United States has an 
obligation to do all it can to work toward it. The research of this dissertation supports 
such efforts which in the long run, say a century from now, will matter. The three case 
studies in this work have highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the efforts to date 
to control and reverse proliferation of nuclear arms. The renewed effort to continue the 
reduction of strategic nuclear arms embodied in the new START agreement between the 
United States and Russia will cut these systems by a third which is an encouraging new 
step in the right direction. But a great deal of further arms control needs to be done to 
reach the NPT goal. 
As the case studies on the ABM and strategic arms reductions describe, bilateral 
negotiations are important but have significant limitations. The participation and support 
of the United States were essential to the success of these agreements and appear to have 
been the drivers behind the new START. As this process moves forward to deal with a 
range of remaining systems and issues, the limitations of bilateral negotiations and 
agreements must be recognized and anticipated. Specifically, the issue of the degree of 
sovereignty lost by a party state must be perceived as appropriate for security gained 
through the reductions. Some have argued that the easier reductions have already been 
made which in turn poses the ultimate challenge for state leadership on the part of the 
United States: how to reassure all parties of the value of the gain from a reduced number 
of nuclear arms. The current focus on preventing proliferation to terrorist groups may 
prove a sufficient reinforcement and incentive to continue reductions. Until a level near 
the other nuclear weapons states is reached, approximately 500 strategic weapons, the 
other nuclear weapons states will remain on the sidelines and the fragility of a bilateral 
agreement will remain. 
As with the ABM case where the Bush Administration decided an older 
agreement no longer fit the security environment, a similar perception of threats could 
reverse the gains of the new START. Missile defense, a continuing goal of the United 
States, continues to be viewed with suspicion in Russia as having the potential to negate 
the remaining Russian ICBM force, which remains a key support of their great power 
perception of their state. The United States may have been successful in helping Russia 
see U.S. missile defense efforts as focused on other states as the states negotiated the new 
START deal. President Obama may have offered to include Russian experts as Reagan in 
the development of missile defense did at Reykjavik only to be rebuffed by Gorbachev. 
If so, events would seem to support a positive response from Medvedev which signals the 
prospect for a far more positive relationship. In a further sign of a more appropriate post 
Cold War relationship, the new START verification and inspection protocols reportedly 
allow each side to both be more transparent and less negatively intrusive due to 
advancements in the technology used to accomplish these processes. Once this 
relationship matures, the potential for progress in a wider set of negotiations will likely 
increase. 
Beyond the immediate goal of reducing strategic nuclear arms, the wider issue of 
the U.S. role and support in efforts to secure nuclear material and reduce weapons below 
the strategic system level remains the more critical issue impacting the health of the NPT 
regime. The NPT regime remains weakened or under stress from proliferators, non-
signatories and breakout states. A lack of complete security on materials and tactical 
nuclear systems contributes to this problem. Despite a great deal of work to deal with 
these problems through programs such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism, a lack of US support to the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference provided mixed signals to the international community on the degree of U.S. 
support to the goals of the treaty. Through the past decade, the U.S. backed both efforts 
to control North Korea and Iran but had a more inconsistent record with respect to other 
states' nuclear programs such as Pakistan and India. With a return to a more focused and 
comprehensive approach to nuclear issues, the United States will need to insure actions 
including appropriate funding support follow words. The U.S. sponsored Nuclear 
Security Summit would seem to be an appropriate "informal" pre-NPT Review 
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Conference to gage nuclear weapons states positions, particularly Russia and China, for 
reinforcing the NPT and widening future nuclear security discussions. If the U.S. nuclear 
agenda is to progress, the 2010 NPT Review Conference would seem an important 
moment for the U.S. to positively engage. 
Assuming the U.S. remains for the immediate future the most powerful state in 
the international system, what can the U.S. do to improve the maintenance of the nuclear 
security regime and the international security environment? As was mentioned earlier, the 
ball is rolling toward implementing the recommendations of President Obama's Prague 
Speech. The key treaty elements of this program are now beginning to take shape 
including the new START agreement signed on the one year anniversary of President 
Obama's Prague Speech, a push to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and a call to negotiate and ratify a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The CTBT and 
the FMCT once completed would essentially place a permanent limit on state's ability to 
produce new nuclear material for weapons and constrain new weapons testing. These two 
processes are seen as essential to further limiting the entrance of any new nuclear states. 
In support of these normative measures for the international community, President 
Obama called for increased support for inspections, primarily through funding of the 
IAEA, the development of a cooperative civilian nuclear fuel bank to assist in 
achievement of the NPT goal of supporting peaceful uses of nuclear energy while 
limiting opportunities for proliferation and consideration of stronger consequences for 
rule breaking of the non-proliferation regime. One example of his commitment to this last 
policy was seen in the President's direct discussions with the Chinese leader Ho Jin Tao 
during another of his stated goals, the U.S. hosted Nuclear Security Summit in April 
2010, where he sought a Chinese commitment to support additional sanctions against 
Iran's nuclear program. 
Additionally the President's nuclear arms policy agenda includes support to 
strengthening the global regime to stop proliferators with specific emphasis on reversing 
North Korea's nuclear program and preventing further proliferation from that state while 
seeking to engage Iran in a multilateral dialog. At present, the latter effort seems to be 
developing into a classic carrot and stick approach as Iran is unwilling to either engage in 
such a dialog or slow its progress toward achieving nuclear weapons capability which 
they continue to categorically deny is the aim of their nuclear program. Beyond dealing 
with these two states, the U.S. President's ultimate policy goal is to prevent terrorist 
groups from possessing a nuclear capability. To achieve this end, the United States is 
supporting all efforts to secure all nuclear material that could be transferred to such 
groups by 2014. During the Washington Nuclear Security Summit at least two states 
offered to have the United States to secure their material immediately while the 
conference concluded with a 47 state commitment to the U.S. goal of complete security 
in four years. These policy initiatives demonstrate two parts of the central argument of 
this dissertation in action: U.S. leadership in the international community on the nuclear 
issue and the potential power of multilateral efforts like the Nuclear Security Summit. 
The United States has also stated several policy changes to demonstrate the 
seriousness and long term nature of the commitment being made to the NPT goals. The 
President has stated his full support for having durable international institutions continue 
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 Chile, Mexico and Ukraine have committed to immediately transfer their civilian HEU for 
disposal. See Daryl G. Kimball, "New START Good for U.S. and International Security, Deserves the 
Senate's Support," Arms Control Association website, 2010. 
http://www.annscontrol.org/pressroom/NEWStartStatement (accessed April 15, 2010). 
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to assist states in reaching a world free of nuclear terror, most notably in Prague, 
identifying the Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism 
as examples. The actions of the United States at the NPT Review Conference will no 
doubt continue to provide clear support for that multilateral international institution and 
its non-proliferation regime. In a parallel policy development, Vice President Biden, in a 
major policy speech given in February 2010 at the National Defense University, 
reaffirmed the United States nuclear policy agenda outlined in Prague and added the 
President's intent to stabilize the existing government nuclear enterprise with funding to 
modernize U.S. nuclear labs, hire specialists to work nuclear reductions, and assure 
reliability of the remaining nuclear systems. Included in the Vice President's remarks was 
a commitment to increase U.S.-Russian verification transparency in new START 
agreement. The April release of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report provided a 
restatement of the United States commitment to these policies as well as several 
additional specific steps to advance the overall agenda. 
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review while aligning with the Prague Speech nuclear 
agenda was the product of much internal debate between the White House and the 
Department of Defense. In the end, the review reaffirmed the importance still remaining 
for U.S. security of the nuclear deterrent. The review also placed constraints on the 
United States that previous reviews had not been willing to do. The 2010 Nuclear Policy 
Review focused on five objectives that frame U.S. nuclear arms policy: 
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, 
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 
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4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; 
and 
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 
At the center of these objectives is the explicit restatement of the U.S. commitment "to 
bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy 
Agency Safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, 
and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increased proliferation 
risks."30 The Nuclear Policy Review also reaffirmed the Prague goals of aggressively 
pursuing arms control efforts including the new START agreement, "ratification and 
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entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Cutoff Treaty." 
Included in the Nuclear Policy Review actionable policies was the clarification of 
circumstances where nuclear weapons would not be used, specifically, the United States 
"is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing 'negative security assurance' by 
declaring the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations." This provision has already spurred criticism for departing from 
the long standing position of "having all options on the table" when dealing with 
potential aggressors but as has been earlier discussed, this policy change is fully in line 
with the concept of providing states considering their security from a purely power based 
view a strong incentive to resist selecting nuclear weapons as a means to do so. Equally 
important to reestablishment of the leadership role for the United States, the Nuclear 
29Department of Defense. "Nuclear Posture Review Report," Department of Defense website, vi. 
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Policy Review makes clear the U.S. interest in a permanent extension of the non-use of 
I T 
nuclear weapons that has held for 65 years. 
Among the specific initiatives described in the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review 
Report, the United States has committed to a deepening of bilateral dialogs with Russia 
and China on nuclear issues to seek "strategic stability," conduct follow-on analysis that 
will identify the next set of strategic arms reductions for negotiation with Russia, work 
with Russia to deal with non-strategic nuclear weapons both deployed and non-deployed, 
and implement any reductions to the nuclear arsenal "in ways that maintain the reliability 
and effectiveness of security assurances to our allies and partners. In a clear indication 
of the United States' multilateral intentions, the Nuclear Policy Review Report states that 
allies and partners will be consulted on the appropriate approach to post-New START 
negotiations. The Nuclear Policy Review Report concludes that while the conditions to 
achieve a world without nuclear weapons do not yet exist, the United States believes that 
NPT goal is achievable through working actively to create them. 
GETTING TO UNITY OF EFFORT: EXPANDING MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR 
DISARMAMENT EFFORTS 
United States must also begin to shape the long term security environment in 
terms of progress toward nuclear disarmament beyond the above steps. Specific issues to 
be addressed both in pursuit of above objectives and disarmament in the long run must 
solidify the multilateral nature of the effort which seems to be the goal of the emerging 




have limits that can be stronger in the long run than the short term achievements of their 
agreements. The conditions for a stronger and more dynamic multilateral effort with the 
original five nuclear weapons states are in place. The United States leadership is essential 
to moving this group beyond any lingering Cold War rooted political, military or other 
relationship. 
The long term plan for strategic arms reductions should include an effort to bring 
the P5 to a common negotiation which has yet to be suggested formally. These states 
control all but less an estimated 500 of the world's nuclear weapons and no longer 
threaten other members of this group. Combined with their status on the UN Security 
Council, they should seek out means to follow the renewed leadership of the United 
States on strategic nuclear weapons. The April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was 
attended by the leaders of these states and as discussed earlier each has committed to the 
goal of securing the world's nuclear material and are engaged either directly or indirectly 
with the North Korean and Iranian issues. This working relationship should be 
strengthened and made routine to build confidence and trust between them ultimately 
removing any risk of accident or miscalculation among them. Such an arrangement is a 
natural outgrowth of the U.S. Nuclear Policy Review recommendation to further develop 
the Russia and China bilateral relationships with the United States. 
As the original nuclear club shows maturity and forward thinking on 
concentrating their collective efforts to move toward the NPT goals, they will also need 
to work to merge arms control efforts with disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. 
The United States has already identified the initial steps required and has demonstrated a 
significant change in direction from the immediate past. Ultimately, other states must 
297 
cooperate. As this dissertation describes, the example of one state followed by other 
power based states, which each of the P5 are, opens the potential for cooperation toward 
the NPT goals. What remains as a significant challenge for the United States is to 
continuously and steadfastly reinforce the gains each state will derive from the new 
nuclear agenda. As the United States begins to achieve success in lengthening the 
shadows of these states, engagement of the normative based states should quickly align 
all but the few outlying states in working to achieve the NPT goals. The speed at which 
the 47 states attending the U.S. sponsored Nuclear Security Summit is a strong indicator 
of the potential of this concept to succeed. The willingness of Russia and China to work 
to develop "smart sanctions" for Iran shows progress on gaining support from power 
based states as well. 
A range of follow on discussions and activities focused on confidence building 
measures that lead to consensus building where these states work toward common goals 
such as was done in the immediate Cold War period experiences of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty and the NATO Partnership for Peace is the obvious next step. 
Here again the United States is best positioned to organize and lead these activities. Once 
the nuclear agenda shows significant progress the next layer of issues particularly the 
resolution of lingering regional security issues will become most obvious and important 
to resolve. Without unity of international effort, lengthening the shadow of the future for 
Israel, Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan and their neighbors will remain problematic. 
For the immediate future, the United States must continue to responsibly negotiate 
continuing reductions in two largest nuclear inventories (U.S. and Russia) adding 
international verification while increasing irreversibility and transparency. This 
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negotiation should begin immediately to capitalize on the momentum of this "nuclear 
moment." The history of successful strategic nuclear arms control negotiations does not 
favor pauses in their process. The 2010 Nuclear Policy Review suggests the United States 
is committed to further reductions and inclusion of sub-strategic weapons which are the 
most likely objects of theft, accident or other incident. What has become apparent in the 
last forty years of arms control and reductions especially in the post Cold War experience 
is that the economic component of the process dominates the other components. The 
Nunn-Luger efforts and others have provided both the model and economic path to 
remove any incentives to resist reductions due to a lack of host nation funding. The 
United States needs to find the resources to continue these efforts to conclusion in a 
manner that eliminates any fluctuation based on shifts in political support. The most 
important byproduct of this modernized bilateral relationship is sustained "adult like" 
behavior on the part of both states which in turn serves as example to all states of need to 
continue toward goals of the NPT and uphold the related international agreements. U.S. 
State Department has reportedly been given this guidance from the President but at the 
moment there is uncertainty as to Russian willingness to build on the current momentum. 
One means of gaining Russian support for the nuclear agenda would be a further 
"embrace" of Russia in the European security discussion. The NATO Secretary General 
has suggested the Alliance move rapidly toward doing so.34 
As the relationship between the P5 modernizes, the United States must be willing 
to take the lead under international supervision serve as the recipient of any international 
nuclear materials for conversion from military use or to prevent such use. If a state 
34
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wishes to retain nuclear material, the United States needs to be ready to provide any 
assistance required to insure these materials remain secure and out of military use. The 
nearly immediate acceptance of assistance from Mexico, Ukraine and (another state, see 
news) during the Nuclear Security Summit shows the requirement and the United States 
needs to be prepared to respond with all available speed. This was the standard during the 
immediate post Cold War period when the three former Soviet Republics denuclearized 
and should be fully embraced in this renewed period of nuclear non-proliferation activity. 
If the United States is unable or unwilling to do so, reinforcement of President Obama's 
stated policy and goals will become very difficult. A similar emphasis on providing other 
states with experts who can assist in developing the appropriate documents and political 
rationales for negotiating and ratifying the CTBT and FMCT should be led by the U.S. 
Department of State. This outreach effort would not only demonstrate the positive nature 
and commitment of the United States to its stated agenda to the international community, 
it would potentially provide reinforcement of the value of U.S. leadership to the members 
of the Senate who would need to be convinced of the need to ratify these treaties. 
The United States should also demonstrate leadership by more than calling for 
more financial support of the IAEA by supporting the placing of this critical UN agency 
at the center of providing transparency of all states engaged in nuclear programs. As a 
part of its efforts to widen the multilateral nature of arms control leading to non-
proliferation and eventual disarmament, the United States must seek wider international 
acceptance of IAEA as controlling authority of nuclear arms inspections, verification, 
destruction, and governing of appropriate procedures for civilian nuclear energy 
programs. One of the keys to this effort would be increased transparency of U.S. 
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programs to international inspection. The United States need to continue to allow all the 
same processes it has asked other states to accept on their programs as a clear 
demonstration of support for the IAEA, a rejection of any "do as I say, no as I do" 
attitude. As the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review has stated, the United States does not intend 
to modernize any existing systems beyond requirements to assure their continued 
reliability which the IAEA can and should monitor. The United States is committed to 
both continued security and reliability of its nuclear deterrent and should leverage IAEA 
oversight throughout these efforts to reinforce the new nuclear agenda. Along with this 
security and surety commitment, the United States needs to allow the IAEA to verify that 
the 2010 Nuclear Policy Review commitment not to build any new nuclear systems, to 
refrain from any testing of weapons. 
Support for UN and IAEA efforts to widen nuclear and alternative energy sources 
with sufficient restrictions and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear materials to 
weapons development is another significant area which U.S. support and expertise will be 
critical to the nuclear non-proliferation agenda. President Obama's suggestion of an 
international nuclear fuel bank open to all states with a desire for nuclear energy 
production is well within the realm of the possible. One former Soviet plant is already in 
place for this function and producing fuel for a number of states. The dual goal of such a 
project is to solve the nuclear fuel supply problem to NPT compliant states while 
negating need or desire to build national capability to produce fuel. As was seen in the 
Soviet example, states can choose to build dual use nuclear facilities that would only 
increase the requirement for international controls and at the same time continue to 
provide states the opportunity to defect from the NPT regime. 
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As has been seen in the decade of combating terrorism, keeping those groups who 
do not want to operate within the rules and norms of the international system are difficult 
to fully interdict. Several groups have stated their desire to acquire nuclear weapons by 
any means. Preventing this circumstance is the stated goal of the United States with the 
near universal support of the international community. Each of the non-proliferation 
efforts described in this chapter is ultimately aimed in eliminating the use of nuclear 
weapons completely. States remain the dominant powers in the international system to 
deal with this threat. The United States has led international efforts in a number of ways, 
some accepted, and some not as much to deal with terrorism and so far the international 
community has not suffered a nuclear terrorist attack. Continued leadership of the United 
States to secure all nuclear material, support the growth of durable international 
institutions such as the PSI, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and most 
importantly the UN and the IAEA while seeking to increase the binding together of 
individual states to prevent nuclear capabilities from reaching these groups is essential. 
The United States leadership on UNSCRs 1540 and 1887 are a clear demonstration of 
U.S. support for a multilateralist approach to nuclear issues. Both of these UNSCRs 
align and are mutually reinforcing of the NPT and the policies of the U.S. nuclear agenda. 
As the state that brought the world both the nuclear weapon and the UN, continued 
support through this international institution is essential to fostering the required 
increasing interdependence and cooperation of the international community to finally 
remove the fear of nuclear threats and destruction. 
Earlier in this chapter, the rise of individual voices to deal with the nuclear 
disarmament issue before terrorists strike was mentioned. On prominent group includes 
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two former Secretaries of State, a Secretary of Defense and a former Senator joined 
together to call for immediate and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons with this 
terrorist threat as central to their argument. George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William 
Perry and Sam Nunn in a series of Wall Street opinion editorial pieces and most recently 
an hour long video appeal have highlighted the much changed international security 
environment and suggested a number of requirements to ultimately eliminate this 
emerging threat of nuclear terrorism. Many of the current policies of the U.S. renewed 
nuclear agenda are supported by these statesmen. Their appeal calls for U.S. leadership in 
a multilateral effort which includes the stated goals of the Obama Administration to 
secure of worldwide stocks of nuclear material, implement substantial reductions of 
existing nuclear arsenals including elimination of short range battlefield nuclear weapons, 
identifying the requirement for the CTBT and strengthening verification and enforcement 
capabilities. Their effort in support of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, called the Nuclear 
Security Project (NSP), also recommends developing cooperative missile defense and 
early warning systems, developing a new international system to manage the risks of 
producing fuel for nuclear power, and phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in 
civil commerce. The NSP group's potentially most controversial recommendation was 
their call for discarding Cold War practices for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to 
decrease the danger of accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch. Essentially, this last 
recommendation would "de-alert" or stand down those nuclear systems that remain on 
alert for rapid response and launch. Their argument is supported by the difficulty of using 
these systems to retaliate against a terrorist attack if this scenario seems to be rising over 
time as the fear of a nuclear war for which the alert is designed to respond fades. 
If the ultimate goal of the NPT is to be achieved, a truly universal effort on the 
part of the United Nations will be required. From the more theoretical and political 
problem of finding an appropriate set of explanations for power based states to accept a 
world without nuclear weapons to the smallest detail on an IAEA inspectors' checklist, 
the unifying goal of nuclear disarmament and the potential gains from a vastly more 
complex interdependent world would seem more than worthy of the effort. Bilateral 
efforts of the past have been slow to achieve and ultimately what progress was achieved 
was at best incremental and subject to changes in the domestic political environment. 
Renewed emphasis on the U.S. and Russia arms control relationship should be seen as a 
part of a much larger effort to achieve the goals of the NPT and the formation of a new 
international environment where military forces are not the best means for resolving 
conflict. Given the willingness of the Obama Administration to push forward a 
significantly different nuclear arms policy agenda than he inherited, leadership by the 
United States at a key moment in the NPT regime has significant potential for positive 
movement toward its goals. Sustainment and cooperation by the P5 states of this effort 
will likely cause a significant shift in global attitudes toward the international security 
environment and the place of nuclear weapons in it. The United States has already taken 
the important steps on a delayed journey toward nuclear disarmament. This return to the 
unfinished business of the Cold War is long overdue and far more likely to succeed than 
resigning the world to live in a very short shadow of the future. 
SUGGESTED FUTURE RESEARCH 
While recent events have moved the nuclear disarmament discussion to the 
forefront of the international policy agenda, other pressing matters will inevitably cause 
the issues involved to return a lower state of interest fairly quickly. What will remain 
important is the need to continue to work toward the goals of the NPT and to renew 
research within international relations to better describe the security environment of 
today and the future world as we approach disarmament. In an important policy shift, 
U.S. nuclear arms control policy has been significantly updated to support this effort 
beginning with President Obama's Prague speech in April 2009. This dissertation 
research fully supports continuing U.S. support for multilateral nuclear arms control in 
support of the NPT goals with disarmament the constant long term objective. 
Additionally, this research suggests that the global security environment has significantly 
shifted since the end of the Cold War and continues to accelerate away from traditional 
realist explanations particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This 
research has suggested a basic hybrid theory for addressing the explanation gap between 
power and normative focused states as a means of addressing the need to strengthen 
multilateralism to end nuclear proliferation and reach disarmament. 
In order to expand the discussion within the international relations field, this 
dissertation suggests three areas that would provide useful new avenues of research: 
characterization of non hegemonic single state leadership in multilateral efforts, 
implications of the merging of international agendas, and the need for new thinking on 
nuclear disarmament. As this research recommends, the United States is best positioned 
to assert leadership in the international environment. However, the traditional view of 
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that hegemonic (benevolent or not) leader state, as one could assert the United States 
attempted to be after September 11, 2001, requires review. The United States, which 
remains the most powerful military and economic power in international system, has 
demonstrated in recent years that that power has limits. At the same time, the United 
States has had difficulty asserting moral leadership in a number of issue areas despite its 
position in the international system. Either the "unipolar moment" has truly passed in to a 
multipolar period or some other deeper explanation of how the international system has 
evolved is possible. Is it possible that the rise of a more normative explanation for how 
states interact is emerging? Conflict between states remains but conflicts are not 
occurring to the global extent of the world wars or the Cold War of the last century. 
International relations theory has settled into a relative steady state where power and 
normative explanations oppose each other. A useful avenue of exploration would be to 
discuss the requirements, conditions and effects of a single state as it shifts from a base of 
military power to enforce its security interests to acting as an example that follows 
internationally accepted norms without resorting to force. 
The emerging international environment characterized by globalization of 
economic, social and political systems has placed increasing stress on the nation state. 
One of the leading stressors from the challenge of adapting to globalization that states 
individually are increasingly less capable of relying on self help is terrorism. With 
globalization, a merging of agendas from economics and trade to human rights versus 
state sovereignty has begun to emerge. Not all states are well equipped to gain from the 
positive benefits of a global economic system. Several states continue to refuse to accept 
international norms causing fault lines to appear in a range of issues that seem settled to a 
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majority of states. Security issues are rapidly combining with other issues resulting in a 
globalization of the international security environment. What would seem to be emerging 
is a form of complex interdependence similar to Nye and Keohane's formulation over 30 
years ago. Has military power become increasingly less relevant as they suggested? If 
one accepts that the international environment is dramatically different today, then a 
reinvestigation of complex interdependence measured against today's situation would be 
useful. 
As has been suggested in this dissertation, there is a moral component to the 
requirement to achieve nuclear disarmament which the United States has once again 
provided as support to President Obama's renewed nuclear arms control agenda. The 
moral argument for nuclear disarmament is not new and has been forwarded since the end 
of World War II. If rational states and their leadership have long accepted that nuclear 
weapons are immoral, then one should wonder why they are still with us. Obviously, 
concerns for being the next state to suffer a nuclear attack have long been an overriding 
reason to retain or acquire nuclear weapons, more powerful than any moral argument for 
their abolition. As this research has suggested, Cold War rationales for using nuclear 
weapons to defend one's state and allies have begun to lose their meaning as the likely 
scenarios for their use become small in number. If the moral argument to support this 
NPT goal is insufficient, than a requirement for a replacement argument seems obvious 
and necessary. This new thinking can be supported by this dissertation's suggestion of a 
hybrid theory to allow power based and normative based states to frame the requirement 
to disarm cooperatively. The possibility of terrorism by nuclear means offers a significant 
point of departure for reconsidering the utility of nuclear weapons. A range of rationales 
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could be explored such as environmental, economic, as well as security effects of any 
nuclear event, accidental or otherwise. 
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APPENDIX A: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS1 
Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969 
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969 
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970 
Proclaimed by US. President March 5, 1970 
Entered into force March 5, 1970 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger 
of nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special 
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic 
points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States 
from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful 
purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon 
States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
1
 Arms Control Association, "Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)," Arms Control Association 
website, 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt (accessed September 17, 2009). 
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Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, 
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to 
continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the.manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use offeree against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 
armaments of the worlds human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. 
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Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as 
set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed 
with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The 
safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this article. 
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes 
in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth 
in the Preamble of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing 
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this 
Treaty. 
324 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to 
do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world. 
Article V 
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an 
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon 
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty 
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control. 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional 
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories. 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall 
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 
amendment. 
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2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall 
enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the 
amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it 
shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty 
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with 
a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of 
the Treaty. 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may 
accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to 
the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any 
requests for convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty. 
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of 
July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight. 
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APPENDIX B: ABM TREATY 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF 
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC 
MISSILE SYSTEMS2 
(Note: This appendix provides the English version of the 1974 Additional Protocol as well as the original 
1972 ABM Treaty.) 
In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and 
the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas, so 
restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become 
the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration 
capability of the others retaliatory missile forces. 
The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and 
another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 
kilometers apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the 
beginnings of a nationwide system. 
Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be 
deployed. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 
launchers. Agreement on the number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had 
required extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions governing 
these important components of ABM systems are spelled out in very specific detail in the 
Treaty and further clarified in the "Agreed Statements" accompanying it. 
Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e.g., not 
to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one 
interceptor missile at a time or modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and 
systems for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These provisions, the Agreed 
Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided 
warhead. 
There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting 
radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and 
the Treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early 
warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located 
along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that they do not 
contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior. 
2
 Arms Control Association, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty," Arms Control 
Association website, 2009. http://www. armscontrol. org/documents/abmtreary (accessed September 17, 
2009). 
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Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the 
strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-
based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile 
land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems 
"based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was 
agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treaty's 
provisions for consultation and amendment. 
The Treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to 
promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the 
first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated 
December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a 
number of questions in the Commission relating to each side's compliance with the 
SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in 
question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern. 
Article XIV of the Treaty calls for review of the Treaty five years after its entry into 
force, and at five-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the 
Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this 
session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the Treaty had operated 
effectively during its first five years, that it had continued to serve national security 
interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time. 
The most recent Treaty review was completed in October 1993. Following that review, 
numerous sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission have been held to work out 
Treaty succession ~ to "multilateralize" the Treaty — as a result of the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and to negotiate a demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems. 
Subsequently reduced to one area (See section on ABM Protocol). 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF 
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC 
MISSILE SYSTEMS 
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972 
Ratified by U.S. President September SO, 1972 
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972 
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972 
Entered into force October 3, 1972 
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The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating 
consequences for all mankind, 
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems 
would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and 
would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear 
weapons, 
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile 
systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable 
conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, 
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward 
reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete 
disarmament, 
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the 
strengthening of trust between States, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to 
adopt-other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory 
of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy 
ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in 
Article III of this Treaty. 
Article II 
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: 
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed 
and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; 
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for 
launching ABM interceptor missiles; and 
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM 
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those 
which are: 
(a) operational; 
(b) under construction; 
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(c) undergoing testing; 
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or 
(e) mothballed. 
Article III 
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except 
that: 
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one 
hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a 
Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no 
more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) 
ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of 
each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three 
kilometers; and 
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one 
hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party 
may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more 
than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large 
phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM 
radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the 
Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo 
launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a 
potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two 
large phased-array ABM radars. 
Article IV 
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their 
components used for development or testing, and located within current or 
additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of 
fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges. 
Article V 
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or 
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for 
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, 
not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to 
develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for 
rapid reload of ABM launchers. 
Article VI 
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and 
their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: 
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor 
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic 
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ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them 
in an ABM mode; and 
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic 
missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national 
territory and oriented outward. 
Article VII 
Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM 
systems or their components may be carried out. 
Article VIII 
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas 
specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited 
by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within 
the shortest possible agreed period of time. 
Article IX 
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not 
to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM 
systems or their components limited by this Treaty. 
Article X 
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would 
conflict with this Treaty. 
Article XI 
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic 
offensive arms. 
Article XII 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its 
disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of 
international law. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of 
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which 
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current 
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. 
Article XIII 
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, 
the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within 
the framework of which they will: 
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations 
assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; 
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(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers 
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations 
assumed; 
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national 
technical means of verification; 
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a 
bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; 
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of 
ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions 
of this Treaty; 
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the 
viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty; 
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at 
limiting strategic arms. 
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, 
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, 
composition and other relevant matters. 
Article XIV 
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall 
enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force 
of this Treaty. 
2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals 
thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty. 
Article XV 
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give 
notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the 
Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the 
notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
Article XVI 
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional 
procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and 
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
RICHARD NIXON 
President of the United States of America 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
L. I. BREZHNEV 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
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APPENDIX C: SALT I TREATY 
INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES 
WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS3 
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 
Approval authorized by U.S. Congress September 30, 1972 
Approved by U.S. President September 30, 1972 
Notices of acceptance exchanged October 3, 1972 
Entered into force October 3, 1972 
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, 
Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this 
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active 
negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension 
and the strengthening of trust between States, 
Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, 
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972. 
Article II 
The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs 
of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of 
types deployed after that time. 
3
 Federation of Atomic Scientists, "Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation Of Strategic 
Offensive Arms," Federation of Atomic Scientists website, 2009. 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt 1 /text/salt 1 .htm, (accessed December 20, 2009). The US Department 




The Parties undertake to limit submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers 
and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under 
construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to 
launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as 
replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 
1964 or for launchers on older submarines. 
Article IV 
Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of 
strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement 
may be undertaken. 
Article V 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this 
Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its 
disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification 
of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede 
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim 
Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, 
conversion, or overhaul practices. 
Article VI 
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim 
Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under 
Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in 
accordance with the provisions of that Article. 
Article VII 
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic 
offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not 
prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be 
worked out in the course of further negotiations. 
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Article VIII 
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of 
acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems. 
2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced 
earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It 
is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of 
concluding such an agreement as soon as possible. 
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from 
this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter 
of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of 
its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim 
Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the 
notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
RICHARD NIXON 
President of the United States of America 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
L.I. BREZHNEV 
General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 
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PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 
CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC 
OFFENSIVE ARMS 
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, 
Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile 
launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the 
Interim Agreement, 
Have agreed as follows: 
The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period 
during which that Agreement remains in force: 
The United States may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines 
(SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union 
may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 
62 modern ballistic missile submarines. 
Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in 
the United States — over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, 
and in the USSR — over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, 
operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal 
numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic 
missile launchers on older submarines. 
The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted 
against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the United States and the USSR. 
This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement. 
DONE at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
RICHARD NIXON 
President of the United States of America 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
L.I. BREZHNEV 
General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 
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AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL 
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION 
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
1. Agreed Statements 
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the 
Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added): 
AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION 
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
[A] 
The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim 
Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of 
ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the 
continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental USSR. 
[B] 
The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction 
as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed. 
[C] 
The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the 
dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased. 
[D] 
The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no 
significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in 
the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further 
understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be 
undertaken only for purposes of testing and training. 
[E] 
The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types 
deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced 
by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the 
beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest 
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possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification 
thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative 
Commission. 
2. Common Understandings 
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the 
negotiations: 
A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions 
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: 
The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that an increase will not 
be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo 
launchers. 
Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding. 
B. Standing Consultative Commission 
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972: 
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation 
of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of 
the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents 
Agreement, 
See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War Between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 
30, 1971 agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on 
SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: 
when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can 
be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc 
arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through 
diplomatic channels. 
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. 
statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding. 
C. Standstill 
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: 
In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is 
prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of 
both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of 
these two documents. 
In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: 
The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 
concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like 
to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, 
neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered 
into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by 
either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval. 
The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement. 
3. Unilateral Statements 
(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by 
the United States Delegation: 
A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: 
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to 
achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following 
agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with 
respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an 
objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term 
basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR 
Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled 
without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on 
strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps 
toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement 
providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved 
within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it 
would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States does 
not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is 
because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. 
Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive 
arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional 
consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the 
U.S. position. 
B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers 
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: 
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In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest 
of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal 
that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-
based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer 
the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent 
negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the United States 
would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the 
period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement. 
C. Covered Facilities 
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: 
I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of 
Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines. 
D. "Heavy" ICBMs 
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: 
The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a 
common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation 
believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM 
having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational 
on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States proceeds on the premise that the 
Soviet side will give due account to this consideration. 
On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the 
Soviet Side": 
Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the 
possession of not only the United States, but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union 
agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim Freeze Agreement the United 
States and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 
ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic 
missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. 
allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the 
numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of 
signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding 
increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of 
the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim 
Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of 
the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the United States. Therefore, 
the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating 
the American missile submarine bases outside the United States, will be appropriately 
resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations. 
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On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: 
The United States side has studied the "statement made by the Soviet side" of May 17 
concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third 
countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that 
statement. 
On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 17. 
Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26. 
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APPENDIX D: START I TREATY 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 
THE REDUCTION AND 
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS4 
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, 
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it 
cannot be won and must never be fought, 
Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms 
and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of 
nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, 
Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security 
require the strengthening of strategic stability, 
Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the 
Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty 
and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. 
ARTICLE II 
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM 
launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber 
armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the 
aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not 
exceed: 
(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their 
associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy 
ICBMs and their associated launchers; 
4
 Department of State, "Hypertext of START I Treaty," Department of State website, 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/startl,html#ArtI (accessed June 17, 2009). This text 
contains numerous hypertext references when viewed on the website which provide the reader a 
comprehensive view of all related documentation to this basic treaty text. 
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(b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed 
heavy bombers, 
(i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; 
(ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs; 
(hi) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. 2. Each Party shall 
implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that 
its strategic offensive arms do not exceed: 
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of 
this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers: 
(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their 
associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers; 
(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed 
heavy bombers; 
(iii) 8050, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; 
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force 
of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers: 
(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their 
associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers; 
(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed 
heavy bombers; 
(iii) 6750, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; 
(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of 
this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article . 
3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed 
SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such 
aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons. 
ARTICLE III 
1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in 
subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty: 
(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each 
deployed SLBM and its associated launcher; shall be counted as one unit, 
(b) Each deployed heavy bombers shall be counted as one unit. 
2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and 
deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, 
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be 
considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively. 
(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not 
been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at 
that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher. 
(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not 
been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be 
considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher 
shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant 
to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility. 
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3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: 
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first 
stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or 
SLBM of that type. 
(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled 
missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be 
considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in 
launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be 
considered to be an ICBM of that type. 
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first 
leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched 
from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister 
shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or 
has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall 
be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type. 
4. For the purposes of counting warheads: 
(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall 
be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of 
the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type 
shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that 
type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or 
SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry 
vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less 
than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the 
accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry 
vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM of SLBM of a new type. In the case of an ICBM or 
SLBM of a new type with a of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM of SLBM of a 
new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the 
applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to 
agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or 
SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall 
be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type 
has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section 
of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty 
remains in force. 
(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested 
shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released 
during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles 
performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure 
for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing 
reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from 
a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. 
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(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead. 
(e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear 
ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. 
Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such 
heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of 
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of 
America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that 
are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at 
which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy 
bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is 
considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear 
ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. 
(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with 
eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess 
of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the 
number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range 
nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, 
and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for 
which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such 
heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of 
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is 
actually equipped. 
(g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. 
5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs 
and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time. 
(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following: 
(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to 
the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of 
warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types; 
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of 
deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, 
which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the 
number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing 
types. 
(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III shall be carried out 
subject to the following: 
(i) Minuteman III to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be 
deployed at the same ICBM base. 
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(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into 
force of this Treaty. 
(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III to which a reduced number of 
warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. 
(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other 
than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following: 
(i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party. 
(ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of 
two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads 
attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type. 
(iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no 
more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty. 
(iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, 
shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. 
(v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, 
shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of 
the same ocean. 
(vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is 
reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which 
such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a 
new reentry vehicle platform. 
(d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of 
warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which 
that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of 
this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a 
number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any 
SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to 
subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. 
6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations 
provided for in this Treaty as follows: 
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs; 
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and 
the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation 
begins, whichever occurs earlier; 
(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo 
launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation 
for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been 
completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a 
mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it 
arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs 
provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM 
loading facility; 
(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
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(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first 
launched; 
(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM 
launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which 
that launcher is installed is first launched; 
(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the 
shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber 
are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of 
the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy 
bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. 
7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or 
SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or 
SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers 
of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows: 
(a) a silo launchers of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a 
missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is 
reinstalled, whichever occurs first; 
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission; 
(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is 
installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that 
submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own 
power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed. 
8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or 
into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different 
category or former heavy bombers as follows: 
(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when 
it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range 
nuclear ALCMs; 
(b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category 
provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the 
Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the 
inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 
20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol expires. 
9. For the purposes of this Treaty: 
(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter 
objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic 
missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. 
(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all 
ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. 
(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise 
missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. 
(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a 
particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. 
If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of 
ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or 
SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted. 
(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of 
that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those 
that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type 
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been 
flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type 
shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, 
a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be 
distinguishable from one another. 
(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested 
from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-
range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been 
initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be 
considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and 
is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not 
so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from 
mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of 
ICBMs of other new type of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles 
installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of 
ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of 
other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed. 
(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of 
ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of 
ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be 
distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their 
associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried 
out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: 
(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States 
of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and 
Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, 
Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, respectively; 
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-
12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the 
United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, 
SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively. 
350 
(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States 
of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
MX; 
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the 
United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively. 
(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the 
United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, 
Minuteman I and Polaris A-3. 
(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States 
of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-l, and 
B-2; 
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United 
States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively. 
(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated 
by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
as, AGM-86B and AGM-129; 
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs 
designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, 
which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. For ICBMs and SLBMs: 
(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed 
ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125. 
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of 
an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type 
specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs 
located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile 
launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility. 
(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM 
emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than: 
(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM 
emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or 
(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM 
emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. 
(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test 
ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this 
Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges 
shall not exceed 25. 
2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers: 
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(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of 
ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18. [RF MOU, Section IV] [US MOU Section IV] 
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs 
located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to 
no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM 
base. 
(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs 
located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may 
contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs 
that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility. 
(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 
during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the 
number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test 
launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall 
not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, 
and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. 
(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile 
training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training 
launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile 
training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile 
launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are 
observable by national technical means of verification. 
3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers: 
(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-
nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 
75. 
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20. 
4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or 
space: 
(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, 
unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases. 
(b)Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers 
located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this 
limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs 
located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed. 
(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space 
launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers 
located at that facility. 
5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two 
for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one 
warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the 
number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to 
no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-
mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30. 
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6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within 
five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two. 
7. For static displays and ground trainers: 
(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on 
static displays after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs 
and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the 
number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no 
more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on 
static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on 
static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in 
this Treaty. 
(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after 
signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted 
after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items 
converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in 
Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations 
provided for in this Treaty. 
8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs 
and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50. 
9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms: 
(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at 
maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM 
loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs 
or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities 
for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and 
prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases 
or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in 
transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within 
an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on 
missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base 
at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based. 
(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance 
facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for 
mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, 
conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space 
launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at 
maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed 
mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit. 
(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test 
launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, 
provided that: 
(i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins; 
(ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test ranges and does not involve 
movement to any other facility; 
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(iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in 
each calendar year; and 
(iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is 
located outside test ranges at any one time. 
(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a 
test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward 
the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a 
mobile test launchers pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile 
launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be 
counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, 
the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 
45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their 
associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the 
number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles 
located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three. 
(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers 
of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers 
located at each ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each 
type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. 
(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at 
production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at 
training facilities for heavy bombers. 
10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such 
motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket 
motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations 
where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
11. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities: 
(a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair 
facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, 
ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination 
facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base 
for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type 
are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of 
ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any 
storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training 
facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New 
facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of ICBMs of any 
type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement 
equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo 
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launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range 
missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of 
ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not 
specified for that ICBM base or that test range. 
(b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a 
particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular 
type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type 
of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of 
that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested. 
(c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 
kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-
mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area. 
(d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from 
any test range. 
(e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less 
than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear 
armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage 
areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, 
any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training 
facility for heavy bombers. 
12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days. 
ARTICLE V 
1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement 
of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to: 
(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch 
weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type; 
(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs; 
(c) produce test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; 
(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of ICBMs of heavy ICBMs, except 
for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have 
been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, 
provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded; 
(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy 
ICBMs; 
(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs; 
(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type. 
3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on 
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party 
undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of 
ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a 
type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to 
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this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to 
which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the 
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of 
such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers 
of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile 
launcher of ICBMs. 
5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not 
to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of 
launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing 
types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, 
without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. 
6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than 
transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one 
warhead. 
8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM 
bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. 
9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space 
launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch 
facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the 
Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this 
Treaty. 
10. Each Party undertakes not to: 
(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers 
specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site 
launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or 
SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed; 
(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type. 
11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo 
launchers of ICBMs. 
12. Each Party undertakes not to: 
(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles; 
(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the 
number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a 
number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was 
attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type; 
(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number 
of warheads attributed to it; 
(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or 
new type. 
13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number 
of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.[Agreed State 3] 
14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or 
SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles. 
15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the 
upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international 
obligations undertaken by the Parties. 
16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not 
to conduct rapid reload. 
17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not 
originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines. 
18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy: 
(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such 
missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other 
than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile 
storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices; 
(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the 
ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for 
emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such 
missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal 
waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all 
areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I 
and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971; 
(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit; 
(d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs); 
(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons. 
19. Each Party undertakes not to: 
(a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a 
range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or 
deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments; 
(b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a 
bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated planform area 
in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy 
such an airplane with nuclear armaments; 
(c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an 
airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an 
airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane 
with long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy 
bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future 
heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air 
bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy 
bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. 
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23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear 
ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which 
heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based. 
24. Each Party undertakes not to convert: 
(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM, if such heavy 
bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; 
(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for 
long-range nuclear ALCM or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other 
than long-range nuclear ALCMs; 
(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category; 
(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers. 
25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic 
missile submarines. 
26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been 
eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, 
unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of 
verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-
associated railcars. 
27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic 
offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been 
provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless 
notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and 
support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their 
movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy 
bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for 
purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms. 
28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations 
of this Treaty outside its national territory. 
29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile 
tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a 
ballistic missile submarines for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a 
submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base. 
30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of 
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for: 
(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for ICBMs for 
mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages; 
(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch 
canisters or without launch canisters; and 
(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in 
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launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics 
exhibitions. 
ARTICLE VI 
1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based 
only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size 
and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted 
area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of 
ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM. 
2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of 
ICBMs within each restricted areas so that these structures shall not be capable of 
containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area. 
3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall 
not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment 
area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs. 
4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based 
only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point 
on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from 
any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. 
A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison. 
5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such 
entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a 
total of four rails). 
6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than 
the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail 
garrison shall have no more than five parking sites. 
7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of 
ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard 
configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more 
than one train of standard configuration. 
8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility. 
9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave 
restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. 
Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave 
deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals. 
10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total 
number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or 
five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside 
restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of 
the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated 
missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be 
outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation. 
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11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of 
ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one 
time. 
12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles 
of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform 
to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, 
or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrisons after the 
other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that 
rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for 
routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard 
configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section 
II of the Notification Protocol. 
ARTICLE VII 
1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in 
accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification 
and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion 
or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring 
Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. 
2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy 
bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the 
limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease 
to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures 
provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations 
provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, 
precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the 
Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs. 
4.The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of 
ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers [Agreed State 
10]shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in 
Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of 
ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall 
be eliminated in situ. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the 
flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open in 
situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for 
in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the 
Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the 
limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data. 
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2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each 
Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) 
of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this 
Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this 
Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol. 
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification 
Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the 
Inspection Protocol: 
(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided 
for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding and other agreed categories of data; 
(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in 
this Treaty; 
(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with 
the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter 
referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol; 
(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations 
provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty; 
(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national 
technical means of verification; 
(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning 
telemetric information; 
(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds; 
(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to 
this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities; 
(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and 
(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals. 
4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for 
continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in 
accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise 
provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than 
one hour after receipt. 
5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time 
shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a 
notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date 
in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. 
6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release 
to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum 
of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic 
coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating 
to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. 
The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information 
provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations 
provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and 
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obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other 
information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require 
such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the 
obligations provided for in this Treaty. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a 
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification 
of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by 
national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation 
not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of 
ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or 
SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment 
measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and 
deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms. 
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique 
identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol. 
ARTICLE X 
1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall 
make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information 
obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine 
which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the 
methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information. 
2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test 
undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, 
including: 
(a) the use of encryption; 
(b) the use of jamming; 
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional 
beaming; and 
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or 
recoverable reentry vehicles. 
3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test 
undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to 
the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or 
SLBM. 
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall 
provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating 
to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a 
recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test. 
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5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall 
provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the 
analysis of the telemetric information. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall 
have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no 
more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven 
flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each 
type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing 
mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and 
paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried 
out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. 
Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or 
SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph. 
ARTICLE XI 
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring 
activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection 
Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be 
conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and 
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to 
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such 
facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
Section I of the Notification Protocol. 
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to 
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such 
facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the 
accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new 
facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification 
Protocol. 
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that 
covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first 
stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. 
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed 
ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry 
vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. 
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of 
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the 
number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the 
inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after completion of the 
dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base. 
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination 
inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. 
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9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the 
elimination of facilities has been completed. 
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to 
confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used 
for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. 
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right 
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an 
SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and 
each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that 
technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items. 
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former 
heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such 
exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of: 
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such 
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical 
characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the 
data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to 
demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy 
bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this 
number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article V of 
this Treaty, as applicable; 
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM 
has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training 
heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are 
no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from 
which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose 
of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited 
type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments 
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-
nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber 
are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same 
type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and 
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the 
inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant 
of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H 
to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be 
to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with 
paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range 
non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such 
exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for 
long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy 
bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided 
364 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The purpose of 
these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes 
satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination 
Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber 
of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-
tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the 
other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 
percent of the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of such type 
equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base 
specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to 
demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each 
exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped 
for long-range nuclear ALCMs. 
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at 
production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of 
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced. 
ARTICLE XII 
1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party 
shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of 
the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures: 
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted 
areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs 
based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of 
the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and 
such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of 
ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located 
next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures; 
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites 
specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the 
entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The 
number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such 
request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, 
provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail 
garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the 
designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of 
Understanding; and 
(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within 
one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former 
heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such 
heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire 
airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. 
Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the 
requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be 
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specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 
of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later 
than 12 hours after the request for display has been made. 
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, 
and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall 
have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at 
any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking 
site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right 
to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a 
display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former 
heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and 
shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the 
requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force 
majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 
3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a 
case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be 
reduced. 
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been 
designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors 
have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested 
shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been 
completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
Section V of the Notification Protocol. 
ARTICLE XIII 
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile 
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. 
Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-
mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and 
their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below: 
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time 
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time 
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification 
provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall 
be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal. 
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their 
associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison 
of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall 
be considered to be part of the dispersal. 
366 
b(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their 
associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrisons of an 
ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall 
continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of 
the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was 
provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. 
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their 
associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for 
mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of 
the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside 
their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal. 
(g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins, 
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted: 
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years; 
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections; 
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility 
inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection 
has expired; or 
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a 
data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an 
inspection. 
(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with 
paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the 
right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base 
for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative 
measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal. 
(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and 
their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted 
areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with 
paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. 
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has 
been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal 
Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be 
conducted as provided for below: 
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in 
the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in 
the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in 
the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise. 
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(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be 
completed no later than 30 days after it begins. 
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for 
baseline data inspections. 
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct 
inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers 
involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume 
three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving 
heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of 
such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be 
carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of 
the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the 
quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE XIV 
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile 
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy 
bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, 
and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and 
their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such 
dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party 
shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted 
as provided for below: 
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time 
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the 
Notification Protocol. 
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time 
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the 
Notification Protocol. 
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to: 
(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the 
Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched 
Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination 
processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant 
notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification 
Protocol; 
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections; 
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and 
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such 
case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that 
has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the 
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operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 
1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. 
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later 
than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been 
provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The 
right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of 
the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X 
of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the 
time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures 
during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas 
provided for by this Treaty. 
4. When an operational dispersal is completed: 
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be 
located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations. 
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be 
located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or 
relocations . 
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed 
normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national 
territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately 
engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided. 
5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not 
conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two 
requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, 
for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not 
count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this 
Treaty. 
ARTICLE XV 
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties 
hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree 
that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission to: 
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; 
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of this Treaty; and 
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a 
new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance 
with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. 
ARTICLE XVI 
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any 
international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The 
Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to 
resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision 
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does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of 
strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party 
and a third State. 
ARTICLE XVII 
1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all 
of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a 
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No 
later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to 
consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be 
extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that 
period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so 
decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall 
remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a 
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. 
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the 
other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into 
force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE XIX 
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: George Bush 
President of the United States of America 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: M. Gorbachev 
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
APPENDIX E: SORT TREATY 
TEXT OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS5 
Signed May 24, 2002 
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties, 
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of 
strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship, 
Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively 
new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties, 
Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, 
cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability, 
Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, 
Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America 
and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa 
and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 
in Washington, 
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, 
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish 
more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and 
enhancing international stability, 
Have agreed as follows: 
5
 Arms Control Association, "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)," Arms Control 
Association website, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/sort (accessed June 17, 2010). The 
Arms Control Association cites the State Department as the original source. The current Department of 
State website does not contain a copy of the agreement. 
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Article I 
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of 
the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the 
Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that 
by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-
2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of 
its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of 
such warheads. 
Article II 
The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. 
Article III 
For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a 
year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission. 
Article IV 
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional 
procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by 
agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. 
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon 
three months written notice to the other Party. 
Article V 
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 
AMERICA: [signed] [signed] 
George W. Bush Vladimir Putin 
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APPENDIX F: NEW START TREATY 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND 
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS6 
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to 
as the Parties, 
Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction 
across the whole range of their strategic relations, 
Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship 
based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation, 
Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new 
relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear 
weapons, 
Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on 
the Non-Pro liferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the 
historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat, 
Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation, 
Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step 
process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security 
of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, 
including to a multilateral approach, 
Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for 
the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth 
in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both 
Parties, 
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive 
arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important 
as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not 
undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties, 
Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability, 
6
 Department of State, "Treaty Between The United States of America and The Russian Federation 
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," Department of State 
website, 2010. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf (accessed June 17, 2010). This 
website contains a photocopy of the original English text and signatures. 
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Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, 
verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century, 
Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations 
under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter 
referred to as the START Treaty, 
Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of 
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United 
States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were 
achieved, 
Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace 
and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, 
Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty 
and its Protocol. 
2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the 
Protocol. 
Article II 
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM 
launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear 
armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the 
aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not 
exceed: 
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and 
nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; 
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-
deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. 
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2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of 
its strategic offensive arms. 
Article III 
1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1 
(a) of Article II of this Treaty: 
(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one. 
(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one. 
(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1 
(b) of Article II of this Treaty: 
(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of 
reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs. 
(b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber. 
3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 
1(c) of Article II of this Treaty: 
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one. 
(b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one. 
(c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one. 
(d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one. 
(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: 
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as 
assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its 
launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
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(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as 
assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type 
shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, 
the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an 
ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from 
the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an 
ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been 
removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an 
ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static 
display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be 
distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type. 
5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as 
follows: 
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility; 
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed; 
(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is 
first launched; 
(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first 
brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber 
are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of 
the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such 
heavy bomber airframes. 
6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to 
be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this 
Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all 
ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been 
eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
7. For the purposes of this Treaty: 
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(a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects 
not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to 
which the provisions of this Treaty apply. 
(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall 
be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty or to 
the limitations thereof when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of 
that type is eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber equipped for non-
nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: 
(a) Existing types of ICBMs are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, 
and Peacekeeper; 
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and 
RS-24. 
(b) Existing types of SLBMs are: 
(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-
56; 
(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II. 
(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are: 
(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A; 
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160. 
are: 
(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers 
(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-
18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-
56; 
(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, 
Minuteman HI, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers Trident II. 
Article IV 
1. Each Party shall base: 
(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases; 
(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases. 
2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile 
submarines. 
3. Each Party shall locate: 
(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, 
ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination 
facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of 
prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; 
(b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at, as appropriate, 
submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair 
facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or 
elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and 
production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be 
located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. 
4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as nondeployed mobile 
launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit 
between facilities to no more than 30 days. 
5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges. 
6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test 
ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo 
launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM 
base. 
7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten. 
8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. 
Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at 
repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers. 
9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped 
for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless 
otherwise agreed by the Parties. 
10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during 
their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such 
facilities. 
11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national 
territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the 
Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of 
international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to 
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visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located 
outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with 
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
Article V 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic 
offensive arms may be carried out. 
2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that 
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for 
consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers 
for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert 
and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and 
SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted 
prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. 
Article VI 
1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability of strategic 
offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the 
Protocol to this Treaty. 
2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from 
accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol 
to this Treaty. 
3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be 
carried out by: 
(a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of this 
Treaty; and 
(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty. 
Article VII 
1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall be created in 
accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Categories of data for 
this database are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other 
notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and 
receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty. 
4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the 
notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure 
confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty. 
5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the 
implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public 
such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the 
public data related to its respective strategic offensive arms. 
6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this 
Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to 
this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to 
this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties 
within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of deployed 
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of 
warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for 
deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and nondeployed 
ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-
deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties. 
Article VIII 
In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to 
ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and 
effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability 
concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may 
include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party 
associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to 
preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This 
information shall be provided through diplomatic or other channels. 
Article IX 
By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs 
and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount 
of exchange of such telemetric information. 
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Article X 
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party undertakes: 
(a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; 
(b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other 
Party operating in accordance with this Article; and 
(c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national 
technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use 
them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, 
ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers 
during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover 
or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for 
strategic offensive arms. 
Article XI 
1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive 
arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance 
with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, 
and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of 
declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive 
arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and 
deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy 
bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections. 
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities listed in Section VII 
of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections shall be to 
confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics 
of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that 
strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated. In addition, each Party shall 
have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are provided 
for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being 
used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. The inspections provided for in this 
paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections. 
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4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions 
conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate 
distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to 
demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive 
arms subject to this Treaty. 
Article XII 
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, 
the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and 
procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this 
Treaty. 
Article XIII 
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not 
assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its 
provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to 
third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this 
regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including 
obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this 
Treaty, between a Party and a third State. 
Article XIV 
1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to 
ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty 
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a 
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If 
either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider 
the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of 
no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the 
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. 
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the 
other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the 
notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall 
terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned 
notice, unless the notice specifies a later date. 
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4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions 
of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date. 
Article XV 
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter 
into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. 
2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this Treaty that do not 
affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the 
procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article XVI 
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Done at Prague, this eighth day of April, 2010, in two originals, each in English and 
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
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